








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Vroegrijk, M. J. J. (2012). "Smart shopping": Implications of hard-discounters and multiple-store patronage.
CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







Implications of Hard-Discounters 










Implications of Hard-Discounters 








ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University op gezag van 
rector magnificus, prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten 
overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de 
aula van de Universiteit op woensdag 26 september 2012 om 10.15 uur door 
 
Mark Jacobus Johannes Vroegrijk 
 
geboren op 3 maart 1984 te Roosendaal. 
  
Promotores: Prof. dr. Els Gijsbrechts 





Prof. dr. Katia Campo, Professor of Marketing and Dean of the Subfaculty, Lessius‟ 
Subfaculty of Business Studies, Integrated Faculty of Business and Economics, Catholic 
University Leuven, Belgium. 
 
Dr. Kathleen Cleeren, Assistant Professor of Marketing, Department of Marketing and 
Supply Chain Management, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, The 
Netherlands. 
 
Prof. dr. Marnik Dekimpe, Research Professor of Marketing Models and CentER Fellow, 
Department of Marketing, Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg 
University, the Netherlands, and Professor of Marketing, Department of Marketing and 
Organisation Studies, Faculty of Business and Economics, Catholic University of Leuven, 
Belgium. 
 
Prof. dr. Inge Geyskens, Professor of Marketing and CentER Fellow, Department of 
Marketing, Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University, the 
Netherlands. 
 
Prof. dr. Els Gijsbrechts, Professor of Quantitative Marketing and CentER Fellow, 
Department of Marketing, Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg 
University, the Netherlands. 
 
Prof. dr. Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, Professor of Marketing, Department of Marketing, 







































The research in this dissertation was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation 




“…en dagge bedaankt zijt da witte.” 
“Hey Mark, before you leave…”. Back in 2006, my life as a researcher began with those 
words. After defending my master‟s thesis, I was about to walk out of the door (and start 
hunting for a job) when my supervisor, Els, stopped me just in time to suggest I should apply 
for a Ph.D. position. I‟m still very grateful that she did. Not only did it allow me to further 
pursue my interest in doing research, it also has led to the dissertation that now lies before 
you. I want to use this space to thank all of the people who contributed along the way. 
First, I am indebted to my advisors, Els Gijsbrechts and Katia Campo. Els, your expertise and 
passion for academic research were very inspiring, and your involvement and interest in my 
work pushed my research to a higher level. Thank you for your believing in my abilities, for 
turning disappointments into encouragements, and for always being open to the questions and 
problems I faced! Katia, your ideas and attention to detail always offered me a unique 
perspective on my work, and helped me to become a better researcher. Also, I am grateful for 
all the support you gave me throughout the writing process, especially during its final phases. 
Els and Katia, you were fantastic supervisors, and I look forward to our future cooperation! 
In addition, I am honored that Kathleen Cleeren, Marnik Dekimpe, Inge Geyskens and Peter 
Popkowski Leszczyc were all willing to join my doctoral committee. Your excellent 
suggestions and comments have greatly improved my dissertation, and are truly appreciated. 
I also would like to mention my former colleagues at Tilburg University; they made the four 
years I spent at the marketing department unforgettable. Special thanks go out to my fellow 
Ph.D. students: Anne, for the nice talks we had (on both Dutch and Belgian ground); Arjen, 
for sharing great ideas, along with many fun stories; Carlos and Femke, for all their advice, 
and for making me take up running; Didi, for always being interested and helpful, and for 
being at the office in the evening hours as well; Jaione and Millie, for their enthusiasm, and 
 
ii 
for bringing in some of the funniest presents at our annual “Sinterklaas” events; and Johanna, 
for her dedication in organizing many of the Ph.D. drinks and dinners. I also would like to 
thank my two former officemates. Benjamin, even though we only shared the office for a few 
months, I really enjoyed your company. And last but not least, Néomie, thank you for your 
great sense of humor, for your positive view on life, for sharing my distaste of Milow – and 
for being a really great friend overall! I am happy to have you as my paranymph. I should also 
not forget to mention Hans, who shares my passion for music; Henk, who let me stay around 
just a little longer; and Anke, Cedric, Ellen, Ernst, Heidi, Jan, Marit, Petra, Robert, Rutger and 
Scarlett, with whom I had some great academic and non-academic conversations. Finally, I 
would like to thank Bart, Bernadette, Iris, Peter and Suzan for helping me out with my data 
and teaching tasks, and my new colleagues at Lessius for making me feel very welcome there. 
Of course, I could not have written this dissertation without the support of my friends, family 
and family-in-law. Pap en mam, bedankt dat jullie me onvoorwaardelijk steunen, en altijd 
voor me klaarstaan. Jullie hebben me een fantastisch thuis gegeven. Mijn twee broers: 
Martijn, bedankt voor al je hulp en interesse, je bent een topkerel. Marcel, de manier waarop 
jij altijd je eigen weg volgt maakt mij een trotse broer, die stiekem nog veel van je kan leren. 
Laurence-Vincent, bedankt voor alweer zestien jaar hechte vriendschap! Ik ben dan ook erg 
blij dat je mijn paranimf wilde zijn. Bas, bedankt voor je enorme betrokkenheid, en voor alle 
feesten en festivals die we de voorbije jaren hebben meegepikt. Charalampos, thank you for 
all the nice conversations we had over coffee, dinner or beers! Alwine, Chloé, Gerard, Paul en 
Tom, bedankt voor alle gezellige avonden (met of zonder champagne), etentjes en vakanties! 
Mijn laatste regels wijd ik aan de persoon die mij gedurende de afgelopen twee jaar altijd 
heeft bijgestaan. Martine, ik kan met niemand zo lachen als met jou. Telkens wanneer ik het 
zwaar inzag heb je me gerustgesteld, en wist je me elke keer opnieuw weer aan te moedigen. 





Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1   The Hard-Discounter Format ......................................................................................... 3 
1.2   Multiple-Store Shopping ................................................................................................ 7 
1.3   Dissertation Outline ...................................................................................................... 10 
 
Chapter 2 Close Encounter with the Hard-Discounter: A Multiple-Store Shopping 
Perspective on the Impact of Local Hard-Discounter Entry ........................ 13 
2.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 13 
2.2   Theoretical Background ............................................................................................... 15 
2.3   Methodology ................................................................................................................ 22 
2.4   Data and Operationalizations ....................................................................................... 27 
2.5   Results .......................................................................................................................... 36 
2.6   Implications .................................................................................................................. 43 
2.7   Discussion .................................................................................................................... 52 
2.8   Limitations and Future Research .................................................................................. 54 
 
Chapter 3 Battling for the Household’s Category Buck: Can Economy Private Labels 
Help Defend Against the Hard-Discounter Threat? ...................................... 57 
3.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 57 
3.2   Theoretical Background ............................................................................................... 60 
3.3   Methodology ................................................................................................................ 63 
3.4   Data and Operationalizations ....................................................................................... 66 
3.5   Results .......................................................................................................................... 74 
3.6   Discussion .................................................................................................................... 86 
3.7   Limitations and Future Research .................................................................................. 90 
 
Chapter 4 Save or (Over-)Spend? How Shopping Pattern Choice Affects Consumer 
Grocery Spending ............................................................................................. 93 
4.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 93 
4.2   Theoretical Background ............................................................................................... 96 
4.3   Methodology .............................................................................................................. 105 
4.4   Data and Operationalizations ..................................................................................... 110 
 
iv 
4.5   Results ........................................................................................................................ 113 
4.6   Discussion .................................................................................................................. 118 
4.7   Limitations and Future Research ................................................................................ 121 
 
Chapter 5 Conclusion........................................................................................................ 125 
5.1   Summary of Findings ................................................................................................. 126 
5.2   Implications and Recommendations .......................................................................... 129 
5.3   Limitations and Future Research ................................................................................ 135 
 
References ............................................................................................................................. 143 
 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 157 
Appendix 1   Shopping Pattern Choice and Spending Share Model .................................. 157 
Appendix 2   Estimation of Category-Specific Price and Assortment Sensitivities .......... 162 
Appendix 3   Marginal Effects and Elasticities .................................................................. 165 
Appendix 4   Survey Items for the Measurement of Category Factors .............................. 172 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
 The recent economic downturn has made today‟s grocery shoppers more price-
conscious – and increasingly focused on keeping their expenditures in check (AdNews 2011; 
Nielsen 2011; Verdict Research 2009). Accordingly, consumers have altered their shopping 
behavior as well, aligning it to this enhanced emphasis on savings. Two interesting examples 
of such “smart shopping” behavior are the increased popularity of the so-called “hard-
discounter” store format, as well as a rise in systematic multiple-store patronage (EFMI and 
CBL 2010; Gijsbrechts, Campo and Nisol 2008; Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). While these 
two developments both play an important role in shaping consumers‟ grocery shopping 
behavior (often even going hand in hand), they have remained relatively unexplored in the 
academic literature so far. This dissertation aims to bridge this gap, and specifically 
investigates the hard-discounter and multiple-store shopping phenomena in terms of (i) their 
interrelationship, (ii) their implications for consumers‟ purchase and/or spending behavior, 
and (iii) their impact on “traditional” retailers‟ market performance (and how it could be 
responded to). A short overview of both phenomena is provided in the paragraphs below.  
 The hard-discounter format originated in Germany, pioneered by Aldi and at a later 
stage successfully adopted by other chains like Lidl. Its business model strongly focuses on 
cutting costs, which is realized through a limited assortment (between 1000 – 1500 SKUs on 
average) that primarily comprises private label products (about 90%), and makes for efficient 
operations. In addition, hard-discounter outlets are basic and functional in terms of layout, and 
staffing levels are kept to a minimum (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). Together, this allows 
hard-discounters to offer extremely low prices – lying between 40 to 60% below those of 
national brands sold at more traditional chains (Nielsen 2007; Nauwelaers, Renders and 
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Vandenbroucke 2012). This large price advantage, together with the fact that the format has 
become more socially accepted and geographically accessible to consumers (Costa et al. 
2006; Steenkamp and Kumar 2009) has made hard-discounters one of the most important 
players in the grocery business. Despite this importance, however, the format has remained 
largely understudied, with prior research mainly focusing on another and vastly different type 
of discounter: the “large-discounter” (i.c. Wal-Mart, Ailawadi et al. 2010; Gielens et al. 2008; 
Singh, Hansen and Blattberg 2006). Studies that do consider hard-discounters, have primarily 
aimed to uncover the key success factors behind the format (e.g. Colla 2003; Gerhard and 
Hahn 2005). To our knowledge, a paper by Cleeren et al. (2010) is the only study that 
assesses the competitive impact of hard-discounters on traditional retailers‟ performance. 
While the aforementioned study provides interesting insights regarding the magnitude of this 
impact, it does not explicitly address what the underlying antecedents are – nor does it reflect 
on how traditional retailers may mitigate this impact. This dissertation will therefore aim to 
cover these topics. 
 As stated above, the second development of interest for this dissertation is the rise of 
(systematic) multiple-store patronage. Instead of buying all groceries at a single store, 
consumers may visit two or more grocery stores on a regular basis – and allocate their 
purchases between them (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). This form of shopping behavior has 
become increasingly common over the years, and has now been adopted by a majority of 
grocery shoppers (EFMI and CBL 2010; Fox 2005; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Previous studies 
have identified various drivers of multiple-store shopping behavior, including variation in 
stores‟ (product) offer, trip type-dependent store preferences, and – in line with the starting 
point of this dissertation – the savings potential that arises from price differences between 
stores (Cude and Morganosky 2001; Fox and Hoch 2005; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008; Krider and 
Weinberg 2000). While the antecedents of multiple-store shopping have thus received quite 
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some attention in the current marketing literature, much less is known about the consequences 
of this behavior – both from the retailer‟s and the consumer‟s perspective. For one, little is 
known about how multiple-store shopping affects retailers‟ vulnerability to other market 
players and/or entrants. For another, it remains unclear how this alternative way of shopping 
affects in-store decision making, i.e. what and how much consumers actually choose to buy in 
the stores. However, given that multiple-store patronage has become the rule rather than the 
exception among grocery shoppers, such insights are increasingly relevant. The current 
dissertation will therefore aim to shed more light on these issues as well. 
 In the next two paragraphs of this chapter (§1.1 and §1.2), a more extensive overview 
will be given on the subjects of hard-discounters and multiple-store shopping. A review of 
related studies is provided, along with an indication of the most salient gaps that still exist in 
the literature. Accordingly, the focal research topics of the dissertation will be covered, along 
with a discussion on how they contribute to bridging the aforementioned literature gaps. §1.3 
then provides an outline of the remaining chapters in the dissertation. 
 
1.1   The Hard-Discounter Format 
Hard-discounters have become an increasingly common sight in today‟s retailing 
landscape. While the format originated in Germany, the two main hard-discounter chains Aldi 
and Lidl are nowadays both ranked among the top 25 retailers worldwide, and can be found in 
over twenty European countries (Nielsen 2007; Retail Forward 2004). Their expansion has 
proceeded at an especially rapid pace during the last two decades, as is evident from the 
number of European discounter outlets nearly doubling between 1991 and 2005 (Costa et al. 
2006). Moreover, the format is steadily making its way to Eastern Europe, Australia, Canada 
and the US as well (Retail Forward 2004). As a result of this growing presence, hard-
discounters have become more and more accessible to consumers – a Dutch survey, for 
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example, indicating that the vast majority (80%) of consumers has a hard-discounter outlet 
available in their near vicinity (EFMI and CBL 2010). 
Along with this improvement in accessibility, goes an increased acceptance of the 
format among shoppers. Due to accumulated consumer experience over the years, hard-
discounters have gained considerable trust, and no longer solely target the poor (Costa et al. 
2006; Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). This, along with their price leadership over their 
competitors (as is recognized by a majority of consumers; OIVO 2010) has made the hard-
discounter format a considerable force within grocery retailing. This is illustrated by the 
percentage of shoppers that buy products at a hard-discounter, which amounts to 70% in 
countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, and even over 80% in Germany (EFMI and CBL 
2010; Nielsen 2007; OIVO 2010). Accordingly, the format is found to capture up to 30-40% 
of grocery sales in some countries (Cleeren et al. 2010; Hansen and Kliger 2004). 
 Prior research on the hard-discounter format is mostly descriptive in nature, and has 
primarily aimed to identify the key drivers of its success (e.g. Colla 2003; Gerhard and Hahn 
2005). Next to the factors discussed above, these studies conclude that the main strength of 
hard-discounters does not solely lie in their rock-bottom prices, but also in the fact that these 
low prices go hand in hand with excellent product quality. Hard-discounters often contract 
renowned national brand manufacturers to produce their private labels, and are not afraid to 
remove items from their assortments when quality is not up to par (Gerhard & Hahn 2005). 
Moreover, by offering an additional and weekly-changing selection of special items, hard-
discounters are able to repeatedly attract steady flows of traffic to the store. 
While these studies are certainly valuable in explaining the strong position of hard-
discounters in general, they do not yet provide a clear insight into how hard-discounters affect 
the market performance of competing (traditional) retailers in particular. Only recently, this 
topic has slowly started to receive attention from academics, with a study by Cleeren et al. 
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(2010) analyzing how the advent of hard-discounters affects the profitability of traditional 
retailers. Interestingly, the study concludes that while the local market entry of a hard-
discounter has an immediate negative impact on incumbent retailers‟ market shares, their 
profitability only starts to deteriorate when more hard-discounters enter the market. 
Current literature gaps 
 The findings by Cleeren et al. (2010) show that the extent to which a hard-discounter 
affects the performance of traditional retailers, depends on the configuration of the trading 
zone in which these stores operate. However, other factors may be at play as well. First, some 
traditional retailers may be more vulnerable to hard-discounters than others. Indeed, some 
industry sources suggest that it is especially the value-oriented retailer (as compared to 
“upscale”, full-service retailers) who will experience difficulty in withstanding the hard-
discounter threat (Fem Business 2006; Foodmagazine 2009). However, such claims are yet to 
be empirically verified. Second, a retailer‟s geographical location vis-à-vis the hard-
discounter seems to matter as well. Business press has, however, not yet reached a consensus 
on whether retailers should prefer a location close to, or further away from the hard-
discounter (Foodmagazine 2009; Levensmiddelenkrant 2010) – and again, no empirical 
support is available to resolve this issue. 
In all, the impact of hard-discounters on traditional retailers, and its possible 
antecedents, is not yet fully understood. This limited knowledge on the (drivers of the) impact 
of hard-discounters on traditional supermarkets, makes it more difficult to theorize on 
effective response strategies as well. Currently, traditional retailers often respond to hard-
discounters in the area where they are at the most obvious disadvantage: price. While the 
consequences of some of these strategies (e.g. large-scale price cuts; Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts 
and Pauwels 2008) have been assessed by prior studies, the effectiveness of others, such as 
the proliferation of a budget private label line or the launch of an own discount subsidiary 
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(Ailawadi, Pauwels and Steenkamp 2008; Cleeren et al. 2010) has remained largely 
unexplored. The viability of alternative, non-price-based response strategies is yet to be 
determined as well. 
Contribution of this dissertation 
 This dissertation aims to bridge some of the gaps discussed above. First, we provide a 
new perspective on the impact of hard-discounters, by viewing it from a multiple-store 
shopping perspective. Even though many consumers shop at a hard-discounter, the format is 
seldom visited in isolation – and even rarely constitutes a consumer‟s primary store (e.g. only 
for 26% of Dutch hard-discounter shoppers; EFMI and CBL 2010). Given this premise, we 
offer a richer view on how hard-discounters impact traditional retailers, by studying how 
these formats compete for customers – and more importantly in this context – for their share-
of-wallet. 
Second, our focus on multiple-store shopping uncovers several antecedents of the 
impact of hard-discounters. For example, a retailer‟s vulnerability to hard-discounters may 
depend on the extent to which the retailer possesses distinct strengths of its own – and as such 
can “complement” a hard-discounter (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Moreover, as a retailer‟s 
geographical location determines the relative ease of being visited alongside the hard-
discounter, this may drive the latter‟s impact as well – an issue that we will empirically 
explore and support in this dissertation. In addition, we will deduct different response 
strategies from these antecedents, along with a test of their viability. 
 Third, this dissertation will assess the effectiveness of an increasingly-used response 
strategy vis-à-vis hard-discounters: the proliferation of an economy private label. While 
traditional retailers can opt for other (price-based) response strategies as well (such as the 
launch of an own discount subsidiary), economy private labels are relatively easy to 
implement and align perfectly with the increasing popularity of “multi-tiered” private label 
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strategies (Geyskens, Gielens and Gijsbrechts 2010). However, as of yet, it remains unclear 
whether these economy private labels are truly effective in defending against the hard-
discounter threat. This question is especially relevant given that some studies (e.g. Hansen 
and Singh 2008) suggest that they may actually yield the opposite effect – that is, make 
consumers more (instead of less) prone to switch to a lower-priced competitor. This 
dissertation will, therefore, empirically assess whether economy private labels can be an 
appropriate defense tool vis-à-vis hard-discounters – and if so, under what circumstances. 
 
1.2   Multiple-Store Shopping 
 Today‟s consumers have a wide range of different (product) needs to fulfill (e.g. for 
groceries, clothing, electronics, personal entertainment, et cetera) and, to satisfy these needs, 
they have to patronize different stores. The question on how consumers organize their visits to 
these stores, frequented for different purposes, has already been covered by several academics 
(e.g. Dellaert et al. 1998; Popkowski Leszczyc and Timmermans 2001).  
However, consumers do not just visit multiple stores because they serve different 
purposes. A current trend is that even for groceries alone, consumers often visit more than one 
store – and (systematically) allocate their purchases between them. Such “single-purpose, 
multiple-store shopping” behavior is nowadays adopted by a majority of grocery shoppers, 
with reported figures ranging from 60 to over 80% of consumers (EFMI and CBL 2010; Fox 
2005; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008; Stassen, Mittelstaedt and Mittelstaedt 1999). This rise in 
multiple-store patronage is fuelled by several recent developments. First, the retailing 
landscape has become increasingly diverse; grocery stores can now operate under a multitude 
of vastly different formats, making their (product) offers more unique and less 
interchangeable (Morganosky 1997). Second, for many trading areas, the number of available 
grocery outlets has greatly expanded over the years – allowing consumers easy access to 
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multiple grocery chains. This is illustrated by a recent Dutch survey, which indicates that on 
average, consumers have more than four different grocery chains located in their near vicinity 
(EFMI and CBL 2010). Finally, consumers have become more mobile themselves, making it 
easier for them to visit more than one store on a frequent basis – even if the stores are 
somewhat remotely located. 
 Still, the prevalence of multiple-store (grocery) shopping cannot be ascribed to 
changing market circumstances alone. To begin with, consumers may prefer different stores 
for different categories (e.g. because the stores vary in their positioning and/or the availability 
of specific items), and therefore choose not to limit themselves to just one store (Cude and 
Morganosky 2001; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). In addition, since shopping objectives can differ 
on a trip-by-trip basis, consumers may visit a set of stores that can jointly satisfy these 
objectives (e.g. a store close by may be preferred for quick “fill-in” trips, while a more 
distant, but better-stocked (or lower-priced) store is chosen on more extensive “major” trips) 
(Krider and Weinberg 2000; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Perhaps the most common reason for 
multiple-store shopping, however, is that the patronage of more than one store allows 
consumers to capitalize on the price differences between these stores – and thus helps them to 
save money as a result (Fox and Hoch 2005; Mägi and Julander 2005). 
Current literature gaps 
While the current marketing literature provides valuable insights into the underlying 
drivers of (multiple-store) shopping patterns, much less is known about how and when 
consumers switch between these different patterns, and about the implications of such 
behavior. First, from a competitive point of view, Gijsbrechts et al. (2008) indicate that – 
depending on whether single- or multiple-store shopping prevails – grocery stores either 
primarily compete for customers, or for their share-of-wallet, respectively. However, given 
that some stores (such as hard-discounters; EFMI and CBL 2010) are intrinsically more prone 
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to be part of a multiple-store shopping pattern than others, it has remained unclear what this 
notion implies for the actual degree of competition between (different types of) grocery stores 
– and the underlying drivers of these relationships.   
Second, from the consumer‟s perspective, the current literature primarily sheds light 
on how multiple-store shopping affects consumers‟ store choice decisions (e.g. Gijsbrechts et 
al. 2008; Krider and Weinberg 2000). Yet, much less is known about the impact on spending 
behavior, i.e. whether consumers still spend similar amounts of money when they engage in 
(different forms of) multiple-store shopping. Given that multiple-store shopping constitutes an 
entirely different way of grocery shopping (compared to the single-store “standard”), but is at 
least as popular, this issue has become increasingly relevant to address. 
Contribution of this dissertation 
 Again, this dissertation aims to cover the topics discussed above. First, we study 
consumers‟ shopping patterns (including single-store and (different types of) multiple-store 
shopping) within a dynamic context; that is, both before and after the local entry of a hard-
discounter. By tracking consumers‟ shopping patterns over time, we shed light on how such a 
major event affects how consumers switch between different patterns – and more specifically, 
their tendency to engage in multiple-store shopping behavior.  
Second, through our comparison of consumers‟ shopping patterns before and after 
local hard-discounter entry, we provide insights into the nature of competition between hard-
discounters and traditional supermarket chains. Specifically, our analysis allows us to assess 
the vulnerability of (differently positioned) market players to the hard-discounter format, both 
in terms of their clientele and their share-of-wallet. Moreover, by relating these losses to chain 
characteristics – and, given the role of multiple-store shopping, the interactions between them 
– we are able to identify important drivers of these competitive relationships. 
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 Finally, this dissertation will provide a clearer view on consumer grocery spending 
and how this varies across different shopping patterns. By tracking consumers‟ shopping 
patterns alongside their specific purchase behavior, we can assess consumers‟ expenditures 
across the different shopping patterns in which they engage, and more specifically: whether 
multiple-store shopping and/or the patronage of hard-discounters systematically affect how 
much consumers spend on their groceries. Such particular insights are especially interesting 
given that savings are a common reason to engage in such forms of shopping behavior (Costa 
et al. 2006; Mägi and Julander 2005; Stassen, Mittelstaedt and Mittelstaedt 1999) – but they 
also add to current knowledge on the relationship between shopping patterns and subsequent 
decision making (e.g. Kahn and Schmittlein 1989). 
 
1.3   Dissertation Outline 
 In addition to the current (introductory) chapter, this dissertation comprises three 
research-based chapters. In these chapters, we investigate the hard-discounter and/or multiple-
store shopping phenomena, both in terms of their interrelationship, as well as their 
implications for (traditional) retailers and consumers. Table 1.1 summarizes the contents of 
these three chapters, showing that chapter 2 provides a “broader” view on both hard-
discounters and multiple-store shopping, while chapters 3 and 4 zoom in on specific sub-
topics. Each of the chapters is described in more detail in the paragraphs below. 
 Chapter 2 (“Close Encounter with the Hard-Discounter: A Multiple-Store Shopping 
Perspective on the Impact of Local Hard-Discounter Entry”) studies how the local entry of a 
hard-discounter outlet affects consumers‟ shopping behavior and, consequently, the market 
performance of incumbent chains. For this purpose, we model households‟ period-by-period 
choice of (grocery) shopping patterns, and thereby explicitly account for the advent of 
multiple-store shopping – a form of grocery shopping that often goes hand in hand with hard-
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discounter patronage (EFMI and CBL 2010). We underline this (important) role of multiple-
store shopping in our conceptual framework, and use it to theorize on the vulnerability of 
“traditional” retailers to the hard-discounter format, as well as its main underlying drivers. By 
employing a dataset that covers nearly 200 local hard-discounter entries (and the purchase 
behavior of more than 700 households), we are not only able to empirically assess these 
claims, but also to identify and test different response strategies to hard-discounter entry – 
ranging from “heads-on” price competition to more cooperative approaches. 
TABLE 1.1 
Overview of Research-Based Chapters 










competition Purchase behavior 
Ch. 2 √ √ √ √ √ Store patronage Share-of-wallet 
Ch. 3 √  √  √  Category volume 
Ch. 4 √ √     Overall spending 
 
 Chapter 3 (“Battling for the Household‟s Category Buck: Can Economy Private 
Labels Help Defend Against the Hard-Discounter Threat?”) zooms in on the effectiveness of 
an increasingly-used defense to hard-discounters: the introduction of an “economy” private 
label. While this cheaper variant of “standard” private labels allows traditional retailers to 
match or even beat the prices offered at hard-discounters, extant research suggests that it also 
makes customers more price-conscious – and therefore more (rather than less) susceptible to 
the hard-discounter format (Corstjens and Lal 2000; Hansen and Singh 2008). To gain a better 
insight into this matter, we adopt a difference-in-difference modeling approach that helps us 
quantify retailers‟ (category) losses from hard-discounter entry, and relate the size of these 
losses to the absence or presence of an economy private label. Moreover, we provide 
guidelines on the specific product categories in which retailers are most vulnerable to hard-
discounters, and/or where economy private labels are an appropriate defense. We do so by 
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using data on 48 product categories (in which a major Dutch retailer introduced an economy 
private label), 45 hard-discounter entries, and the grocery purchase behavior of nearly 400 
households. 
 Chapter 4 (“Save or (Over-)Spend? How Shopping Pattern Choice Affects Consumer 
Grocery Spending”) focuses on the spending implications of different types of (grocery) 
shopping patterns (including multiple-store shopping and/or the patronage of hard-
discounters). Its main point-of-departure lies in a commonly used motive for such shopping 
patterns: consumers‟ desire to cut back on their grocery expenses. Building on insights from 
the consumer behavior literature (e.g. MacInnis and Jaworski 1989), we propose that 
shopping patterns not only vary in the savings opportunities that they provide, but also affect 
consumers‟ ability and motivation to save in different ways. This raises the question of how 
much consumers actually spend across different shopping patterns – and specifically, whether 
actual expenditures under multiple-store shopping and/or hard-discounter patronage are 
consistent with consumers‟ saving goals. We empirically address this issue by analyzing 
households‟ grocery expenditures across the different shopping patterns they engage in, while 
controlling for both situational and household-specific factors. Our data covers the shopping 
and spending behavior of more than 1300 households (across 300+ categories), and yields 
insights into how consumer spending is shaped by (i) whether one or multiple stores are 
visited, (ii) the store format(s) chosen, and (iii) the way in which shopping trips are organized. 
 In the concluding chapter, the main research findings are summarized, and their most 
important implications – both for consumers and (different types of) retailers – are reflected 
on. Moreover, we also discuss the limitations of our analyses, and suggest potential directions 
for further research in the area of hard-discounters and multiple-store shopping.
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Chapter 2 Close Encounter with the Hard-Discounter: 
A Multiple-Store Shopping Perspective on 
the Impact of Local Hard-Discounter Entry  
 
2.1   Introduction 
Over the past decade, one of the most striking developments in grocery retailing is the 
rise of the so-called hard-discounter format (HD hereafter). Several factors have allowed 
these no-frills price fighters to secure a considerable market share in many Western countries. 
First, the number of HD outlets has expanded rapidly over the years: exemplar chains Aldi 
and Lidl currently operate more than 18,000 outlets worldwide, while an additional 6,000 are 
projected to be opened by 2014 (Planet Retail 2010). Second, consumers have become 
increasingly receptive to the format, leading to its acceptance in low- and high-income 
segments alike (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). Originally seen as a European phenomenon, 
HDs are now quickly making their way to US markets (Cleeren et al. 2010). While their share 
is still modest compared to mainstream US retailers, their growth figures are astounding (e.g. 
21% in 2008 and 13.7% in 2009 for Aldi). As such, “… [this] new class of European 
Discounters have US retailers squarely in their sights” (Steenkamp and Kumar, 2009, p. 2), 
forcing traditional retailers to “pick up the gauntlet” (Planet Retail, 2010). 
 Yet, despite these pressing messages, there is a dearth of academic research on the HD 
format (see Cleeren et al. 2010 for an exception). Insights into how traditional chains are 
affected by HD entry, what drives these effects, and how they should be responded to, are yet 
to be developed. Available studies do investigate the impact of “large-discounter” entry (in 
particular: Wal-Mart), revealing that when a large-discounter enters a local market, traditional 
incumbents are severely hurt and incur sales losses of about 17% on average (Ailawadi et al. 
2010, Gielens et al. 2008, Singh et al. 2006, Zhu, Singh and Dukes 2011). These losses 
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primarily stem from defection of incumbents‟ best customers, and are most pronounced for 
incumbents close to the newly opened Wal-Mart store, either geographically or in terms of 
assortment composition (Ailawadi et al. 2010, Gielens et al. 2008, Singh et al. 2006). In 
response to such large-discounter entry, traditional supermarkets are advised to reduce 
assortment overlap, or to establish more competitive (Hi-Lo) prices (Ailawadi et al. 2010, 
Gielens et al. 2008). 
Large-discounters strongly differ from hard-discounters, however. By capitalizing on 
their purchasing power and scale economies (Singh et al. 2006), large-discounters can keep 
prices low while simultaneously offering an extensive choice of (well-known) products. In 
contrast, savings at HDs come at the cost of lean, private-label dominated assortments 
(Steenkamp and Kumar 2009) that enable extremely efficient operations and even lower 
prices. This vastly different business model is likely to trigger different shopper responses, 
and call for different incumbent reactions. While large-discounters, with their broad and deep 
assortments, pose a full-fledged alternative to traditional supermarkets, the limited-range HDs 
are less likely to fully replace these supermarkets as the format-of-choice. Rather, consumers 
may choose to simultaneously “trade down” in some categories and “trade up” in others by 
visiting both formats in tandem (Costa et al. 2006). This makes hard-discounters complements 
to traditional supermarkets – rather than strict substitutes. 
 Such complementarity may entail a dual effect on (traditional) incumbents‟ clientele. 
On the one hand, it may increase the appeal of “multiple-store shopping” (MSS hereafter), 
and induce incumbents‟ loyal customers (single-store shoppers) to shift part of their purchases 
to the HD entrant. While these customers would not be entirely lost, their spending would be 
substantially reduced. On the other hand, customers who already visited the focal incumbent 
alongside another traditional chain, may now trade one of these chains for the new (more 
complementary) HD store. This, then, gives rise to two possible scenarios. If the focal 
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incumbent is replaced, the customer and his spending are entirely lost. If, however, the focal 
incumbent remains in the store set alongside the HD, the customer and part of his spending is 
retained. Depending on which scenario prevails, the incumbent‟s losses after HD entry may 
thus be entirely different. Hence, more insights are needed into (i) how consumers' (multiple-
store) shopping behavior changes when a HD enters the local market, (ii) what drives these 
behavior shifts and (iii) how this shapes proper response strategies for incumbent chains.  
To provide these insights, we build on earlier work on multiple-store shopping 
(Popkowski Leszczyc, Sinha and Sahgal 2004, Gijsbrechts et al. 2008), and develop a 
conceptual framework in which consumers' patronage and spending allocation decisions 
depend not only on local outlet characteristics, but also on interactions between them. This 
enables a richer view on the competition between traditional and HD grocery chains: instead 
of regarding them as strict substitutes, we allow for complementary effects that may lead to 
their joint patronage. We then empirically test this framework using a unique data set of 
actual shopping behavior before and after a HD enters a local market. 
 The text is organized as follows. We first discuss the relevant literature and develop 
our conceptual framework. Next, we present the model, and describe the data and setting. We 
then report the estimation results and discuss their implications. The final section summarizes 
the main conclusions, and provides limitations and recommendations for further research.  
 
2.2   Theoretical Background 
Related literature 
Our work builds upon two streams of literature. The first stream bears on the advent of 
discounters in grocery retailing. Within this area, most scholars study how entry of a large-
discounter such as Wal-Mart affects the performance of traditional supermarket chains, and 
generally find considerable post-entry sales drops (of up to 27%; Ailawadi et al. 2010, Singh 
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et al. 2006). These losses are accounted for by a small fraction of customers (10% of the 
households accounting for 64 % of the observed losses) – implying that incumbents lose some 
of their best customers (Singh et al. 2006, p 459). Incumbents that exhibit large assortment 
overlap with the large-discounter entrant (i.e. offer the same product categories) and/or are 
located close to the large-discounter, suffer most (Ailawadi et al. 2010, Gielens et al. 2008). 
The second literature stream is that on grocery shopping behavior, with particular emphasis 
on multiple-store shopping, i.e. the systematic joint patronage of two or more stores to take 
advantage of the complementarities between them (Dellaert et al. 1998, Krider and Weinberg 
2000, Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). While such behavior is less relevant for large-discounter entry, 
it may play an important role in assessing HD entry effects. Building on these two streams of 
literature, we present our conceptual framework below.  
Conceptual framework 
Grocery shopping patterns in the presence of multiple stores. Bringing together insights from 
earlier work by Bell, Ho and Tang (1998), Rhee and Bell (2002) and Gijsbrechts et al. (2008), 
Figure 2.1 offers a stylized representation of what drives consumers' grocery shopping 
patterns. The top part reflects the traditional view, in which consumers select the single store 
that maximizes their overall (fixed plus variable) shopping utility (Bell et al. 1998). 
Specifically, they choose the store with the lowest travel cost, unless the intrinsic appeal (in-
store utility, stemming, e.g., from high service or enjoyable shopping ambience) or variable 
benefits and costs (basket utility, determined by the quality and price of the assortment) of a 
more remote store more than compensate for the larger distance (Berman and Evans 2010; 
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 The bottom part of the figure adds a second possible decision path: that of multiple- 
store shopping. The underlying premise is that store choice decisions are not incidental and 
made on a visit-by-visit basis but, rather, are part of a more stable shopping pattern that 
maximizes consumer utility over a longer period (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008, Krider and 
Weinberg 2000). While single-store shopping can still be selected as the optimal pattern-of-
choice, consumers can also decide to visit more than one store. This allows consumers to take 
advantage of store complementarities (i.e. different stores offering superior variable shopping 
utility in different categories; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). By spreading their purchases across 
different stores, consumers can increase their overall basket utility – which may justify having 
to compromise on shopping convenience (e.g. because of larger travel costs). While multiple 
stores can be visited on separate occasions, consumers may also choose to visit them together 
on the same shopping trip. “Separate-trip” patterns generally require less time per shopping 
trip, and allow for a frequent replenishment of inventories (e.g. for perishable products) 
(Gijsbrechts et al. 2008; Krider and Weinberg 2000). In contrast, “combined-trip” patterns 
primarily help to reduce consumers‟ travel costs (especially when the stores are located 
closely together; Dellaert et al. 1998), and allow consumers to exploit inter-store 
complementarities to the fullest (as they can buy every category in the store with the most 
attractive offer) (Dellaert et al. 1998; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). 
Taken together, Figure 2.1 shows two ways in which stores can become part of a 
consumer‟s shopping pattern: either as the “single-best” option in which all of the grocery 
budget is spent, or as part of an appealing “store set” – that is either visited on separate or 
combined trips. When one store provides an overall advantage over all other stores, the store 
is more likely to become the single store-of-choice. When stores can only provide a partial 
variable utility advantage, for a subset of categories, they are more likely to be selected as part 
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of a set of stores, especially when complementarity with other stores is high and extra travel 
costs low. These insights are particularly important to gauge the effects of HD entry. 
Impact of hard-discounter entry. As indicated above, HDs constitute a new format, entirely 
different from the traditional retail business model, but also from large-discounters such as 
Wal-Mart. HD stores are small outlets (approximately 600 m2 in floor space), often located 
right next to (in “twin-location” with) traditional supermarket outlets (Foodmagazine 2009). 
They are characterized by lean assortments (holding about 1,000 to 1,500 SKUs, compared to 
100,000 at Wal-Mart), and especially for fresh product categories such as meat and 
vegetables, the number of available product types is generally limited at best. In addition, a 
major share of these assortments is taken up by private labels (over 90% at Aldi, compared to 
only 38% at Wal-Mart) (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). Together with a functional, no-frills 
store design and limited service, this allows HDs to keep costs down and charge even lower 
prices than large-discounters (up to 20% below Wal-Mart‟s, Wall Street Journal 2009).  
With their lean and private label-dominated assortments, HDs do not provide a full-
fledged substitute for traditional supermarkets, and are not likely to fully replace these 
supermarkets as the consumer‟s single store-of-choice. At the same time, however, the HD 
entrant is likely to be selected as part of a MSS pattern – as indicated by the shaded boxes in 
Figure 2.1. For one, the nature of the HD format makes MSS more rewarding in terms of 
basket utility. Given the limited number of SKUs per category and the absence of leading 
national brands, HDs cannot beat traditional supermarkets in categories where choice variety 
and brand equity play an important role (Briesch et al. 2009). Yet, they do have a competitive 
advantage in a subset of categories where price sensitivity is high: their strong price focus and 
back-to-basics assortment providing consumers with an easy, best price choice in those 
categories. Hence, HDs provide a highly complementary store offer. By purchasing at a HD 
as well as a traditional supermarket, consumers can combine large cost savings in price-
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sensitive categories with high-quality purchases in others (“trading up and down”), thereby 
enhancing their overall basket utility (Costa et al. 2006, Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). In addition, 
to the extent that HDs are located nearby traditional outlets, they make MSS – and especially 
combined-trip shopping – less costly in terms of extra travel time. This leads to interesting 
premises on the nature of incumbent losses from HD entry, and their underlying drivers. 
First, as discussed above, HD entry is unlikely to stimulate primary store switching. 
Instead, consumers are more likely to visit the HD as part of a MSS pattern. As a result, a 
traditional chain is primarily at risk to lose its secondary customers to the HD entrant, that is: 
those consumers who already visited another supermarket alongside the chain, may now 
replace the latter with the new HD. In contrast (and unlike what was the case for large-
discounter entry), the traditional chain is much less prone to entirely lose its best customers 
(i.e. those who bought their entire baskets at the chain before HD entry). Typically, these 
consumers will at most start visiting the HD alongside – rather than instead of – the traditional 
chain. 
Second, while multiple-store shoppers who do replace the traditional chain with the 
HD are entirely lost as customers, they represent a smaller (relative) loss in spending (since 
only part of their basket was spent at the incumbent in the first place). In contrast, prior 
single-store shoppers who shift to MSS (with the new HD) are not entirely lost as customers, 
but can still substantially reduce their spending at the traditional chain.
1
 Since recent sources 
indicate that a majority (>60%) of shoppers systematically engages in MSS nowadays 
(Gijsbrechts et al. 2008, IGD 2011), the first scenario seems the most likely one – indicating 
that traditional chains‟ (relative) spending losses from HD entry are likely to be smaller than 
their (relative) losses in customer count. 
                                                 
 
1 Note that for MSS shoppers who stay with the incumbent, but now patronize it alongside the HD (instead of 
another traditional chain), we do not expect important spending shifts – as these households continue to spread 
their purchases across chains. 
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Third, consumers‟ sensitivity to price versus assortment is highly category-specific 
(Erdem, Swait and Louvière 2002; Inman, Shankar and Ferraro 2004) and, as indicated in a 
recent Nielsen study, many consumers want the “cheapest of the cheap” in some categories, 
while looking for “a wide selection of high quality brands” in others (Nielsen 2008, p. 3). 
Whereas the low-priced HD can perfectly meet consumers‟ demands for price-sensitive 
categories, its ability to fulfill assortment-related needs (quality, variety of choice) remains 
limited. Traditional chains, for which appealing assortments play a more central role in their 
selling proposition, seem better apt to satisfy these needs – and thus “complement” the HD‟s 
price focus. Therefore, the more a traditional chain prioritizes on its assortment, the more it 
complements HDs – and the more likely it becomes that, after HD entry, the chain will still be 
visited alongside the new HD. As such, the extent to which traditional chains lose customers 
to HDs, may be inversely related to their complementarity with this format.  
Finally, the likelihood that consumers keep visiting a traditional chain after HD entry, 
may also depend on that chain‟s location vis-à-vis the new HD. Specifically, when a HD 
locates in the near vicinity of a traditional chain, the resulting “twin-location” strongly 
facilitates “one-stop shopping” – allowing consumers to spread their purchases across the two 
stores in an extremely convenient fashion. Hence, customers of traditional chains in 
immediate proximity of a HD are less likely to entirely defect, and more likely to visit both 
stores (on combined trips) instead (Brooks, Kaufmann and Lichtenstein 2004; Dellaert et al. 
1998). This “ideal neighbor advantage” (De Volkskrant 1995; Foodmagazine 2009), however, 
does not apply to traditional chains located further away from the HD entrant. As such – in 
contrast to what was found for large-discounter entry – losses to HDs are not necessarily the 
most severe for incumbents in close proximity. 
In sum, rather than completely lose their best customers (that is, customers who 
visited the chain in isolation) to HDs, traditional chains may primarily see “secondary” 
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customers switch away. However, since these (multiple-store) shoppers were not loyal to the 
chain in the first place, the (relative) loss in spending to HDs is likely to be less severe than 
the (relative) loss of patronage. Moreover, we expect the number of customers actually lost 
upon HD entry, to remain fairly limited when the chain is strongly complementary and/or 
conveniently located vis-à-vis the new HD. In the next section, we present a methodology that 
allows for an empirical assessment of these expectations. 
 
2.3   Methodology 
We first present a base model in which households' shopping behavior, possibly 
involving multiple stores, is specified as a function of local store availability and 
characteristics. Next, we indicate how local HD entry is incorporated in the specification.  
Base model 
In line with the expected entry effects of HDs, we focus on households' monthly 
shopping pattern decisions, instead of individual trips. This allows us to uncover changes in 
systematic shopping behavior across multiple stores, rather than promotion-induced “cherry-
picking” (Fox and Hoch 2005). Based on our conceptual framework (Figure 2.1), we assume 
that households face four interrelated choices: single- versus multiple-store shopping pattern, 
separate- versus combined-shopping organization (given MSS), store (set) choice, and 
spending-allocation across stores (given MSS). We model these choices in a nested fashion.
2
 
Single- versus multiple-store shopping. Households can either choose to shop at a single store 
or buy their groceries at multiple stores. This choice can be expressed by a binary-logit model 
(layer A in Table 2.1), in which the utility of shopping at multiple stores is a function of the 
                                                 
 
2 Note that even though we use a nested structure, this does not imply that consumers make the four choices 
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overall attractiveness (captured by the inclusive values )(MSSIV ht  
and )(SSSIV ht ) of 
multiple- and single-store shopping  (the “vertical” comparison in Figure 2.1). We control for 
evolutions in MSS independent of local market characteristics through the trend ( tMonth ). 
Separate versus combined trips. Households that patronize multiple stores must decide how to 
organize their trips to these stores (see the right side of Figure 2.1 and layer B in Table 2.1). 
They can engage in separate-trips (i.e. visit the stores on separate shopping occasions) or 
combined-trips (i.e. make multi-stop trips including more than one store). Again, we use a 
binary-logit model to capture the choice between these two options, including as explanatory 
variables the inclusive values of combined and separate trips ( )(CMBIV ht ; )(SEPIV
h
t ), as 
well as a trend variable controlling for exogenous evolutions in trip organization.  
Store (set) choice. Another shopping decision faced by households is which store – or set of 
stores – to select. This decision is captured by a multinomial logit model (layer C in Table 
2.1). Each (individual) store‟s utility comprises three components (see upper part of Figure 
2.1): (i) in-store utility ( )(rinstU h ): benefits obtained from the physical environment or 
service in the store outlets (Berman and Evans 2010), (ii) travel (dis)utility ( )(rtrvlU h ): costs 
of covering the distance to the store (Fox, Montgomery and Lodish 2004), and (iii) basket 
utility ( )(rbsktU
h
t ): benefits and costs of purchasing one's basket (shopping list) of groceries 
at the store (Bell et al. 1998). For the drivers of these utility components: see Table 2.1 and 
the operationalization section below.  
In line with our conceptual framework, households do not only extract utility from 
individual stores, but also from sets of stores. Consistent with Gijsbrechts et al. (2008), we 
restrict the maximum number of stores within a set to two. This greatly enhances tractability, 
while still allowing us to cover 90% of the sampled households' grocery spending. Like for 
individual store options, the utility of a store set is composed of: the in-store ( ),( srinstU h ), 
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travel ( ),( srtrvlU h ), and basket utilities ( ),( srbsktU
h
t ) of the store set (r,s). Travel utility 
associated with a set of stores is again a function of distance, be it that this variable now 
reflects the travel distance to be covered when visiting the set of stores – either on separate or 
combined trips (see Table 2.1). The latter option can help keep travelling costs minimal, 
especially when the distance between stores is small. In-store utility from a set of stores is 
given by the mean of the stores‟ individual in-store utilities (see Table 2.1). In line with prior 
multiple-store shopping literature (Krider and Weinberg 2000), we thereby assume there are 
no synergies between stores‟ in-store benefits. While a similar specification could be used for 
a store set's basket utility, this would ignore category-based complementarities between the 
stores ( ),( srComp ht ). As indicated above: by buying each category in the most appealing 
store for that category, households can increase their total basket utility. Hence, we augment a 
store set‟s basket utility with a “correction” for the degree to which the stores in the set 
complement each other (see Table 2.1). As the degree to which consumers can capitalize on 
these complementarities (i.e. allocate each category purchase to the store with the most 
attractive offer) may depend on the shopping organization, we allow the parameters  and  
to differ between separate- and combined-trip patterns. The complementarity construct is a 
key component of our model. We will discuss this construct in detail in the next section. 
Spending allocation across stores in the set. Households that opt to visit a set of stores, must 
decide how to allocate their purchases across these stores. As indicated in Table 2.1 (layer D), 
we model this decision using a logistic specification. In this model, the household's spending 
share at store r, given that this store is patronized along with store s, depends on the 
difference in in-store utility and basket utility (corrected for complementarity) between the 
stores (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008, Inman et al. 2004, Zhang, Gangwar and Seetharaman 2010). 
Like for store set choice, we allow the parameters of this spending equation to differ for 
separate- and combined-trip organizations. Similar to Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004) and 
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Zhang and Wedel (2009), we assume that the error term of the spending model has a logistic 
distribution and allow it to be correlated with the store set choice errors (see Appendix 1).  
Incorporating Hard-Discounter Entry 
Local entry of a HD outlet will affect the specification in several ways. First, the new 
HD outlet may either belong to a chain that was previously unavailable to the household, or to 
a chain that the household already had access to – but that is now expanding its local 
presence. In the former scenario, new options will be added to the household's consideration 
set at model layer C. The HD then comes in as an extra individual store alternative. It also 
forms a store set with each incumbent chain – to which part of the household's purchases can 
then be allocated (layer D). In the latter case, no additional shopping options become 
available. Instead, the new outlet (or store sets involving this outlet) may replace existing 
options in the household‟s consideration set, for example when the new HD outlet is more 
conveniently located vis-à-vis the household (or other stores) than the chain‟s current outlets. 
Second, HD entry may have a differential effect on the choice probability of 
incumbent stores, as their probability of being chosen as part of a store set also depends on the 
complementarity and distance to the new HD (cf. Figure 2.1). Finally, all of the above 
changes affect model layers B (separate- versus combined-trip organization) and A (single- 
versus multiple-store pattern) through the inclusive values. We note again that, because the 
HD has high complementarity with traditional supermarkets, we expect store sets involving a 
HD and a traditional store to have high appeal, and – possibly – to increase MSS.  
Estimation 
We estimate the model parameters using simulated maximum likelihood. Unobserved 
household heterogeneity is incorporated by a latent class approach in which all parameters 
(except the trend parameters at model layers A and B, and the error correlation parameter at 
layer D) may vary across segments. As stated by Andrews, Ainslie and Currim (2002) and 
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Zhang and Wedel (2009), this finite mixture specification is empirically equivalent to the use 
of continuous mixing distributions. Details on the likelihood are given in Appendix 1.  
 
2.4   Data and Operationalizations 
Setting and Sample 
To assess the impact of local HD entry, we use data on outlet openings of two HD 
chains in the Netherlands, between May 2002 and August 2006. We obtain these data from 
Reed Business, which – every 3 to 4 months – tracks all outlets of the main Dutch grocery 
retailers, along with their size and location. Taken together, our data cover 54 Aldi and 140 
Lidl entries. Similar to Hwang, Bronnenberg and Thomadsen (2010), we define the local 
markets in which these HDs operate as circular areas around the HDs, with a 5 km radius. 
Openings and closures of non-HD outlets are also obtained from the Reed Business data. 
To track shopping behavior before and after local HD entry, we use scanner purchase 
records from GfK's national household panel. From these data, we obtain households' 
shopping patterns, category needs and geographical location. To reduce model complexity, 
we only use purchases made in the top 9 grocery chains in the Netherlands, covering 78% of 
sales. Besides Aldi and Lidl, these include seven traditional players. Table 2.2 shows that 
while these traditional chains are not uniform in positioning (some being more upscale, e.g. 
Albert Heijn, others being more price-oriented, e.g. Jumbo), their wider assortments and 
higher prices make them very distinct from HDs. Our sample consists of households who (i) 
live in one of the 194 local markets, (ii) participated in the panel for the entire period 2002-
2006 and (iii) purchase over 80% of their groceries in the chains under study. This leaves us 
with 703 households: split up into a calibration and holdout sample of 600 and 103 
households, respectively. For each household, we observe 56 months of purchases, leaving us 
with a total of 39,368 observations – of which 17,535 (21,833) occur before (after) HD entry. 















Traditional chains      
Albert Heijn 20.2% 1,200 1.017 1.465 1.100 
C1000 15.5% 876 .362 .902 -.512 
Dirk 6.5% 1,074 .085 -.104 -1.149 
Edah 4.7% 994 .166 -.121 .720 
Jumbo 3.8% 1,104 .136 .154 -.238 
Plus 3.9% 845 .347 -.101 -.025 
Super de Boer 7.4% 930 .582 .580 .104 
Hard-discounters      
Aldi 11.0% 430 -1.157 -1.373 - 
Lidl 4.6% 627 -1.090 -1.403 - 
 
Operationalizations 
Consideration set. Following Fox et al. (2004), we delineate households‟ consideration sets 
based on distance. Consistent with our definition of outlets‟ trading areas, a household h‟s 
consideration set in month t includes only stores within a 5 km radius from its residence 
(forming the set htK ). Moreover, when multiple outlets of the same chain are available within 
this 5 km radius, we assume that consumers consider those outlets that minimize travelling 
distance for any shopping pattern involving the chain. For single-store shopping patterns, and 
MSS patterns involving separate trips, this is the outlet closest to the customer‟s home. For 
MSS-combined trip patterns, outlets that minimize the chained-trip distance are considered. 
Dependent variables. Within any month, similar to Gijsbrechts et al. (2008), we classify a 
household‟s shopping pattern as single-store if more than 80% of its total grocery spending 
occurred in a single chain, and as multiple-store otherwise. We further classify a multiple-
store pattern as combined-trip if more than half of the spending occurred on chained trips, and 




 To identify a household‟s store (set) of choice, we determine the 
chain (set) where the largest share of monthly grocery spending occurred. The dependent 
variable of the spending share model – explaining the allocation of grocery purchases over a 
selected set of stores r and s in month t – is measured as the amount spent in that month in the 
first store (r), divided by the amount spent at both stores.  
Explanatory variables. In line with our conceptual framework, we include in-store utility, 
travel (dis)utility, basket utility and complementarity as explanatory variables in the choice 
model. Given our objective to (i) explain consumers' choice of shopping patterns, as well as 
(ii) shifts in these patterns following HD entry, we do not include previous choice as an 
explanatory variable (see Bell and Lattin 1998 and Fox et al. 2004 for a similar approach). As 
indicated by Bell and Lattin (1998, p. 79), such a last choice variable would already reflect 
most of the effects of in-store, travel and basket utility, and would not permit us to separate 
them out. Our model, in contrast, enables us to uncover how the chains' relative location and 
complementarity explain consumers' shopping behavior, before and after HD entry. We will 
revisit the effect of “last choice” in the robustness checks.  
In-store and travel utility. We capture in-store utility through segment-specific intercepts for 
each store chain. These intercepts reflect the intrinsic preference for the chain “based on 
factors related to general positioning (service level, friendliness), operational policies, and 
overall excellence in execution” (Fox et al. 2004, p. S36). In addition, to accommodate 
differences in outlet size within each chain, we include outlet selling surface, measured in 
1000 m
2
. Travel distances are operationalized by using the Euclidean distances between 
household and outlet zip-codes, as further indicated in Table 2.3. Similar to Briesch et al. 
(2009), we log-transform these distances to accommodate decreasing marginal effects.   
                                                 
 
3 We define “chained trips” as shopping occasions on which more than one chain was visited at the same part of 
the day (i.e. morning, afternoon, or evening), the most detailed time frame in the GfK data. 




Notation Variable name Operationalization 
In-store utility 




)(rListAttr ht  Shopping list 
attraction 
Composite variable, reflects attractiveness of purchasing all 









)(cwh  Category weight Category c‟s value share in household h‟s grocery spending across 
observation period 
),( rcAttrt  Category 
attraction 
Attractiveness of purchasing category c in store r. Computed as: 
),(*),(*),(* ,,, rcPLsharercPricercAssort tcPLtcPtcA    
),( rcAssort t  Category 
assortment size 
Number of unique SKUs sold (as observed in panel data) in category 
c by store r in month t (standardized across both chains and months) 
),( rcPricet  Category price 
level 
Average price per volume unit, across all SKUs
a
 sold (as observed in 
panel data) in category c by store r in month t (standardized across 
both chains and months) 
),( rcPLsharet  Category private 
label share 
Share of private label SKUs (as observed in panel data) in category c 
and store r in month t (standardized across both chains and months) 
),( srComp ht  Inter-store 
complementarity 



























),( yx  Geographical 
distance 
Euclidean distance between geographical locations x and y, measured 
in 10km 
)(rDist h  Single-store 
pattern travel 
distance 
),(*2 rh  
(i.e. distance from household h's home to store r; and back.) 
)|,( SEPsrDist h  Separate-trip 
pattern travel 
distance 
75.*)],(*2),(*2[ shrh   
(i.e. distance from household h's home to store r and back + distance 
from household h's home to store s and back.)  
This distance is multiplied by .75: the middle between separate-trip 
shoppers engaging in twice as many trips, or in the same number of 
trips, as single-store shoppers. 
)|,( CMBsrDist h  Combined-trip 
pattern travel 
distance 
),(),(),( shsrrh   
(i.e. distance from household h's home to store r + distance from 
store r to store s + distance from store s back to household h's home.) 
a 
For each SKU, the price per volume unit is a weighted average of promotional and non-promotional prices, 
with the weights being the number of times these prices were observed.
 
 
Basket utility. The “shopping list attraction” that store r provides to household h in month t, is 
computed as a weighted average of the attractiveness of all product categories in the store:
























with weights )(cwh  equal to the categories‟ shares in the household‟s grocery spending 
throughout the observation period (see also Fox et al. 2004). We use the GfK category 
classification, which covers a wide variety of products including food and non-food items, 
small- and big-ticket items, and categories with low and high levels of product differentiation 
(the full list of 52 categories can be found in Table A.2 in Appendix 2). All categories are sold 
in each of the nine chains under study – be it that assortment depth within each category may 
strongly differ. Following Briesch et al. (2009), the category attractions ),( rcAttrt are further 
specified as a function of assortment size ),( rcAssort t  
and price levels ),( rcPricet   (see Table 
2.3 for their operationalization). For the traditional supermarket chains, we include the 
assortment share taken up by the store brand ),( rcPLsharet  as an additional explanatory 
variable (Dhar, Hoch and Kumar 2001).
4
 The parameters, cA, , cP ,  
and cPL ,  reflect 
category-specific assortment, price and store-brand sensitivities. Estimating these parameters 
simultaneously with the shopping pattern choice parameters would make the model 
exceedingly complex. Therefore, similar to Bell and Lattin (1998), we assess them through 
separate, category-level models, linking the portion of households‟ category outlay spent in a 
chain on the one hand, to that chain‟s category price, assortment, store-brand share (and two 
control variables) on the other (see Appendix 2 for details). In total, 52 such models were run 
(one for each category), with 5 parameters each. The number of observations for estimation 
(each observation representing a household‟s category outlay within a certain month) ranges 
from 1,823 (for diet products) to 38,301 (for vegetables). 
                                                 
 
4 This variable is not relevant for HD chains, whose assortment consists almost exclusively of private labels. 
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Store complementarity. As outlined above, a key driver of MSS (and of the impact of HD 
entry) is store complementarity: the fact that two stores may have strong appeal in different 
categories such that, taken together, they constitute an attractive combination. Our measure of 
store complementarity builds on constructs developed in previous literature on the variety and 
complementarity of products in an assortment (Rooderkerk, Van Heerde and Bijmolt 2011, 
Van Herpen and Pieters 2002). Rooderkerk et al. (2011), in their study of assortment context 
effects, quantify both (i) product dissimilarity (to what extent do product attributes differ from 
those of other items in the assortment), and (ii) product dominance (to what extent are 
products superior in their attributes to other available options). Similar dimensions are used 
by Van Herpen and Pieters (2002). While our setting is completely different (store chains 
with differences in category attractiveness, as opposed to products in an assortment with 
different attribute levels), the same notions apply, in that the degree of complementarity 
between two chains depends on (i) the magnitude of differences (dissimilarities) in category 
attractiveness (positive effect) and (ii) the extent to which one store is consistently superior to 
(dominates) the other (negative effect). With this in mind, we construct the following measure 
































The first term in the numerator reflects the “dissimilarity” factor, and sums the stores‟ 
                                                 
 
5 Van Herpen and Pieters (2002) propose an attribute-based measure that comprises two components: the 
dispersion of attribute levels over different products (i.e., how strongly do attributes differ across products), and 
the dissociation of attribute levels (to what extent do different combinations of attributes occur in different 
products). Note that the specifics of our complementarity construct are quite different from previous authors‟: 
Van Herpen and Pieters (2002) quantify the variety in a complete assortment, and Rooderkerk et al. (2011) 
compute the attribute-based similarity and dominance of a product compared to the total assortment. In contrast, 
the complementarity measure that we propose compares the assortment of two grocery chains, taking the 
price/quality position of different categories into account. Also, whereas Van Herpen and Pieters (2002) consider 
attributes with a discrete number of levels, our category attractions are continuous. 
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absolute differences in attractiveness across categories (weighed by their share in household 
grocery spending).
6
 The less the stores resemble each other in terms of category appeal, the 
larger this sum becomes. The second term represents the “dominance” factor, which goes up 
when one store has the highest appeal for a larger number of categories. It is again a weighted 
sum of differences in category attractiveness. However, by summing up the actual differences 
(rather than their absolute values), positive (store r outperforming s) and negative differences 
(store s outperforming r) can cancel each other out. Hence, as households‟ preferences for 
both stores become more balanced across categories (i.e. both stores being the superior option 
for a different set of categories), the dominance term becomes smaller, and complementarity 
goes up. In contrast, if one store is preferred over (dominates) the other in all categories, the 
second term equals the first, and complementarity is zero. The denominator simply rescales 
the measure to the [0-1] range. Figure 2.2, panels A-D, graphically illustrate the meaning of 
our complementarity measure, for a stylized setting with two categories. Each panel 
represents a scenario in which a hypothetical store (a) and another store (b to e) differ in 
category attractiveness. The panels show how variations in dissimilarity and dominance lead 
to differences in complementarity. For each scenario, the figure also compares the maximum 
obtainable attraction across categories (assuming equal category weights) under single and 
multiple-store shopping patterns, and shows that MSS patterns can provide higher utility than 
single-store patterns as complementarity goes up.  
Hard-discounter entries 
Table 2.4, panel A reports, for each chain, the percentage of visits on single-store, 
separate-trip multiple-store, or combined-trip multiple-store shopping patterns. It shows that 
for each chain, more than 50% of visits occur within multiple-store patterns. These figures
                                                 
 
6 Unlike Rooderkerk et al. (2011), we use a city block distance metric; using absolute instead of squared 
differences. This appears more appropriate, given that we integrate evaluations of different product categories, 
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TABLE 2.4 
Distribution of Shopping Patterns 
PANEL A: DISTRIBUTION OF PATTERNS ACROSS CHAINS 
Grocery chain Single-store Multiple-store 
Separate-trip Combined-trip Total MSS 
Traditional chains 
Albert Heijn 41.4% 46.5% 12.1% 58.6% 
C1000 31.2% 53.2% 15.6% 68.8% 
Dirk 25.5% 58.6% 15.9% 74.5% 
Edah 16.5% 64.6% 18.9% 83.5% 
Jumbo 19.8% 60.4% 19.8% 80.2% 
Plus 42.9% 46.8% 10.3% 57.1% 
Super de Boer 30.8% 56.9% 12.3% 69.2% 
Hard-discounters 
Aldi 8.0% 66.9% 25.1% 92.0% 
Lidl 3.7% 66.4% 29.9% 96.3% 
PANEL B: DISTRIBUTION & TRANSITION
a
 OF PATTERNS ACROSS TIME 
 POST-ENTRY (600 HH) 
 Single-store Separate-trip Combined-trip Total 
PRE-ENTRY (600 HHb) (No HD) (HD) (No HD) (HD) (No HD) (HD)  
Single-store (No HD) 35.5% 0.2% 6.1% 3.8% 0.3% 0.9% 46.9% 
 (HD) 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.2% 1.5% 
Separate-trip  (No HD) 4.8% 0.2% 13.5% 4.1% 0.7% 0.3% 23.6% 
 (HD) 1.2% 0.3% 1.3% 14.2% 0.0% 1.7% 18.7% 
Combined-trip (No HD) 0.5% 0.0% 0.9% 0.2% 2.0% 0.6% 4.1% 
 (HD) 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.9% 0.0% 4.0% 5.3% 
Total 42.0% 1.4% 22.1% 23.8% 3.0% 7.7%  
a 
The transitions depicted are between households‟ “dominant” shopping patterns (i.c. most commonly 
chosen) in the pre- and post HD-entry periods.
 
b 
While all 703 households in our sample reside less than 5 kilometers away from at least one hard-
discounter outlet opening, not all households include these outlets in their consideration set (e.g.  
because they have another outlet of the same HD chain closer by than the entrant), explaining the  
lower number of households used for the pre- and post-entry comparisons. 
 
are especially high for Aldi and Lidl (92.0% and 96.3%, compared to a 70.3% average across 
traditional supermarkets). It follows that the entry of these HDs is likely to enhance multiple-
store shopping. Further support for this notion is lent by Table 2.4, panel B, which depicts the 
prevailing shopping patterns before and after HD entry – and how households transit between 
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them. While the majority of households (70%) does not switch to a different type of shopping 
pattern after a HD opens up, the table shows that if households decide to visit a HD (in 
response to HD entry), they are most likely to do so by means of a multiple-store pattern. As a 
result, the table shows that the total number of multiple-store shopping households has 
increased after HD entry (from 51.7% to 56.7%). 
 The emerging picture thus is that HD entry indeed leads to more MSS. Yet, the 
question remains how it affects the patronage and spending at incumbent supermarkets and, 
especially, how this impact depends on the stores‟ location and complementarity vis-à-vis the 
HD. The model outcomes will shed light on these issues.  
 
2.5   Results 
Category attractions and complementarities 
We first discuss the estimation results for the auxiliary category-attraction equations, 
used to compute store-specific shopping list attractions (see Table A.1 in Appendix 2). In line 
with expectations, the assortment coefficients are significantly positive for 37 (out of 52) 
categories, while significant and negative price effects are found in 41 categories. The PL-
share coefficients are mostly negative (39 parameters negative significant), but this is only a 
partial effect: the (positive) impact of lower PL prices already being captured through the 
price coefficient. For 31 categories, households respond more strongly to assortment size, 
while price response dominates in the remaining 21 categories.
7
 This supports the notion that 
consumers “trade up” for some products and “trade down” for others. The resulting pattern of 
category attractions (see Table A.2 in Appendix 2) confirms that HDs have a comparative 
advantage in a subset of price-sensitive categories, yet tend to be less attractive in categories 
                                                 
 
7 Note that since these variables are standardized, their coefficients can be compared. 
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where product quality and/or choice variety play a more important role. Overall, the results 
have face validity, and constitute a sound input for our complementarity construct.  
Table 2.5 displays the resulting degree of complementarity for each chain pair in our 
data set, averaged across households and time. First, it shows that for each traditional chain, 
complementarity is far stronger with the HDs than with other supermarkets. Second, 
complementarity between the two HDs is low, indicating that it is most prevalent across store 
formats. Third, among the traditional chains, a distinction emerges between high-end chains 
(such as Albert Heijn, see also Table 2.2), and those that are more price-oriented (like 
Jumbo). The latter chains exhibit lower complementarity with the HD stores, a result that 
makes intuitive sense and supports the validity of our measure. 
TABLE 2.5 




Heijn C1000 Dirk Edah Jumbo Plus 
Super 
de Boer Aldi Lidl 
Albert Heijn -         
C1000 .282 -        
Dirk .170 .195 -       
Edah .157 .197 .165 -      
Jumbo .195 .241 .115 .169 -     
Plus .124 .130 .184 .155 .109 -    
Super de Boer .094 .155 .211 .210 .197 .130 -   
Aldi .734 .755 .298 .297 .436 .345 .550 -  
Lidl .697 .740 .350 .352 .492 .399 .616 .131 - 
 
Shopping pattern choice and spending allocation 
Based on the BIC criterion, the three-segment solution is retained (BIC=6748.9, 
compared to 6784.5 and 6806.6 for the two and four segment model, respectively). With a hit 
rate of 35.9% and an average hit probability of 56.1%, the model also exhibits high predictive 
validity in the holdout sample. 
Table 2.6 reports the parameter estimates for the 3 segments (with sizes of 36.9%, 
26.3% and 36.8%). Overall, the estimates provide support for the conceptual framework and 
are in line with previous store choice literature. At model layer C (store (set) choice), the 
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chain intercepts that capture the chains‟ overall appeal (relative to market leader Albert 
Heijn), point to substantial differences in intrinsic store preferences across chains and 
consumer segments. At the same time, stores are more likely to be included in households‟ 
shopping patterns when they are larger in size, provide greater shopping list attraction, and are 
located closer to the household. These factors enhance selection of the store as a single 
shopping destination, but also as part of a MSS pattern – as illustrated in Table 2.7, panel A, 
which displays the % change in visit probability for two incumbents (high-end: Albert Heijn, 
price-oriented: Jumbo), triggered by a 10% increase in their list attraction (the elasticity 
expressions are derived in Appendix 3). For sets of stores (MSS patterns), the 
complementarity parameter is strongly significant and positive in 5 out of 6 cases, indicating 
that the more complementary two stores are, the more attractive it is to visit both of them.
8
 
The positive and significant inclusive value parameters transfer such increases in store 
set utility to model layers B and A. The intercepts at these layers point to a strong tendency 
towards MSS (positive significant layer-A intercept λ0 for segments 1 and 3, encompassing 
73.7% of the shoppers) and towards visiting different chains on separate rather than combined 
trips (negative layer-B intercept 0 for all segments). 
 A closer look at the segment differences shows consumers in segment 1 to be more 
likely to engage in MSS than those in segment 2. Interestingly, they also have the most 
positive attitude towards Aldi and Lidl, and are most sensitive to store complementarities. In 
contrast, segment 2 primarily consists of single-store shoppers, with a strong preference for 
upscale stores, resistance to cover larger distances and low sensitivity to complementarities. 
 
                                                 
 
8 In estimating the utility-maximizing shopping pattern model, we do not posit that consumers actually use all 
the detail included in the measures that enter this model. Still, the literature on cognitive psychology suggests 
that consumers, in their own way, may be able to form beliefs about the key constructs in our model, and use 
them to guide their shopping behavior along the proposed lines. Our finding that the estimated effects are 
significant and in line with expectations corroborates this. 
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Estimates significant at the 5% and 1% level (two-sided) are portrayed in bold  
and italics, respectively. Values in brackets represent t-values for the coefficients.
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2   Close Encounter with the Hard-Discounter 
40 
Chapter 2   Close Encounter with the Hard-Discounter 
41 
While complementarity plays a key role in store selection of multiple-store shoppers 
and, through the inclusive values, can drive up MSS, its parameters in the spending share 
model are not significant. This needs to be interpreted against the fact that the (conditional) 
spending share model is parameterized only on chains that do co-occur in a MSS pattern, and 
for which complementarities are already high in the first place. It is also in line with the 
distribution of actual spending shares among stores in a MSS set, which has a strong mass 
point around .5, with a small deviation. Still, the spending model estimates reveal that, given 
store set selection, consumers spend relatively more at larger stores (positive significant 
parameter for selling surface in 3 out of 6 cases). 
Implications for HD entry effects. The estimation results in Table 2.6 already shed light on the 
likely effects of HD entry. HDs provide greater complementarity-advantages than traditional 
stores (cf. Table 2.5), thereby increasing the probability that a store set including the HD will 
be chosen and – through the inclusive values – the tendency to visit multiple stores. Based on 
the positive complementarity-coefficient, incumbents that are more complementary to the HD 
are more likely to be selected in such a MSS pattern alongside the HD. This is further 
documented in Table 2.7, panel B, which shows the % change in visit probability for Albert 
Heijn and Jumbo that would result from a 10% increase in their current complementarity with 
Lidl. From this table, it becomes apparent that even if the incumbents‟ list attraction remains 
unchanged, the mere increase in complementarity enhances their combined shopping 
propensity with Lidl (on average: by 2.88% for Albert Heijn and 1.83% for Jumbo), and even 
slightly increases their patronage in any MSS pattern (+.16% for AH, +.20% for Jumbo) and 
overall (+.10% for AH, +.16% for Jumbo). Moreover, over and above this partial effect, 
complementarity will substantially enhance the impact of increases in incumbents‟ list 
attraction, on their probability of being selected alongside the HD (see Appendix 3) – as we 
will show in the implications section. 
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The negative coefficient of store distance already suggests that location close to a 
traditional supermarket – which is quite common for HD entrants – may facilitate combined-
trip MSS, by allowing consumers to take advantage of store complementarities while keeping 
travel cost increases under control. Table 2.7, panel C shows this effect to be substantial. If 
the distance to the HD would drop from .5 km to 0 km (a twin-location), the propensity of 
combined shopping with Lidl would go up by no less than 37% for both Albert Heijn and 
Jumbo, without jeopardizing the incumbent‟s MSS or overall patronage propensity.  
Robustness checks. As a robustness check, several alternative models are estimated. First, to 
check whether our model fully captures the effect of HD entry, we test a more flexible 
specification in which we allow the entry to directly impact on the shopping pattern and trip 
organization decisions, over and above the effect captured by the inclusive values. We do so 
by incorporating additional step dummies for HD entry in model layers A and B.
9
 We find 
that these extensions do not lead to an improvement in model fit (i.e. AIC and BIC). Second, 
we estimate a model including loyalty (i.e. the fraction of trips in the previous month on 
which a chain was visited, see Briesch et al. 2009 for a similar measure) as an extra 
component of chain utility. This model points to only one segment of households and, as 
expected, leads to a much less pronounced effect for the other (in-store, basket and travel) 
utility components – suggesting that, indeed, their impact is reflected to a large extent in 
previous months' choices. As store introductions influence buying behavior through the same 
underlying factors (cf. Figure 2.1), this also reduces the model‟s ability to explain HD entry 
effects. Still, even in this model, complementarity significantly enhances the utility of both 
separate and combined multiple-store visits. In all, this lends further support to our findings.  
                                                 
 
9 Specifically, we tested the following: (i) whether the choice between single-store and multiple-store patterns 
was directly affected by HD entry in general, and „first-mover entries‟ (outlets that are the first HD to open in a 
local market) in particular, (ii) whether the choice between separate-trip and combined-trip patterns was directly 
affected by HD entry in general, and „twin-location entries‟ (HD outlets that open up next to another grocery 
store) in particular. Details can be obtained from the authors. 
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2.6   Implications 
While the parameters in Table 2.6, and the ensuing effects in Table 2.7, give a first 
feel for the drivers of HD entry losses, they do not yet paint the full picture. First, they do not 
document the magnitude of incumbent losses if a new HD enters the market. Second, they 
only point to partial (ceteris paribus) effects, whereas changes in the stores‟ offer or location 
will typically affect the stores‟ attractiveness in multiple ways. Below, we use the estimated 
parameters to simulate these implications, and analyze how they depend on the incumbent's 
competitive position vis-à-vis the HD – both geographically and in terms of complementarity. 
Next, we explore the effect of alternative marketing mix responses by traditional incumbents. 
Consequences of local hard-discounter entry 
To document the size and nature of incumbent losses, we first use the data across all 
households and local markets to quantify the HD entry effects. For each market, we consider 
the month prior to HD entry and use the model parameters, together with the conditions in 
that market (store locations and marketing mix variables), to calculate the households‟ 
patronage propensity and spending share for each local incumbent. We then compute these 
same quantities after bringing in the new HD entrant, keeping everything else constant, and 
compare the results.
10
 We find that incumbents‟ average patronage losses range between 
3.98% (Albert Heijn) and 12.52% (Edah), with an overall average of 8.33%. Spending losses, 
as expected, are somewhat lower, with an overall reduction of 7.85%, and average values for 
specific incumbents ranging between 3.45% (Albert Heijn) and 10.81% (Edah).
11
 These 
                                                 
 
10 By comparing predicted metrics of the two scenarios, we can control for marketing mix, and avoid a 
confounding with model forecast errors (see Chintagunta, Kadiyali and Vilcassim 2006 for a similar approach). 
To further enhance comparability and tractability, we did not include cases where HD entry coincided with entry 
or exit of another store. 
11 These figures are interesting in the light of a recent paper by Datta and Sudhir (2012). This study finds that the 
competitive impact of a store can be substantially driven by local zoning restrictions. However, given that HD‟s 
will seldom be the strongest player in a local market (in terms of market share), it is unlikely that their entry 
decisions were shaped by such restrictions. 
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figures are sizable, but lower than those observed for large-discounter entry – which is not too 
surprising given that HDs cannot fully substitute for traditional supermarkets. 
While these figures document the average losses that can be expected across a wide 
range of local market settings, the fact that they are average quantities makes it difficult to 
explain the differences observed between incumbent stores, and their underlying drivers. 
Losses may differ depending not only on the characteristics of a specific incumbent, but also 
on the presence and location of rival stores. To better disentangle these effects, we consider a 
local market (hereafter: market A) in which most of the incumbent chains (i.c. Albert Heijn, 
C1000, Jumbo and Super de Boer) operate only one outlet. This makes it easy to link changes 
in chain performance to the location of specific outlets. Figure 2.3 displays the relative 
geographical position of these outlets.  
In January 2004, market A was confronted with the local entry of a Lidl outlet. Using 
our model parameters, we simulate the effect of the new Lidl outlet in twin-location with 
Albert Heijn – a strongly complementary traditional supermarket (average degree of 
complementarity in January 2004: .735). Again, we do so by comparing (i) incumbents' 
predicted performance for the month in which Lidl actually entered, with (ii) the predicted 
performance in the absence of Lidl's outlet – keeping all other factors constant. Given the role 
of distance in consumers' shopping behavior, the consequences of the HD opening will vary 
by household location. Therefore, we consider all possible household locations, i.e. for each 
unique 4-digit zip code in market A, we identify a geographical “center point” that will 
represent households in that zip code. Pre- and post-entry performance is then simulated for 
each of these center points,
12
 and weighed with the number of resident households in the zip 
code (data source: Statistics Netherlands), before aggregating to the local market level. The 
implications are reported below. 
                                                 
 
12 For all center points, we set category weights equal to the average across our sample. 
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FIGURE 2.3 
Market A: Geographical Location of Outlets 
 
 
Changes in store patronage. Table 2.8, panel A, reports the expected number of resident 
households visiting each incumbent before and after the HD entry. It also displays the fraction 
accounted for by single- and multiple-store (separate- or combined-trip) shopping. 
The new Lidl outlet attracts a sizeable clientele (2,560 out of 9,425 households). As 
expected, only a small fraction of these Lidl customers (7.94%) engage in single-store 
shopping. Most of the HD shoppers opt for MSS on combined (25.7%) or separate trips 
(66.38%). The ensuing customer losses for incumbents vary widely, ranging from a low 6.1% 
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(Albert Heijn) up to 23.1% and 25.4% (Super de Boer and Jumbo). Zooming in on the 
shopping patterns before and after entry, we find that incumbents mostly retain their single-
store shoppers, losses among these customers being far below the overall drop in customer 
count (e.g. for Albert Heijn: 2.6% compared to 6.1%, for Super de Boer: 7.3% compared to 
23.1%). As discussed in the conceptual part, this indicates that after HD entry, traditional 
chains‟ best customers generally keep shopping at these chains, and are thus not (completely) 
lost to the new entrant. From Table 2.8, it seems that especially upscale chains (like Albert 
Heijn) appear able to retain their loyal customers. 
While the overall percentage of MSS slightly increases following entry (from 57.4 to 
58.6%), most of the new HD shoppers already patronized multiple stores, and now trade one 
of the traditional chains for the HD entrant. Again, it seems that some chains are better able to 
stand their ground than others, and are less likely to be removed from the shoppers‟ choice 
set. Albert Heijn, for instance, succeeds in limiting the customer loss to 8.4% and 9.5% of its 
separate-trip and combined-trip shoppers respectively, while Super de Boer loses over 30% of 
its combined-trip shoppers. We will come back to these differences in vulnerability below. 
Implications for spending. Next, we use our estimated spending-share parameters to predict, 
for each possible shopping pattern in market A, how households‟ monthly spending is 
allocated between the chains in that pattern. Combined with the simulated shopping-pattern 
probabilities, this indicates how Lidl's entry affects the spending at incumbents in market A. 
Table 2.8, panel B, displays the results. Not surprisingly, given its small proportion of single-
store shoppers, the new entrant‟s spending share (14.5%) is far lower than its share-of-
customers (27.2%). As for the traditional chains: we expected them to lose (relatively) less in 
terms of spending than in terms of patronage. Our simulation results are in line with this 
premise. Albert Heijn loses 5.5% in spending and 6.1% in patronage, while Super De Boer 
loses 20.5% in spending and 23.1% in patronage. 
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Role of store complementarity: Table 2.8 points to substantial differences in total losses 
among incumbent chains, the largest losses being experienced by incumbents that drop out of 
the multiple-store shoppers‟ choice set and are replaced by the new Lidl store. Why, then, do 
consumers abandon some chains, while they continue to visit others? As discussed earlier, our 
model estimates already revealed that stores with a complementary offer are more likely to be 
selected as the “store-set-of-choice” by multiple-store shoppers. Consistent with this, chains 
that exhibit the highest complementarity with Lidl (on average for Albert Heijn: .697, for 
C1000: .740, see Table 2.5) appear the least harmed, their losses in customer count and 
spending ranging between 5 and 14%, while less complementary chains such as Jumbo and 
Super de Boer face average customer and spending losses of 20 to 25%. Still, considering the 
large difference between Albert Heijn and C1000, other factors must also be at play. 
Effect of store distance: An interesting observation from Table 2.8, panel A, is that the chain 
in twin-location with Lidl (i.e. Albert Heijn), suffers the least from its entry, and far less than 
the other complementary C1000-chain. As outlined in the conceptual part, a possible 
explanation is that its complementarity and co-location with Lidl make for an appealing one-
stop shopping location. Customers that visited Albert Heijn along with a traditional 
incumbent, may now shift to the Albert Heijn-Lidl combination. To further investigate the 
role of distance, we simulate the effect of alternative entry locations on Albert Heijn. 
Specifically, we compare our original results (Lidl opening at the same location as Albert 
Heijn) with two alternative scenarios, in which Lidl locates at an intermediate distance (at .59 
km away from Albert Heijn), or farther away (1.15 km distance from Albert Heijn). 
Interestingly, we obtain an inverted-U effect: Albert Heijn loses more if Lidl locates at an 
intermediate distance (7.0% patronage loss and 6.2% spending loss, compared to 6.1% and 
5.5% for the twin-location), but losses become smaller again when the Lidl outlet is farther 
away (6.4% and 5.7% reduction in patronage and spending, respectively). Unlike earlier 
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findings in the context of large-discounter entry, this suggests that if a traditional chain is 
more closely located to a HD entrant, this does not necessarily imply larger losses for that 
incumbent. Instead, local HD entry mainly hurts chains at a moderate distance: these players 
being too close to avoid competition for the same households, yet not close enough to form a 
one-stop shopping location with the HD. 
To check the robustness of the findings, we also simulated the HD entry implications 
and incumbent responses in another local market, and obtained the same pattern of results. 
We do not report these for reasons of space – details can be obtained from the authors. 
Response to hard-discounter outlet openings 
Given that HD entry may entail substantial losses in customer count and spending, the 
question is how incumbents can mitigate these losses. Available reaction strategies differ in 
(i) the marketing mix instruments that are changed (i.e. a price drop, assortment increase, or 
change in PL share), and (ii) the product categories in which these changes are implemented. 
To get a feel for the effectiveness of alternative strategies, we return to the example of market 
A, where Super De Boer incurred huge losses following the entry by Lidl, and explore 
different options for Super De Boer to regain some of its customers and spending. 
We note that proper response strategies will differ between (i) the traditional single-
store shopping perspective (the upper part of Figure 2.1), in which the store‟s actions 
influence its own attractiveness only, and (ii) our proposed multiple-store shopping 
perspective (lower part of Figure 2.1) in which the store‟s actions also shape the appeal of the 
store sets of which it is part. With single-store shopping only, any “recovery” in patronage 
and spending should result from an increase in the chain‟s own basket utility. We therefore 
start by calculating the changes in category price, assortment size and PL share that would be 
required to enhance Super de Boer‟s list attraction by 1%. Since PLs also come with lower 
prices – on average 30% below those of the premium brands – we implement changes in PL 
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share along with the corresponding reduction in category prices. We do so for two large 
product categories (meat and cheese, each capturing about 8% of consumers‟ share-of-wallet), 
and two smaller ones (prepared meals and diapers, each capturing 1.5%). Moreover, two of 
these products – meat and prepared meals – are “strong” categories, where Super de Boer has 
a higher category attraction than the HD, while the remaining two categories – cheese and 
diapers – are “weak” categories for the traditional chain. 
Table 2.9, panel A, reports the results. It reveals that PL-share increases are not very 
effective, unrealistically high adjustments (ranging between +41.7% and +159.6%) being 
required to generate the desired increase in list attraction. This can be explained by the fact 
that the positive price reduction effect of a higher PL share, almost cancels out against the 
negative “brand equity” effect. The table shows that price tends to be an “efficient” 
instrument in categories where the traditional chain is weaker than the HD (e.g. cheese), while 
assortment increases are more efficient in categories where it is stronger (e.g. meals). This 
makes intuitive sense, since traditional chains are typically weak in price-sensitive categories, 
and strong in categories where assortment variety is key. It also shows that the 
appropriateness of marketing mix actions (e.g. price cuts, assortment extensions) as response 
mechanisms is highly category-specific. When consumers visit only one store, price and 
assortment changes that yield the same change in list attraction will also have the same effect 
on customer counts and spending (see also the elasticity expressions in Appendix 3). In such a 
single-store shopping setting, each of the actions in Table 2.9, panel A would generate the 
same performance recovery. That is, making abstraction of cost differences, Super de Boer 
would be indifferent between, say, a .73% reduction in the price of cheese, and a 4.45% 
increase of its meat assortment. However, the picture becomes different when multiple-store 
shopping and the underlying role of store complementarities are accounted for (the lower part 
of Figure 2.1), as is the case in our model. This is clear from Table 2.9, panel B, which shows 
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the shifts in patronage patterns brought about by the different response strategies. Even 
though they entail equivalent increases in list attraction, changes in strong categories lead to a 
strikingly different recovery pattern than changes in weak categories. Specifically, while 
improvements in strong categories entail a similar recovery of single-store shoppers for Super 
de Boer (+9.58% points for meat and meals, compared to +9.71% points for cheese and 
+9.50% points for diapers), they allow the chain to “haul back in” far more customers who 
start shopping at both Lidl and Super De Boer (+8.03% and +7.99% points for meat and 
meals, only +2.09% points and +1.04% point for cheese and diapers). The reason is clear: 
unlike remedying its weak points, further improving on its strong points enhances Super de 
Boer‟s complementarity with Lidl (in our example: from .536 to .555), which, in turn, 
increases the appeal of the Super de Boer-Lidl store set. 
TABLE 2.9 
Impact of Alternative Response Strategies for Super de Boer (SdB) 
 Categories where SdB is strong Categories where SdB is weak 
 Meat Prepared meals Cheese  Diapers 
PANEL A: CHANGE IN MARKETING INSTRUMENT IN CATEGORY AT SUPER DE BOER 
Price -10.13% -15.23% -.73% -17.77% 
Assortment +4.45% +25.44% +2.55% +70.99% 
PL share +159.57% +108.43% +41.70% +141.96% 
Change in SdB‟s list attraction +1.00% +1.00% +1.00% +1.00% 
PANEL B: IMPACT ON PATRONAGE AND SPENDING 
Change in fraction of customers in shopping pattern (in % points): 
SSS Lidl -.26% -.26% -.21% -.24% 
MSS Lidl+competitor -10.22% -10.47% -4.33% -11.57% 
MSS Lidl+SdB +8.03% +7.99% +2.09% +1.04% 
SSS SdB +9.58% +9.58% +9.71% +9.50% 
MSS SdB+competitor +14.09% +14.63% +8.49% +30.18% 
Any pattern Lidl -2.45% -2.74% -2.45% -10.77% 
Any pattern SdB +31.70% +32.20% +20.29% +40.72% 
Overall Patronage:     
Lidl -.09% -.11% -.09% -.40% 
SdB 1.53% 1.56% +.98% 1.97% 
Overall Spending:     
Lidl -.10% -.11% -.10% -.40% 
SdB 1.62% 1.64% 1.18% 1.96% 
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Interestingly, this “complementarity-enhancing” strategy may also reveal less 
detrimental to Lidl, as can be seen from Table 2.9. Improvements for meals (a category where 
Super de Boer is strong) lead to a smaller customer loss for Lidl than comparable 
improvements for diapers (a category where Super de Boer is weak instead) (-.11%, 
compared to -.40%). Hence, this strategy may allow the incumbent to recover defected 
customers while keeping the risks of a counterattack from the HD low. In some cases, it even 
leads to better results for Super de Boer overall. For instance: marketing-mix improvements in 
the (strong) meat category imply a 1.53% (1.62%) recovery in the number of customers 
(spending), compared to only .98% (1.18%) for the (weak) cheese category.  
 
2.7   Discussion 
In this paper, we address the impact for traditional supermarkets, of local entry of a 
hard-discounter – a store format that has invaded Europe and is strongly on the rise in the US. 
Building on the literature on multiple-store shopping, we propose a framework in which 
consumers can respond to HD entry along multiple routes, taking into account the 
complementarities between the entrant and traditional incumbents. We test this framework 
using a unique panel data set covering over 190 local HD entries in the Netherlands. In so 
doing, we shed light on the size and nature of the losses incurred by incumbent supermarkets 
as well as the drivers of these effects, and explore how traditional chains can mitigate the 
harmful consequences of these “close encounters with the hard-discounters”.  
 Our main substantive findings are as follows. Like large-discounter entry, the advent 
of a hard-discounter store can lead to substantial losses for incumbents. Interestingly, 
however, the underlying pattern of consumer reactions and the drivers thereof, are 
substantially different. Specifically, we identify four major aspects in which HD entry effects 
differ from large-discounter entries. 
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 First, unlike large-discounter entry, which "makes the incumbent chain lose some of 
its best customers" (Singh et al. 2006, p. 475), entry of a HD hardly affects traditional 
supermarkets' loyal customer count. Customers defecting to the HD are mainly those who 
already patronized multiple stores, and now trade in one of the incumbents for the HD chain.  
Second, in contrast to what was observed for large-discounter entry, the largest source 
of incumbent losses comes from a reduction in the number of store customers rather than a 
reduction in average spending. Losses in spending remain more limited, as they are mainly 
incurred on customers that spent only a portion of their wallet at the chain. 
Third, the type of incumbent most strongly hurt is also quite different. Large-
discounter entry revealed particularly troublesome for chains with strong assortment overlap, 
i.e. chains operating in the same product categories as Wal-Mart (Ailawadi et al. 2010, 
Gielens et al. 2008). In contrast, our results indicate (i) that supermarkets and HDs can carry 
the same categories but still be complementary in their price/assortment emphasis for these 
categories, and (ii) that such complementarity reduces incumbents‟ losses. By spreading their 
outlay across the traditional supermarket and the HD, consumers can “pick the best of both 
worlds”. It follows that especially upscale supermarkets, which derive their strength from 
carrying varied assortments with well-known brands, may be in better shape to withstand HD 
entry. On the one hand, their loyal clientele of single-store shoppers is unlikely to defect to 
the HD. On the other hand, multiple-store shoppers interested in the HD, are likely to visit it 
alongside a complementary chain (i.c. the upscale incumbent) that serves their needs in 
categories where they want “the best of the best” (Nielsen 2008).  
Fourth, we obtain interesting effects of location. Opposite to the findings for large-
discounter entry (Ailawadi et al. 2010, Singh et al. 2006), our results show that being closer to 
the new HD may mitigate losses. Becoming part of a twin-location with the HD may turn the 
traditional supermarket into an attractive option for chained visits, enabling it to better 
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compete with rival stand-alone chains serving more distant locations. However, this only 
works for supermarkets in close proximity to the entrant, resulting in an inverted U-shape 
distance effect: HDs locating at mid-range distance being more harmful than those opening up 
right next to, or farther away from, the incumbent.  
From a managerial perspective, we provide new insights for retailers in search for a 
suited response to local HD entry. Recommended reactions to large-discounter entry include 
minimizing assortment overlap and setting more competitive prices across-the-board (e.g. 
Ailawadi et al. 2010, Gielens et al. 2008). Faced with intensified HD competition, however, 
incumbent responses may have to be differentiated across product categories. Indeed, the 
bigger losses occur because consumers trade one incumbent in their store set for the HD, and 
keep on visiting the (other) incumbent most complementary with the HD. It follows that to 
mitigate losses, incumbents should not just focus on enhancing their own basket utility, but 
should also consider how complementarity with the HD is affected. We show that, by 
improving in categories where it is strong (and the hard-discounter is weak), an incumbent 
can form an appealing store set with this HD, and haul back in multiple-store shoppers while 
lowering the risk of a counterattack of the HD. 
 
2.8   Limitations and Future Research 
Clearly, our study has a number of limitations, and opens up new research 
opportunities. First, given our focus on multiple-store shopping as a driver of HD entry 
effects, we modeled changes in households' systematic shopping patterns. While we 
document how many customers stay as regular shoppers and what proportion of their outlay is 
spent at the incumbent store, we neither shed light on the specific number of visits to the 
incumbent store nor on the possible changes in total grocery spending following HD entry. 
Second, our study underscores the importance of store complementarity, which results from 
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cross-category differences in consumers‟ sensitivity to price, assortment and quality. While 
we operationalized these complementarities based on “average” marketing mix sensitivities 
(to keep the number of parameters in check) – and already uncovered a highly significant 
effect, future studies may further accommodate household heterogeneity in marketing-mix 
responsiveness within these different categories. Third, though fostering complementarity is 
an appealing option for incumbents in the immediate vicinity of the HD, supermarkets located 
at mid-distance from the new HD may not enjoy any agglomeration effects, and may need to 
take a defensive stand. While we considered straight price cuts and standard-private label 
share increases, an alternative approach for supermarkets may be the introduction of a 
dedicated, low-priced private label line. The jury is still out on whether this allows them to 
(profitably) recover customers and customer spending – a topic worth pursuing. Fourth, our 
findings corroborate the importance of a “category-management” approach, in which price 
and assortment reactions are attuned to local competition on a category-by-category basis. 
Yet, we could not generate guidelines on the optimal price shifts or assortment changes, 
which would also require insights into the costs involved in these strategies. Moreover, the 
best-suited response may also depend on the offer and location of other incumbent 
supermarkets – issues that we leave for future study. Finally, our current dataset covers 
multiple local Dutch markets, each with its own unique competitive setting (in terms of the 
chains that are present, and the location of these chains relative to consumers and each other). 
Still, it would be interesting to conduct this study for other countries as well, so as to replicate 
our analysis for an even larger number of different market configurations. An intriguing 
question, for instance, is how advent of a HD would re-shape competition in a market where a 
large-discounter (a format not found in the Netherlands) is already present. Will the HD not 
survive such competition? Or would it, by “teaming up” with traditional chains, actually help 
those chains stand up against the giant? These are fascinating issues for future research. 
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Chapter 3 Battling for the Household’s Category Buck: 
Can Economy Private Labels Help Defend 
Against the Hard-Discounter Threat? 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Hard-discounters (HDs) – with Aldi and Lidl as prime exemplars – have been 
dramatically on the rise. By streamlining their operations and economizing on assortment and 
in-store service, these chains can offer grocery merchandise at rock-bottom prices (Steenkamp 
and Kumar 2009). This has helped HDs in conquering the “hearts and minds” of a growing 
segment of consumers, who believe them to provide better value-for-money than “traditional” 
formats (Business Insights 2008). As such, HDs have made major inroads into the trade of 
these traditional supermarkets, capturing up to 35% of market share in some countries 
(Cleeren et al. 2010) and causing sales losses of up to half a trillion dollars per year 
(Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). 
In the face of this threat, traditional retailers have found themselves forced to develop 
appropriate “defense” strategies against these HDs. While these strategies may revolve around 
a further differentiation of the store (e.g. assortment extensions or improvements in customer 
service) (Cleeren et al. 2010), most retailers opt for a more head-on approach that reduces the 
price gap with the HD. Traditional chains have, for instance, been found to substantially cut 
their product prices (Van Heerde et al. 2008), or launch a discount subsidiary of their own 
(Cleeren et al. 2010). 
An alternative price-related response to the HD threat is the introduction of a 
dedicated “budget” or “economy” private label line (Ailawadi et al. 2008). This line 
comprises very basic “no-frills” products, sold for a bargain price – and, as such, is intended 
to provide an alternative to the products sold at HDs (Dekimpe et al. 2011). While somewhat 
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similar to the cheap “white label generics” that were popular in the 1970s and 1980s (Dick, 
Jain and Richardson 1995; Neidell, Boone and Cagley 1984; Szymanski and Busch 1987), 
economy private labels (EPLs hereafter) nowadays are much more central to retailers‟ private 
label strategies, and are usually carried alongside a “standard” and/or “premium” private label 
tier (Geyskens et al. 2010). EPLs have become an increasingly common sight, as many top 
European retailers like Asda (UK), Carrefour (France) and Migros (Switzerland) have 
introduced them in response to the growing HD presence (Coriolis Research 2002; Just-Food 
2006; Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). 
From an academic perspective, however, not much is known about whether EPLs are 
actually effective in “fending off” the HD threat. Available research on EPLs is primarily 
carried out at the brand level – focusing on how EPLs affect the share of other (store) brands 
within the retailer‟s assortment (e.g. Geyskens et al. 2010) – and therefore does not reveal 
their potential as a defense mechanism against HDs. Such knowledge, though, would be 
particularly interesting in the light of a recent study by Hansen and Singh (2008), who find 
that a higher share of standard private label products may actually foster (rather than prevent) 
consumer switching to a large-discounter (i.c. Wal-Mart). Whether EPLs may have a similar 
counter-productive effect on competition from the HD is however uncertain, because of two 
major differences in competitive situation. First, EPLs provide a much larger price advantage 
(than standard private labels), and a better matching point vis-à-vis HDs (Business Insights 
2008). While this lower price may enhance consumer price sensitivity even further 
(Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song 2002) – and as such trigger extra shifts in spending towards 
discounters – it may also produce the opposite effect. Second, HDs constitute an entirely 
different business model from large-discounters (as is explained in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation). In contrast to large-discounters, whose wide and deep assortments make for a 
full-fledged alternative to traditional chains, the HD‟s attractiveness – and thus its impact of 
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entry – may strongly vary across categories (Nielsen 2007). While this makes the need for an 
appropriate “defense mechanism” against HDs more pressing in some categories than others, 
it likely causes the ability of EPLs to fulfill this role to be category-specific as well. 
Taken together, this leads to the following research questions. First, when a HD enters 
a (traditional) retailer‟s trading zone, what portion of customers‟ purchases will be lost across 
different categories? Second, do EPLs act as a defense mechanism, that is, are category sales 
losses lower if an EPL is available in the category prior to HD entry? Third, can we identify 
category characteristics that influence the seriousness of the HD threat and/or the power of 
EPLs to shield against this threat? We will answer these questions by using a difference-in-
difference approach, which allows us to infer the impact of HD entry by comparing pre- and 
post-entry category sales – both in the absence and presence of EPLs. Because EPL presence 
is not exogenous, this difference-in-difference approach will be combined with a selection 
model to correct for endogeneity bias. 
From an academic perspective, our study contributes to the literature on store format 
competition and category-specific store loyalty, and fits into Ailawadi and Keller (2004)‟s 
call for more research on how differently positioned private labels (such as EPLs) affect a 
retailer‟s performance. For retailers, we shed light on the power of EPLs in keeping HDs at 
bay, and offer guidance on what categories these low-tier brands should primarily be offered 
in. Such insights are particularly compelling given that many retailers are still in the process 
of rolling out their EPL program across product categories.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
characterize EPLs, and give a theoretical rationale for why carrying this tier of private labels 
may or may not prevent store customers from shifting their purchases to HDs. We then 
describe our modeling approach, followed by the empirical setting and data. Next, we present 
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the estimation results, and provide a discussion of these findings. The last section indicates 
limitations and offers directions for further research. 
 
3.2   Theoretical Background 
 Economy private labels are carried by an increasing number of retailers as part of a 
“multi-tiered” private label strategy. Their prices are very low: on average 50 to 60% below 
those of the leading national brands within a category, and 40 to 50% below standard private 
label prices (Nauwelaers et al. 2012). However, their quality tends to be lower than that of 
national brands as well, as EPLs are often manufactured using cheaper ingredients and/or 
dated production technologies. In addition, EPL products only come in a few varieties per 
product category, generally have a sober packaging, and receive limited or no marketing 
support (Business Insights 2008; Geyskens et al. 2010; Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). Unlike 
standard private labels, which are typically positioned as “similar quality to national brands at 
a lower price” (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007), EPLs are usually marketed as “basic, no-frills 
products at rock-bottom prices”.  
 Whereas standard private labels are geared towards competition with national brands 
(Kumar and Steenkamp 2007), retailers often introduce an EPL to defend against the “hard-
discounter threat” (Geyskens et al. 2010). Several arguments can be made for why such an 
approach could prove effective. First, the price advantage of EPLs over leading national 
brands is in general on par with that of HD products; in some cases, it is even larger (Business 
Insights 2008). Unlike standard private labels, EPLs thus help traditional retailers to match or 
even beat the prices found at their HD competitors. Second, and somewhat related, carrying 
EPLs allows traditional supermarkets to better cater to consumers‟ “dual demand” – a term 
recently coined by Nielsen (2008) to denote consumers‟ desire for superior quality in some 
instances, alongside a focus on savings in others. By adding an EPL to his regular assortment 
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of renowned national brands and standard private labels, a traditional retailer can cover the 
full range of consumer needs – providing customers with a “best of the best” product 
alternative in terms of quality as well as in terms of price. This makes it less likely that 
consumers will purchase (a large) part of their basket at a second store – possibly the HD – to 
satisfy those multi-faceted needs (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Third, since EPLs (similar to 
standard private labels) are in general exclusive to a specific retailer, they may help that 
retailer to further differentiate from its competitors. This, in turn, may increase store 
switching costs and foster store loyalty – preventing consumers from shifting part of their 
purchases to a (HD) competitor (e.g. Ailawadi, Neslin and Gedenk 2001; Corstjens and Lal 
2000; Sudhir and Talukdar 2004). 
While the above arguments suggest that EPLs are an effective way for a retailer to 
defend himself against HDs, the current marketing literature provides counter-arguments as 
well. To start off, empirical support for the above store loyalty argument has been far from 
unequivocal. Pauwels and Srinivasan (2004), for example, do not observe systematic 
improvements in store traffic after retailers add a private label to their assortments. Other 
scholars indicate that only specific types of private labels will be able to build store loyalty. 
Private labels need to be of high quality, and their packaging should be at least somewhat 
distinctive before they can serve as a means to differentiate a store (Corstjens and Lal 2000; 
Dick et al. 1995). In contrast, a strong focus on price advantages only tends to lead to 
“private-label proneness” – with consumers developing a preference for (low-priced) private 
labels in general, rather than for a specific private label and the store that carries it (Dawes 
and Nenycz-Thiel 2012). This perspective seems to cast doubt on whether EPLs – with their 
extremely low price, basic quality and sober packaging – can make customers more store 
loyal, and less prone to switch to a HD. 
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Moreover, while EPLs are generally just as cheap as products sold at HDs, they may 
still compare unfavorably when it comes to product quality. EPLs offer a quality that is “basic 
and acceptable” (Geyskens et al. 2010). In contrast, HDs (whose lower prices stem from 
streamlined operations and lean assortments, rather than low-cost production processes) sell 
products that can easily match the quality of top national brands – as has often been 
demonstrated by consumer organizations and testing agencies (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). 
Besides objective quality, EPLs may also be at a disadvantage regarding perceived quality, as 
their minimalistic packaging and limited marketing support are likely to keep consumers‟ 
quality expectations low (Moorthy and Zhao 2000; Richardson, Dick and Jain 1994). In sum, 
EPLs are unlikely to serve as a perfect substitute for HD products in terms of quality. This, 
again, calls their propensity to shield against HDs into question. 
Finally, some studies suggest that EPLs may even be “counterproductive” in this 
regard, and may motivate customers to switch to a HD store. The primary argument here is 
that the introduction of a (low-priced) private label can render price differences more salient 
and increase consumers‟ price sensitivity (Chintagunta et al. 2002; Pauwels and Srinivasan 
2004). This makes consumers more susceptible to the HD, as it offers products comparable in 
quality to national brands, but at a much lower price. This notion is supported by Ailawadi et 
al. (2008) and Hansen and Singh (2008), who find private label buyers to be more prone to 
buy from discounters as well. While these authors studied private labels in general, their 
findings may particularly apply to lower-quality private labels (like EPLs), which especially 
“emphasize and intensify consumer price sensitivity” (Corstjens and Lal 2000). 
In sum, while several theoretical and practical arguments can be made for why EPLs 
constitute an effective defense tool against HDs, other arguments point in the opposite 
direction. The net outcome of these forces, therefore, remains an empirical issue. Moreover, 
this effect may very well differ between product categories, depending on their intrinsic 
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characteristics and on the HD‟s category-specific offer. Indeed, consumers‟ proneness to buy 
at a given store format has been shown to differ across categories (e.g. Bell et al. 1998; Inman 
et al. 2004). In addition, inter-category differences are found to be a strong driver of 
(standard) private label power (e.g. Dawes and Nenycz-Thiel 2012; Dhar and Hoch 1997; 
Hoch and Banerji 1993; Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997). This may also apply to EPLs – and 
their effectiveness vis-à-vis HDs. To gain more insights into the actual power of EPLs as a 
defensive tool, we thus need to empirically assess (i) the extent to which traditional retailers‟ 
category sales are affected by HDs, (ii) the moderating role of EPLs therein and (iii) whether 
these effects differ across categories. Below, we present a methodology that allows us to 
address these issues. 
 
3.3   Methodology 
As indicated above, we need to single out how the presence of an EPL in a product 
category affects a traditional retailer‟s sales losses in that category upon HD entry. This poses 
several methodological challenges. 
First, we need to separate the category sales losses triggered by HD entry, from other 
sources of variation in sales. We achieve this through a before-after approach, in which we 
use the market entry of HD outlets as a natural experiment. Specifically, we consider trading 
zones or “local markets” in which a HD outlet opened up in the course of our observation 
period. For each traditional store in those markets, we then compare category sales in the 
period before the HD store enters, with sales in the same period post-entry, and use this as the 
dependent variable in our model. To reduce the effect of other over-time changes, we keep 
this period rather short (four months before and after HD entry). At the same time, to rule out 
that the sales shifts are caused by differences in the composition of the customer base, rather 
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than by the defection of given customers to the HD, we calculate our dependent variable by 
household, and carry out the analysis at the household-level. 
A second key challenge is to assess whether these category sales losses systematically 
differ with the presence or absence of an EPL. This calls for a “difference-in-difference” 
approach. One possibility would be to compare the entry losses for categories in which an 
EPL is present, with categories in which it is not. Such an approach is not feasible, however, 
for two reasons. For one, it would presume that, in the absence of an EPL, losses to HDs 
would be similar across categories. This is a highly unlikely assumption, given that HDs 
appear to be more successful in some categories than in others (Nielsen 2007). Moreover, it 
would ignore the possibility that categories in which an EPL is introduced are the ones where 
EPLs are more effective per se – resulting in an upward bias of its estimated effect. To resolve 
this issue, we exclusively focus on categories in which an EPL actually became available in 
the course of our data period. While such EPL launches are “national” and occur 
simultaneously for every local market where the traditional chain is active, this does not hold 
for the entry of HD outlets. Hence, for each product category, we have local markets where 
HD entry preceded the category‟s EPL launch, as well as markets where the category‟s EPL 
was introduced prior to HD entry. The variation over time in local HD entry therefore allows 
for within-category comparisons of the impact of HDs in the presence or absence of an EPL.  
Third, focusing exclusively on categories in which an EPL was introduced may create 
a selection problem, which we resolve using the traditional Heckman procedure (Heckman 
1979; see the empirical section for details). Fourth, given that a store‟s clientele may differ 
across local markets (Campo et al. 2000) and that between these local markets, consumers 
may differ in their reactions, we need to control for household and local-market 
characteristics. Fifth, even with a rather contained period, part of the difference between pre- 
and post-entry sales may result from contemporaneous changes in the traditional retailer‟s 
Chapter 3   Battling for the Household’s Category Buck 
65 
own marketing mix, rather than from the HD‟s entry. Again, our model needs to explicitly 
control for such effects.  
Last but not least, we must allow the losses from HD entry, as well as the moderating 
effect of EPL presence on these losses, to differ across categories. To this end, we adopt a 
latent class approach: we estimate the model simultaneously across categories, but allow the 
key parameters to differ between latent groups of categories. This leads to the following 
specification for the main model: 
[3.1] kchkchkch sPQsPQ ,,
*














,, ****   
Here, c denotes the product category, k indexes the traditional chain, h is a household 
indicator (note that since each household panel member resides in a particular local market, 
there is no need for a separate local market indicator) and s indexes the latent class (group) of 
categories. cIM  is the “inverse Mills ratio” of the Heckman procedure to correct for possible 
selection bias (see the next section for more details), Z  is a vector with household- and other 
local-market control variables, and X  is a set of controls related to marketing mix changes 
concurrent with the opening of the HD outlet. 
The dependent variable in equation [3.1] is based on household h‟s average monthly 
purchase quantity in category c and traditional chain k. kchPQ ,,  indicates the percentage 
difference in this amount before and after HD entry in household h‟s local market.
13
 As a 
result, the main intercept β0 and chain-specific deviations β1,1 to β1,K-1 
capture the sales impact 
                                                 
 
13 Note that this approach implies that for each household/category/chain, we only use a single observation. This 
eliminates the need for a time subscript, even though these observations pertain to multiple periods in time. 
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of HD entry for K traditional chains (in the absence of an EPL).
14
 kchEPL ,,  is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether chain k offered an EPL in category c at the time of HD entry in 
household h‟s local market. The corresponding parameter β2 is our main parameter of interest. 
Its sign and significance will indicate whether carrying an EPL reduces – or amplifies – the 
impact of HD entry on traditional retailers. As can be seen from [3.1], we allow the EPL 
parameter β2 as well as the (chain) intercepts β0 and β1,k to vary over latent classes (i.c. 
category groups).
15
 The corresponding log-likelihood function takes the following form: 






































where s  is the size of latent class s, S is the best-fitting number of latent groups, cH  is the 
set of households that we observe in category c and chK ,  is the set of traditional chains in 
which we observe purchases of category c by household h.  
 
3.4   Data and Operationalizations 
Data Sources and Research Setting 
 Our data comprise household scanner panel data for the Dutch market (provided by 
GfK), covering the period 2005-2006. This data pertains to a large number of product 
categories, as classified by GfK. The data set also contains information on socio-demographic 
characteristics of the households, along with their geographical location. For the same period, 
we have access to weekly outlet-level IRI data on the major Dutch supermarket chains, 
                                                 
 
14 While our approach is to assess the defensive power of EPLs by comparing HD entry effects in presence 
versus absence of an EPL, one of the traditional chains in our data (Albert Heijn) already introduced their EPL 
(„Euroshopper‟) in the considered categories before our observation period started. Hence, we don‟t observe 
variation in EPL presence versus absence for this chain. In order to avoid confusion between the impact of EPL 
presence on the one hand, and the appeal of the Albert Heijn chain in the considered categories on the other, we 
will keep the EPL dummy fixed at zero for this chain. Hence, in the case of Albert Heijn, the intercept reflects 
category sales changes after HD entry, given that its EPL is already present. 
15 To incorporate additional flexibility in the model, we also allow the error variance to vary across classes. 
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including the zip codes for all outlets of these chains. Last but not least, we have information 
on the SKU listing dates for the EPL of Dutch chain Super de Boer (“Happy Euro”). 
As mentioned in the previous section, our model is specified in the context of local 
HD entry. We use the IRI data to identify these entries: by comparing week-to-week sales 
levels, we locate 45 outlets of HD chains Aldi and Lidl that opened up in 2005 or 2006.
16
 
These HD outlet openings will allow us to calculate the dependent variable (before-after entry 
difference in category spending at traditional chains) for every household that resides nearby 
one of these HD outlets (see also below).  
 Our SKU listing data set for Super de Boer‟s EPL indicates that while this line first 
emerged in 2003, it was introduced in the majority (89%) of categories between 2005 and 
2006 (i.e. our observation period). Henceforth, we focus on those categories. Even within this 
two-year period, considerable variation exists in the exact timing of the EPL introduction 
across categories. This, together with the fact that the 45 HD entries are also spread in time, 
implies that for many categories we observe both (i) local markets in which the HD entered in 
the absence of an EPL, as well as (ii) local markets in which the EPL was already present at 
the time of entry. Specifically, an EPL was absent (present) in 38% (62%) of the observed 
category/entry-combinations, ensuring the feasibility of our “difference-in-difference” 
approach. 
 As for the households, we assume that they are only likely to respond to a local HD 
entry if it makes the format more accessible to them in terms of travel distance. This implies 
that we only consider those households for which one of the 45 HD entrants opened up at near 
distance from the household‟s home (i.e. within a 5 km radius, see Hwang et al. 2010) and 
                                                 
 
16 In the same fashion, we identify outlet openings (and closures) of other (traditional) chains, data that will be 
used to calculate their distance from each household. 
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became the nearest HD outlet available.
17
 Additionally, for each household, we only track its 
purchases in categories that were already bought before HD entry. Our final sample thus 
consists of 397 households, whose purchasing behavior is observed across 48 product 
categories. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the categories, along with information on the 
EPL introduction dates in these categories. 
TABLE 3.1 
Product Categories and Dates of EPL Introduction at Super de Boer 
Product category EPL introduction  Product category EPL introduction 
Air freshener January 2006  Margarine February 2006 
Baking products May 2006  Microwave meals October 2005 
Butter cakes April 2006  Milk November 2005 
Bread February 2006  Muesli October 2005 
Canned meat December 2005  Mustard March 2006 
Canned vegetables November 2005  Oils January 2006 
Cheese spread December 2005  Pancake mix February 2006 
Coffee May 2006  Pasta sauce February 2006 
Coffee creamer March 2006  Peanuts and nuts November 2005 
Cold cuts October 2005  Powder detergent December 2005 
Cookies January 2006  Prepared meat December 2005 
Dry biscuits January 2006  Rye bread December 2005 
Eggs January 2006  Salad dressing March 2006 
Fabric softener January 2006  Salads November 2005 
Fresh vegetables November 2005  Sandwich salads October 2005 
Fruit compote February 2006  Sausages January 2006 
Frying fat January 2006  Shampoo February 2006 
Grated cheese December 2005  Spaghetti March 2006 
Gravy products April 2006  Sprinkles February 2006 
Hair gel February 2006  Tea January 2006 
Hard cheese December 2005  Toilet paper November 2005 
Jam January 2006  Vermicelli April 2006 
Ketchup February 2006  Vinegar March 2006 
Liquid detergent December 2005  Waffles November 2005 
 
Though we will infer the defensive power of EPLs from our data for Super de Boer, 
we also include category sales shifts at three other chains (Albert Heijn, C1000 and Plus, who 
together with Super de Boer account for 48% of Dutch supermarket sales in 2005-2006). 
While no variation in EPL presence is observed for these chains (Albert Heijn‟s EPL was 
                                                 
 
17 Only one household encountered more than one HD entry over the observation period. For that household, we 
considered the entry that was first to occur. 
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available throughout the entire observation period – see also footnote 14 – while C1000 and 
Plus did not carry an EPL at all), the rationale behind including these observations is twofold. 
First, the observations of other chains may allow for a more reliable assessment of the 
category-specific effects of HD entry, and of the controls – leading to a cleaner estimate of 
the EPL impact. Second, including data for these chains is interesting in its own right, as it 
sheds light on the HD losses for traditional supermarkets other than Super de Boer. In total, 
we thus have 6868 observations available for model estimation.
18
 
Variables and Operationalizations 
Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable in our model, , is defined as the percentage difference 
in household h‟s average purchase quantity (expressed in volume units, such as kilograms or 
liters) of category c in chain k, in the period before and after HD entry. We consider a four-
month period, and average across months, so that the dependent variable is operationalized as 
follows (with being the month in which the HD entered household h‟s local market and 






































tkchPQ ,,,  is household h‟s total purchase quantity of category c in chain k and in month t. 
Before we obtain these values from our panel data set, we first apply a correction for possible 
                                                 
 
18 Note that: (i) each household/category/chain-combination is a single observation in our data set, (ii) some 
households buy a category in more than one chain, and (iii) not every category is bought by all households. 
h,c,kPQΔ
)(h
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seasonality in category sales.
19
 This ensures that we will not confuse differences in purchase 
behavior due to HD entry with those resulting from seasonal shifts. 
Independent variables 
To accommodate chain-specific fixed effects, our main model incorporates chain 
dummies for the major players (C1000, Plus and Super de Boer) except Albert Heijn, which 
serves as the reference chain. Hence, in equation [3.1], β0,s will capture the (category-group 
specific) sales loss from HD entry for Albert Heijn. For the remaining chains, this loss is 
given by β0,s plus their chain-specific deviation β1,k,s. The EPL effect is captured by a step 
dummy, equal to 0 if, at the time of HD entry in a household‟s local market, the EPL was 
absent from the category in the chain, and equal to 1 if it was present. An alternative would be 
to measure the number of SKUs in the category‟s EPL line. However, given that this number 
hardly varies after the EPL is introduced (consistent with the observation that EPL lines 
comprise only few, basic SKUs), this operationalization would not add much.
20
 
As for the household and local market controls, we include five household 
demographic variables ( hHHsize , hChildren , hIncome , hDualInc and hAge ) to proxy for 
household traits that may drive susceptibility to HD entry, such as time availability, taste 
variance and price sensitivity (for details on the measurement of these variables, see Table 
3.2). In addition, we control for differences in households‟ local store environments by 
including two store distance variables. hDistHD  is the change in household h‟s travel 
 
                                                 
 
19 To correct for seasonality, we proceed as follows. First, we compute monthly category sales totals from our 
panel data set, for the period 2002-2006. We convert these monthly sales into „indices‟ by computing their 
percentage deviation from the category average. For each category, we then regress these indices on month 
dummies. The coefficients of these regressions may be interpreted as the month-to-month (percentage) 
deviations from the category‟s average sales level. We subsequently apply these coefficients to the sampled 
households‟ purchase quantity averages to obtain the deviations at the household level. As a final step, we 
subtract these deviations from households‟ actual monthly purchase quantities. 
20 We estimated a model in which the step dummy was replaced by the number of EPL SKUs, and found the 
pattern of results to remain the same. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Variable Operationalizations (Main Model) 
Notation Variable name Operationalization 
Dependent variable   







































) quantity (expressed in volume units, e.g. 
kilograms/liters) purchased by household h of category c in chain k 
during month t. 
EPL proliferation   
kchEPL ,,  EPL presence at 
hard-discounter entry 
Dummy indicator, equals 1 when any EPL SKUs are available for 
category c in chain k at the time of HD entry in household h‟s local 
market, 0 otherwise 
Controls: Demographics  
hHHsize  Household size Number of household members of household h 
hChildren  Number of children Number of child members (age<18) of household h 
hIncome  Household income Net monthly income (in thousands of euros) of household h 
hDualInc  Dual-income 
household 
Dummy indicator, equals 1 if household h is a dual-income 
household, 0 otherwise 
hAge  Age of household 
head 
Age (in years) of the head of household h 
Controls:  (Changes in) Marketing mix  



























































































































































tkcPrice ,,  Category price Average price per volume unit, across all non-EPL SKUs sold in 
category c by chain k in month t. 
tkcAssort ,,  Category assortment 
size 
Number of unique non-EPL SKUs sold in category c by chain k in 
month t. 
tkcSPL ,,  Category standard PL 
proliferation 
Number of unique standard PL SKUs sold in category c in chain k 
and month t, relative to category c‟s assortment size. 
tkcPromo ,,  Category promotional 
activity 
Dummy indicator, equals 1 if any SKUs in category c are on 
featured promotion in chain k and month t, 0 otherwise. 
Controls: (Changes in) Store distance  























khDist ,  Change in travel 




















thDistHD ,  Travel distance to 
hard-discounter 
Euclidean distance between household h‟s home and the nearest 
outlet of a hard-discounter chain, measured in kilometers.  
tkhDist ,,  Travel distance to 
chain 
Euclidean distance between household h‟s home and the nearest 
outlet of chain k, measured in kilometers.  
a 
We use absolute instead of percentage changes for promotional activity, due to the possibility of zero-values 
(i.e. no promotional activity) in the pre-entry period. 
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distance to the nearest HD outlet between the pre- and post-entry periods. This variable thus 
reflects the increase in accessibility of the HD format to household h as a result of local HD 
entry. Similarly, khDist ,  is the change in household h‟s travel distance to the nearest outlet of 
traditional chain k pre- and post-entry. By including this variable, we control for changes in 
category purchase behavior that should not be attributed to the HD entry, but rather to 
contemporaneous changes in the traditional retailer‟s own outlet density. 
Finally, the control variables kchPrice ,, , kchAssort ,, , kchSPL ,,  and kchPromo ,,
reflect (percentage) changes in traditional retailers‟ average category price, assortment size, 
standard private label proliferation and promotional activity in the four months before and 
after the HD entry, respectively. These variables thus control for any concurrent sales effects 
of retailers‟ own marketing activities. Note that we do not take EPL SKUs into account when 
computing these price, assortment and private label controls. In this manner, we avoid that 
(part of) the EPL effect that we wish to capture in the parameter β2,s  is incorporated in the 
marketing mix parameters instead. 
To facilitate interpretation, we mean-center the household-demographics prior to 
estimation. Details on the measurement of the independent variables can be found in Table 
3.2. 
Table 3.3 provides category-level descriptives for some key variables. The table 
clearly reveals that, on average, consumers buy less from traditional supermarkets in the 
period after HD entry (negative sign for “ΔPurchase quantity” in the vast majority – i.e. 45 
out of 48 – categories). Such losses occur for each of the traditional chains and, at least for 
some categories, appear to be quite severe. However, these figures do not yet provide a clean 
picture: some of the sales shifts possibly being due to other factors. Indeed, though Table 3.3 
shows that the chains‟ marketing mix remains relatively stable around HD entry – which can 
 











Air freshener .015 (.047) .076 (.121) .000 (.000) -.034 (.172) -.499 (1.167) 
Baking products .005 (.027) -.002 (.100) .027 (.219) -.082 (.218) -.279 (.841) 
Bread -.096 (.088) -.136 (.209) .650 (1.326) -.015 (.283) -.515 (1.083) 
Butter cakes .003 (.056) .098 (.215) .047 (.164) -.032 (.243) -.511 (.968) 
Canned meat -.013 (.033) .008 (.063) -.003 (.063) -.199 (.230) -.296 (1.154) 
Canned vegetables .005 (.037) .020 (.052) .044 (.078) -.108 (.312) .023 (1.271) 
Cheese spread -.048 (.063) -.059 (.117) .073 (.124) -.062 (.265) -.429 (.924) 
Coffee -.002 (.047) .084 (.060) -.028 (.081) .000 (.000) -.049 (1.303) 
Coffee creamer -.015 (.083) .012 (.099) .003 (.062) -.025 (.101) -.495 (.580) 
Cold cuts .003 (.015) .008 (.087) .166 (.366) -.026 (.249) .077 (1.248) 
Cookies .000 (.032) .009 (.157) .298 (.631) -.063 (.241) -.183 (1.189) 
Dry biscuits -.004 (.046) .018 (.062) .048 (.135) .086 (.313) -.301 (1.098) 
Eggs -.002 (.063) .031 (.076) .128 (.224) -.001 (.327) -.187 (1.033) 
Fabric softener .052 (.052) .118 (.098) -.105 (.126) -.081 (.287) -.418 (.977) 
Fresh vegetables -.002 (.066) .040 (.108) .006 (.162) .095 (.428) .155 (1.301) 
Fruit compote .044 (.122) .001 (.085) .001 (.189) -.027 (.347) -.106 (1.147) 
Frying fat .033 (.052) .059 (.092) -.024 (.083) -.134 (.415) -.707 (.590) 
Grated cheese .003 (.037) .055 (.239) .056 (.134) -.063 (.172) -.318 (1.030) 
Gravy products -.038 (.053) .026 (.115) .000 (.000) .004 (.438) -.227 (1.657) 
Hair gel -.000 (.150) .096 (.159) -.053 (.236) .033 (.176) -.402 (1.160) 
Hard cheese -.002 (.018) .029 (.051) .005 (.391) .121 (.398) -.191 (1.133) 
Jam .024 (.084) .036 (.131) .039 (.220) .029 (.294) -.403 (.776) 
Ketchup -.013 (.066) .038 (.058) .138 (.378) .172 (.168) -.565 (.740) 
Liquid detergent -.011 (.050) .130 (.106) -.078 (.097) .000 (.000) -.299 (1.274) 
Margarine .083 (.063) .039 (.053) .006 (.126) -.034 (.270) -.248 (.999) 
Microwave meals .031 (.029) .079 (.058) .014 (.052) .000 (.106) -.194 (1.316) 
Milk -.020 (.039) -.023 (.047) .042 (.044) -.121 (.240) -.079 (1.150) 
Muesli .007 (.037) .010 (.061) .043 (.153) .026 (.290) -.129 (1.535) 
Mustard .010 (.085) .089 (.141) .000 (.000) .004 (.033) -.614 (.721) 
Oils .039 (.076) .036 (.077) -.005 (.153) -.148 (.233) -.317 (1.297) 
Pancake mix .073 (.109) .069 (.203) .177 (.418) .029 (.326) -.232 (1.776) 
Pasta sauce -.006 (.043) .059 (.045) .120 (.325) .085 (.231) -.382 (.993) 
Peanuts and nuts -.010 (.027) .035 (.096) -.028 (.066) -.060 (.260) -.286 (1.159) 
Powder detergent .008 (.038) .048 (.094) -.034 (.154) .000 (.000) -.407 (.927) 
Prepared meat .028 (.034) .068 (.080) .287 (.261) -.187 (.273) -.083 (1.330) 
Rye bread -.006 (.040) -.012 (.106) .094 (.274) -.013 (.085) -.452 (.881) 
Salad dressing .058 (.062) .048 (.130) .038 (.401) -.060 (.406) -.241 (1.371) 
Salads .020 (.051) .070 (.139) .160 (.478) .041 (.489) -.335 (1.402) 
Sandwich salads .032 (.047) .051 (.086) .200 (1.026) .024 (.148) -.148 (1.213) 
Sausages -.034 (.062) -.214 (.315) .297 (.346) -.400 (.452) -.927 (1.260) 
Shampoo .026 (.080) .030 (.117) .168 (.687) -.030 (.173) -.628 (.853) 
Spaghetti .008 (.080) -.000 (.065) .023 (.096) .102 (.404) -.564 (.746) 
Sprinkles .025 (.053) .065 (.077) .119 (.285) .044 (.228) -.172 (1.241) 
Tea .018 (.035) .045 (.086) -.025 (.057) -.213 (.316) -.117 (1.327) 
Toilet paper .013 (.040) .051 (.068) -.054 (.059) -.004 (.030) -.201 (1.239) 
Vermicelli .037 (.081) -.059 (.088) .000 (.000) .049 (.177) -.693 (.512) 
Vinegar .080 (.231) .074 (.100) -.018 (.097) -.063 (.236) -.696 (.694) 
Waffles -.007 (.065) .022 (.101) -.060 (.229) .134 (.480) -.458 (1.045) 
a 
Mean values (standard deviations) are in bold (in brackets), and are computed across households and chains. 
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be explained by the chains‟ centralized management – some shifts do occur.
21
 Moreover, the 
question remains whether these losses can be mitigated by carrying an EPL in the category.  
Based on the rough data, it appears that having an EPL helps to counter the HD threat: 
in the presence of EPLs, we observe smaller losses from HD entry for 62.5% of the categories 
– although on average, these reductions are limited in size (5.91%). At the same time, 
however, the standard deviation across categories is substantial, and it is unclear to what 
extent the effect is due to local market differences (i.e. differences in household profiles or 
distance to the new HD) rather than EPL presence as such. For a clean assessment of the EPL 
effect, we use the model presented in equation [3.1], which allows us to control for these 
confounds. 
 
3.5   Results 
Sample selection  
We estimate our model on a dataset pertaining to 48 categories in which Super de 
Boer introduced its EPL. However, Super de Boer most likely did not choose these categories 
at random. Rather, they may be the categories in which the EPL was deemed most effective, 
or categories in which the impact of HD entry was expected to be most severe. This creates a 
sample selection problem, which we need to correct for to avoid bias in the parameter 
estimates (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). We do so by applying Heckman‟s traditional two-
step procedure (Heckman, 1979). This procedure requires us to first specify a “selection 
equation” that links the retailer‟s decision whether or not to introduce an EPL in a category, to 
a set of relevant category characteristics. We include three sets of such characteristics. The 
first group of characteristics (category penetration, purchase frequency and sales growth) 
                                                 
 
21 We note that, since Dutch retailers are managed centrally and, accordingly, our marketing mix measures are 
calculated at the chain (not the store) level, these shifts cannot follow from the specific HD opening itself (which 
is location-specific), but just happen to co-occur. 
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reflects the category‟s (monetary) importance to a retailer (Ter Braak 2012). As such, they 
may help the retailer in judging whether the category is worth the investment of developing 
and carrying an EPL. The second group (promotion frequency, standard private label 
proliferation and standard private label price advantage (over national brands)) indicates to 
what extent the retailer‟s current category offer already caters to price-sensitive consumers. 
Retailers may use this information to evaluate whether an EPL will be of added value for a 
category. Finally, as retailers have shown to be quite eager in matching competitors‟ price-
related marketing activities (e.g. Van Heerde et al. 2008), we include the EPL proliferation of 
competing retailers in the selection equation as well. Table 3.4, panel A provides more details 
on the included characteristics, along with their operationalization. The (probit) selection 
model, which is to be estimated on the total set of categories, takes the following form (where 
cEPLcarried  is a binary indicator that equals 1 if Super de Boer carried an EPL in category c 
at any time during our 2005-2006 observation period and 0 otherwise; and *cEPLcarried  is a 







































 The estimated selection model does quite well in distinguishing the sampled 
categories from the remaining categories: 86.5% of the categories in which Super de Boer 
carries an EPL, are correctly predicted as such by the model (for the cutoff point, we use the 
percentage of categories in which an EPL is carried). As shown in Table 3.5, Super de Boer 
primarily offers an EPL in categories that are frequently purchased, and in which its 
competitors have an EPL as well.  Following the procedure of Heckman (1979), we use the 
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TABLE 3.4 
Variable Operationalizations (Category Factors) 
Notation Variable name Operationalization 
PANEL A: SELECTION MODEL 
cnPenetratio  Penetration (Year) average share of the retailer‟s
a
 customers that bought 
category c at least once. 
cFrequency  Purchase frequency (Year) average number of weeks in which a category purchase was 
made by the retailer‟s customers who buy in category c. 
cGrowth  Sales growth (Year) average percentual growth of the retailer‟s volume sales in 
category c. 
cPromo_freq  Promotion frequency (Year) average share of the retailer‟s national brand volume sales in 
category c that were made on price promotion. 
cerationSPL_prolif  
Standard private label 
proliferation 
(Year) average assortment share of the retailer‟s standard private 





(Year) average ratio of category c‟s leading national brand‟s (SKU-
weighted) price at the retailer, to the retailer‟s standard private 








 carried an EPL in category c, 0 otherwise  






 (on 5-point Likert scale) of the degree to 
which products in category c are primarily evaluated in terms of 
hedonic product characteristics (instead of functional product 




Averaged expert rating (on 5-point Likert scale) of the degree to 
which products in category c are publicly consumed (Cronbach‟s : 
.708). 
cationDifferenti  Product 
differentiation 
(Year) average number of unique SKUs carried by the retailer in 
category c 
cQual_var  Quality variability Averaged expert rating (on 5-point Likert scale) of the degree to 
which products in category c vary in quality (Cronbach‟s : .761). 
cHD_SKUs  Number of SKUs at 
hard-discounter 
(Year) average number of unique SKUs carried by hard-discounters 
(averaged across Aldi and Lidl), in category c. 
cEPL_order  EPL introduction 
order 
Month (ranging from January 2005 (1) to December 2006 (24)) in 
which the retailer introduced its EPL in category c. 
ccediffHD_EPL_pri  Hard-discounter/EPL 
price difference 
(Year) average ratio of category c‟s (SKU-weighted) price at hard-
discounters (averaged across Aldi and Lidl), to the retailer‟s 
economy private label‟s (SKU-weighted) price. 
a 
In the context of this study, we operationalize these characteristics for Super de Boer. 
b 
Albert Heijn is the only relevant competitor here, being the only one that carried an EPL before Super de Boer. 
c 
As Super de Boer mainly rolled out its EPL in 2005 and 2006, we measure the EPL proliferation of competitors 
at the end of 2004. 
d 
The category characteristics “hedonic (vs. functional) product”, “visibility of consumption” and “quality 
variability” are assessed through a survey, filled in by three experts (see Appendix 4 for the specific items that 
were used). With regard to inter-rater reliability, an average Spearman correlation coefficient of .6 was obtained 
across scales and expert pairs. 
 
selection model parameters to compute the inverse Mills ratio for each category in our final 
sample, and include it as an additional explanatory variable in our main model (see equation 
[3.1]).While this approach will alleviate the bias in the main model‟s parameter estimates, it 
also introduces heteroscedasticity into the error term. We therefore apply weighted least 
squares, to make the parameters‟ standard errors unbiased as well (Smits 1999). 
Chapter 3   Battling for the Household’s Category Buck 
77 
TABLE 3.5 
Parameter Estimates (Selection Equation) 
Parameter  Estimate
a 
Intercept (φ0) -2.117 
(-3.275) 
Penetration (φ1) .021 
(.019) 
Purchase frequency (φ2) .191 
(2.212) 
Sales growth (φ3) -.225 
(-.407) 
Promotion frequency (φ4) .939 
(.231) 
Standard private label share (φ5) .607 
(.148) 
Standard private label-national brand price difference (φ6) -.064 
(-.429) 
Competitors‟ EPL proliferation (φ7) 1.214 
(5.532) 
a 
Estimates significant at the 5% level (two-sided) are portrayed in bold.  
Values in brackets represent t-values for the coefficients. 
 
Main model results 
 Table 3.6 reports fit statistics for the one- to four-class solutions. We retain three 
classes (i.e. groups of categories), as this solution yields the best fit in terms of BIC and 
CAIC. Table 3.7 reports the parameter estimates for the three groups (which include 46%, 




# classes # parameters 
Fit
 
AIC AIC3 BIC CAIC 
1 18 18496 18514 18526 18544 
2 25 18301 18326 18344 18369 
3 32 18248 18280 18303 18335 
4 39 18238 18277 18305 18344 
 
Before turning to the key parameters, we note that the coefficient of the inverse Mills 
ratio is significant. Its negative sign implies that the error terms of the selection equation and 
the main model are negatively correlated: Super de Boer thus primarily introduces an EPL in 
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categories for which the sales loss after HD entry is high. Also, most of the control variables 
have a significant effect. As expected, price reductions, assortment extensions and increases 
in promotional activity make the retailer‟s customers buy more from the category. 
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TABLE 3.8 
Category Allocation to Latent Classes (Category Groups) 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Canned meat
a 
Air freshener Coffee creamer 
Canned vegetables Baking products Frying fat 
Coffee Bread Jam 
Cold cuts Butter cakes Ketchup 
Cookies Cheese spread Mustard 
Fresh vegetables Dry biscuits Shampoo 
Fruit compote Eggs Spaghetti 
Gravy products Fabric softener Vermicelli 
Hard cheese Grated cheese Vinegar 
Liquid detergent Hair gel  
Microwave meals Margarine  
Milk Pasta sauce  
Muesli Peanuts and nuts  
Oils Powder detergent  
Pancake mix Rye bread  
Prepared meat Sausages  
Salad dressing Waffles  
Salads   
Sandwich salads   
Sprinkles   
Tea   
Toilet paper   
a 
Categories are allocated to classes based on their posterior  
class-membership probabilities. 
 
Moreover, we find that when the distance between a household and a traditional 
retailer becomes smaller/larger (e.g. because the retailer opens a new outlet or closes a current 
one down), more/less is bought from the retailer. Hence, separating out these effects turns out 
to be important to get a clean estimate of the impact of HD entry and EPL presence. 
Our primary interest, however, lies in the parameters that capture the category sales 
impact of HD entry on traditional retailers, and whether this impact is moderated by the 
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Sales impact of hard-discounter entry 
 From the estimated (chain) intercepts across latent classes, it becomes apparent that 
traditional retailers can suffer substantial losses from HD entry,
22
 but that the effect differs 
widely across categories. For Albert Heijn, the loss from HD entry in categories of group s is 
reflected in the estimate for β0,s.  For C1000, Plus and Super de Boer, we test this HD entry 
effect by assessing the significance of the associated combination of intercepts (e.g. for 
C1000, we test the significance of β0,s+ β1,1,s). We find that in group 1, the HD entry effect is 
not significantly different from zero for any of the four traditional chains. For this group of 
categories, local HD entry does not appear to entail a systematic sales drop – which may 
indicate that the purchase of these categories is strongly tied to the traditional supermarket 
format (Inman et al. 2004). In group 2, however, traditional retailers do seem to be 
(adversely) affected by local HD entry – the entry effect being negative and significant for all 
four chains (which is in line with the descriptives in Table 3.3). These effects are quite 
considerable: after local HD entry, customers‟ category purchase quantity is reduced by about 
30% on average. Finally, even more pronounced entry losses are observed in the third group 
of categories, and these losses are again significant for all chains (characteristics that can 
explain these differences are discussed in the section on “category group profiles”). 
Given that the household variables are mean-centered, the previously discussed loss 
figures apply to the average household. While these losses are likely to differ across 
households, our results indicate that demographics have low explanatory power in this regard. 
This is not uncommon: other studies on customer defection to discounters (e.g. Singh et al. 
                                                 
 
22 Unlike prior studies (e.g. Cleeren et al. 2010), we do not explicitly make a distinction between HD outlets that 
are the „first of their kind‟ to enter a local market, and HD outlets that open up subsequently. This is mainly 
because the number of „first-mover‟ entries in our sample is fairly small: during the pre-entry period, only 8% of 
households did not yet have a HD located within a 5 km radius. Moreover, we already incorporate a „change in 
travel distance to the HD‟-variable – which is likely to be much larger in magnitude for first-mover entries (since 
the household did not have an HD outlet nearby prior to entry). However, this variable is not significant in our 
final model, which makes it unlikely that substantial differences exist in the category sales impact of first-mover 
and subsequent HD entries. 
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2006) come to a similar conclusion. We do obtain a marginally significant effect for income, 
and find that less affluent households shift a larger share of their purchases away from the 
traditional supermarket after HD entry (which makes sense, given the tighter budget of these 
households). 
Effectiveness of EPLs  
The question central to our paper – whether carrying an EPL helps traditional retailers 
defend against local HD entry – can be assessed from the parameter β2. This parameter is not 
significant for category groups 1 and 2, implying that carrying an EPL in these categories will 
neither mitigate nor amplify the sales loss for a traditional retailer after HD entry. For group 3 
however, the EPL presence parameter is significant, and has a positive sign. For categories in 
this group, carrying an EPL at the time of HD entry thus lowers the sales loss for the 
traditional retailer. Specifically, we find that for group 3, the parameter combination 
β0+β1,3+β2 (which is the total HD entry effect for Super de Boer when it carries an EPL) does 
not significantly differ from zero (p-value .82). This implies that, for the average household, 
offering an EPL in the categories of group 3 successfully prevents Super de Boer from losing 
household purchases in these categories after HD entry. 
Category group profiles 
 Table 3.9 displays the position of the three category groups along two dimensions: the 
nature of the HD entry effect and the effectiveness of EPLs. Two things catch the eye. First, 
for a considerable number of categories in which an EPL is introduced (group 1, 46% of 
categories), local HD entry does not seem to systematically affect traditional retailers‟ sales – 
regardless of whether an EPL is present. Second, while EPLs prove to be an effective defense 
tool in categories where traditional retailers suffer the most severe losses after HD entry, they 
do not seem to work positively in categories where retailers are less vulnerable. 
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TABLE 3.9 
Category Group Characterization 
 Change in category sales after hard-discounter entry 
No changes Sales loss 
Effect of EPL 
presence 
No effect 
Class 1 (22 categories) 
(e.g. canned vegetables, cold 
cuts, milk) 
Class 2 (17 categories) 
(e.g. dry biscuits, eggs, 





Class 3 (9 categories) 
(e.g. jam, ketchup, spaghetti) 
 
 
 To get a feel for what drives these differences, we explore whether the class 
membership of the sample categories can be explained from category factors. Such factors 
may be “intrinsic” to the category, as well as more market-related. Based on the available 
data, and insights from previous literature on private label performance and store format 
choice, we consider as intrinsic characteristics the category‟s purchase frequency (Dawes and 
Nenycz-Thiel 2012; Dhar et al. 2001; Sethuraman 2003), its hedonic versus functional nature 
(Batra and Sinha 2000; Sethuraman 2003; Sethuraman and Cole 1999), the visibility of 
consumption in this category (Semeijn, Van Riel and Ambrosini 2004), the degree to which 
products in the category are differentiated (Inman et al. 2004) and the  perceived variability in 
product quality (Batra and Sinha 2000; Hoch and Banerji 1993). As for the market-related 
characteristics, we include the traditional retailer‟s standard private label proliferation in the 
category (Dhar and Hoch 1997) and the order in which the EPL is introduced in the category 
by the retailer (Sayman and Raju 2004). Moreover, we include two factors affecting the 
comparative advantage of the HD‟s offer: the number of SKUs present in the HD‟s category 
assortment, and the price differential with the EPL. For information on the operationalization 
of these factors, see Table 3.4, panel B. 
 For each of the three category groups, we conduct ANOVAs to compare members and 
non-members of the group on these factors. Table 3.10 depicts the results, along with 
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TABLE 3.10 
Category Factors across Classes and ANOVAs 

























































Reported values are means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the category     
characteristics per class. Values in bold (underlined) are class means that 
significantly differ on a 5% (10%) level from the mean over the other two classes. 
 
descriptives of the factors for each group. Our primary interest lies in the characteristics of 
groups 2 and 3, comprising the categories in which traditional retailers are vulnerable to HDs. 
Looking at the descriptives, group 2 – which holds categories for which EPLs do not help in 
mitigating the losses to HDs (such as dry biscuits, eggs, peanuts and nuts) – seems somewhat 
“average” on almost every characteristic. As such, a remarkable result is that this group does 
not significantly differ from the other two on any of the included characteristics. For this 
reason, the focus in the rest of the discussion below is on category group 3 instead, which 
holds the categories in which traditional retailers are (most) vulnerable to HDs, but where 
EPLs can help them effectively defend as well.  
The ANOVA results indicate that categories in class 3 have a significantly lower 
purchase frequency compared to the remaining categories.
23
 Moreover, categories in group 3 
                                                 
 
23 Due to the exploratory nature of this analysis, and the small sample size for the ANOVAs (48 categories), we 
test significance at the 10% level. Also, because of this limited number of data points, we use separate ANOVAs 
for each variable. 
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seem to be rather homogeneous: they are relatively undifferentiated (few unique SKUs) and 
have the lowest perceived variability in quality. Though they are the least hedonic in nature, 
and show the lowest levels of consumption visibility, these effects are not significant. While 
EPL effectiveness appears to be related to the HD‟s assortment size – group 3 comprising 
categories for which the HD chain offers a smaller assortment – the magnitude of the price 
gap with the HD does not seem to matter. Interestingly, we find that EPL introduction order is 
significantly and positively related to class 3-membership, suggesting that EPLs become more 
effective as the rollout proceeds. The proliferation of the standard private label in the 
retailer‟s assortment, finally, is not linked to group membership. 
Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our findings, we test several alternative specifications. 
First, we estimate a model in which the four-month post-entry period does not start in the 
month immediately following the HD entry, but one month thereafter. Openings of HD 
outlets may go together with special (promotional) activities aimed to attract traffic to the new 
store, and omitting the month immediately after HD entry allows us to assess whether our 
original findings are influenced by such activities. We find the pattern of results to be largely 
unaffected. Like before, we obtain one group of categories in which EPLs (significantly) 
lower HD-entry losses and, again, this is the group where the negative impact of HD entry on 
traditional chains is most severe.
24
 Moreover, focusing on the differences in category 
characteristics between groups, we find the direction of effects to be the same as in Table 
3.10. The differences remain significant for purchase frequency, product differentiation, EPL 
introduction order and the number of SKUs carried by HDs. In addition, the differences on 
hedonic (versus utilitarian) product and standard private label proliferation are now 
                                                 
 
24 We do note that the group where the EPL effect is significant is now larger, and comprises nine extra 
categories. 
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significant as well (under a 10% and 5% level, respectively). We conclude that our results are 
fairly robust to the alternative operationalization of our post-entry period. 
Second, we estimate three more variants of the model, each of which incorporates an 
additional control variable that was not included in the base model. We will discuss how each 
of these variables can help overcome a limitation of the base model, and present the results 
thereafter.  
Interpurchase time. Although our approach of using a “fixed” four-month pre- and post-entry 
period for all categories has its advantages (i.e. it ensures comparability by covering the same 
shopping trips), it does not take differences in category purchase frequency into account. To 
control for these differences, we therefore include category interpurchase time (in weeks, 
averaged across households) as a first additional predictor. 
Timing of HD entry. Our post-entry period comprises the four months following the month in 
which the HD entered. As such, for some HD entries, we measure the entry‟s impact some 
weeks after the outlet opened up (if the HD entered at the beginning of the month), while for 
others the impact is measured immediately after the outlet‟s opening (if the HD entered at the 
end of the month). To check whether these differences in timing affect the measured impact 
of HD entry, we include timing-of-entry (through week dummies) as a second additional 
predictor. 
Local competition. While our base model recognizes that the impact of HD entry may depend 
on the entrant‟s own characteristics (e.g. through the travel distance variable, which indicates 
to what extent the entrant has made the HD format more accessible), it does not so much 
account for the competitive context in which the HD enters. However, the number of active 
competitors may actually influence households‟ response to the new HD – for example 
because it determines whether households were already able to “shop around” (and thereby 
save money) prior to the HD‟s entry. To check whether the impact of HD entry indeed 
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depends on the competitive environment, we include the number of competing chains (within 
a 5 km radius from the household, at the time of HD entry) as a third additional predictor. 
Though some of these additional variables prove significant (the impact of HD entry is 
significantly more negative in categories with a larger interpurchase time: p-value <.01, and 
for entries in the fourth week of the month: p-value <.01), the main pattern of results 
(direction, significance and relative magnitude of parameter estimates, and latent class 
membership) remains (virtually) the same (details can be obtained from the authors upon 
request). This lends further confidence to the robustness of our findings. 
 
3.6   Discussion 
The astounding rise of hard-discounters has triggered a quest for proper defense 
mechanisms among traditional retailers. Though economy private labels have been advanced 
by academics and practitioners as a potentially effective defense tool, empirical support for 
this contention has been limited at best. One explanation for this lack of evidence is the 
difficulty of isolating such “defensive” power of EPLs from other market changes. In this 
paper, we adopt a difference-in-difference methodology to a unique (scanner panel) data set 
for the Dutch grocery market – covering multiple openings of HD stores, as well as EPL 
introductions in multiple product categories. This approach allows us to provide some – to the 
best of our knowledge, first – empirical indications on the following issues. When a HD 
enters the trading zone of a traditional supermarket chain, what share of customers‟ category 
purchases is lost if the chain does not carry an EPL in that category? Does carrying an EPL 
mitigate these category sales losses? And: what explains the differences between categories in 
vulnerability to HD entry and, especially, the power of EPLs to counter the HD threat? 
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Vulnerability to hard-discounter entry in the absence of an EPL 
As expected, local entry of a HD store in general makes traditional chain customers 
buy less from this chain. Using the parameters from our model, and aggregating the predicted 
sales volume losses from HD entry across the households and categories in our sample, we 
observe a sales loss that is quite substantial: 27.6%.
25
 A striking observation is that this 
overall picture conceals dramatic category differences. Specifically, some categories, such as 
frying fat and jam, exhibit major purchase shifts away from traditional chains. In other 
categories, however, sales losses are less pronounced (i.e. roughly half as large, e.g. for eggs 
and sausages) or even remain virtually absent (e.g. for coffee and fresh vegetables). Hence, 
the “HD threat” unfolds itself as highly category-specific. 
Defensive power of EPL 
Likewise, the impact of having an EPL differs considerably between categories. In 
none of the product categories, the presence of an EPL amplifies the sales losses upon HD 
entry. Hence, it seems that for categories in which an EPL is carried, the EPL does not make 
consumers more susceptible to the HD format. In contrast, there is a small subset of 
categories where the presence of the low-tier EPL mitigates the sales losses from HD entry. 
This suggests that having access to a cheap alternative within the traditional chain, reduces 
the incentive for consumers to buy low-priced products at the new HD entrant. Interestingly, 
while EPLs prove to be a particularly effective defense tool in categories where traditional 
retailers incur major losses after HD entry, they do not improve post-entry sales in categories 
where retailers are less vulnerable. Taken together, this implies that if traditional retailers seek 
to shield themselves from HD entry with an EPL, but want to avoid “spoiling their arms”, 
category selection becomes key. 
                                                 
 
25 Note again that for Albert Heijn, the observed shifts are incurred in the presence of the Euroshopper EPL. We 
therefore exclude Albert Heijn from the calculations in computing the aggregate sales loss. 
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In which categories are EPLs most promising? 
To assist retailers in the identification of categories in which EPLs will have the 
highest “defensive ability”, we offer some tentative links with category characteristics. EPLs 
seem most effective at reducing losses from HDs in categories with lower purchase 
frequency. This result is somewhat surprising, given that some prior studies find PL products 
to be more successful in frequently bought categories (e.g. DelVecchio 2001; Sethuraman and 
Cole 1999). An explanation may be that while it is easier for consumers to buy low-frequency 
goods at a HD (as it involves fewer additional store visits), the lower importance of these 
goods in their grocery budgets (Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998) may make consumers less 
intrinsically motivated to do so. As a result, having access to a low-priced EPL in these 
infrequently purchased categories may suffice to prevent consumers from buying them at a 
HD. This is in line with Dawes and Nenycz-Thiel (2012), who suggest that in categories with 
low purchase frequency, private label products may be more successful in tying consumers to 
the store.  
We do not find the categories in which EPLs perform well vis-à-vis HDs, to be 
(significantly) less hedonic in nature. Similarly, categories where EPLs are effective defense 
tools are not necessarily the ones that are more privately consumed (and thus involve less 
social risk). The latter finding is in line with the premise that purchasing items at HDs 
(Steenkamp and Kumar 2009) and purchasing low-priced grocery items in general has 
become more socially acceptable, making this category characteristic irrelevant. 
Instead, our results clearly show that EPLs are primarily effective in (relatively) 
undifferentiated categories, and do not work well in categories that involve a large number of 
brands and/or product varieties. For the latter type of categories, retailers may find it difficult 
to develop a focused store-brand strategy that is still able to appeal to the majority of category 
buyers (Dhar and Hoch 1997). While this holds for private label products in general, it may 
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especially confine the retailer‟s ability to launch a successful EPL alternative, as EPL lines 
generally comprise very few items per category. 
Moreover, variability in product quality is found to play a role – EPLs doing 
especially well in categories where this variability remains low. This is an intuitive result: due 
to their cheap production process, EPLs compare unfavorably to other products in the 
category when it comes to quality. However, the lower the category‟s variability in product 
quality, the smaller this gap will be – thus increasing the EPL‟s relative appeal. In contrast, 
both HDs and EPLs have a negligible impact in categories where perceived quality 
differences (and quality uncertainty) are high. In such categories, consumers are expected to 
rely more on renowned (national) brands (e.g. Batra and Sinha 2000; Erdem and Swait 1998). 
Naturally, this negatively affects the competitive position of both HD products and EPLs. 
Turning to the market-related factors, we find that EPLs are better at keeping HDs at 
bay in categories where these HDs carry few SKUs. In such categories, EPLs – with their 
narrow depth – constitute a more viable alternative against the HD offer. The magnitude of 
the price gap, however, does not seem to matter; an observation also made by Nielsen (2007). 
In this respect, it is important to note that in each of the three category groups, the EPL price 
is – on average – below that of the HD chain.
26
 Hence, it seems that in categories where the 
EPL does not have a large “assortment depth” disadvantage, being cheaper than the HD 
suffices to counter the sales loss. 
The proliferation of the standard private label (SPL) in the retailer‟s assortment is not 
linked to HD losses or EPL power. This may be the result of a clearly differentiated multi-tier 
PL strategy (Geyskens et al. 2010), where higher-priced, high-quality SPLs are aimed to 
reduce the power of national brands, while EPLs primarily serve to fend off low-end price 
                                                 
 
26 When we consider the categories one by one, we find that Super de Boer‟s EPL is priced below HD products 
for 37 out of 48 categories. 
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competition by HD alternatives. When both PL tiers target different competitors (national 
brands within the same store, versus PL products in a different store (i.c. the HD) (Dawes and 
Nenycz-Thiel 2012), the introduction and assortments of these tiers need not be fully aligned 
and can partly depend on other factors and considerations. This explanation is in line with the 
results of the selection model (Table 3.5), which demonstrates that the proliferation of SPL 
SKUs in the assortment has no substantial impact on the decision to introduce an EPL in the 
category. 
Finally, it seems that EPL introduction in a category becomes more effective as the 
rollout proceeds. This may be the result of increased awareness of, or confidence in, the 
retailer‟s EPL tier. Also, consumers may only refrain from patronizing the HD if cheap 
alternatives are available in a wide enough range of categories. For traditional retailers, this 
implies that a sufficiently broad rollout is needed for the EPL program to become effective in 
keeping HDs at bay. 
 
3.7   Limitations and Future Research 
As our study is clearly not without limitations, many issues are still open for future 
work. We discuss these research opportunities below. 
First, our endeavor to separate out the HD entry losses and EPL moderating effects as 
cleanly as possible through a difference-in-difference approach, comes at a price. We consider 
only households in markets where a new HD outlet opened up, and active in the panel during 
the four months preceding and following this entry. More importantly, our analysis was 
necessarily confined to the subset of categories wherein an EPL was introduced in the course 
of our observation period. Though the considered categories cover a broad range of items, it 
would be interesting to replicate our findings for other categories as well. 
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Second, our estimates of the EPL effect pertain only to the chain that rolled out its 
EPL during our observation period (i.c. Super de Boer). However, the effectiveness of an EPL 
may very well depend on how the EPL fits the store that carries it – something our data, 
unfortunately, did not allow us to test. As such, we leave it as a topic for further study. 
Similarly, the vulnerability of traditional chains to HDs (across different categories) was only 
assessed for a limited number of retailers (i.c. Albert Heijn, C1000, Plus and Super de Boer). 
It should, however, be noted that these were the chains most relevant to our study, as they 
were all active on a national level, and have a private label program that is sufficiently 
sophisticated (i.e. multi-tiered) to allow for the listing of an EPL as well. 
Third, we reverted to typical characteristics (e.g. quality, packaging) of EPLs to 
develop arguments on why they can (not) be effective vis-à-vis HDs. However, the 
positioning of EPLs across retailers (and even categories) is not necessarily a given, and some 
variations may exist. For instance, an emerging practice is for retailers (e.g. Tesco) to develop 
a budget private label that does not necessarily offer the lowest price possible, but does match 
HDs in terms of product quality – and generally has more attractive packaging as well 
(Financial Times 2008). While such “discount brands” are thus less of a price-based response 
than EPLs, their quality gap with products sold at HDs is much smaller (both in an objective 
and perceived sense, due to the improved packaging; Steenkamp, Van Heerde and Geyskens 
2010). This may make these brands an effective way to combat HDs in their own right. Given 
our finding that EPLs, though powerful in some categories, do not act as an effective 
defensive mechanism in many others, it is interesting to explore the defensive ability of 
discount brands (or other variations of EPLs) as well. 
Fourth, our time span to assess the sales impact of local HD entry is relatively short 
(that is, an eight-month window around the HD‟s date-of-entry). While this reduces potential 
confounding effects, it also implies that we capture the impact of HD entry, and the 
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moderating role of EPLs therein, on a short-term basis only. As such, the permanent effects of 
HD entry may actually have been understated (in case households need some time to notice or 
“warm up” to the new entrant) or overstated (if many early visits to the HD were for trial 
purposes only). To obtain a more complete picture on the impact of the HD threat and the 
degree to which EPLs can help mitigate it, future studies in this area could adopt a longer-
term perspective. 
 Fifth, because we use local HD entry as our research setting, we assess the defensive 
ability of EPLs from a preemptive standpoint. In other words, we study whether carrying an 
EPL makes a retailer less vulnerable to any subsequent HD entries. While many retailers 
indeed stock EPLs in anticipation of HD entry (Just-Food 2006), others use them more as a 
counter-mechanism – and only introduce them after the initial impact of HD entry is felt 
(Coriolis Research 2002). Even though we find that EPLs can prevent traditional retailers‟ 
customers from switching to a HD, we cannot necessarily conclude the reverse – that is, 
whether the introduction of an EPL can help traditional retailers regain customers that were 
lost to the HD. To obtain a more complete picture of the effectiveness of EPLs in the battle 
against HDs, future research should therefore explore this issue as well. 
Finally, while our results indicate that EPLs shield the store against HDs in only a 
limited subset of categories, this does not imply that EPL introductions in other categories are 
fruitless. Though EPLs are often introduced to counter the HD threat, they may be carried for 
other purposes as well, such as to foster further growth of the retailer‟s private label share, or 
as a means to build or reinforce a distinctive store image (Symphony IRI 2011). A thorough 
overview of categories in which EPLs should or should not be introduced may take these 
other purposes into account as well: issues that we leave for further research. 
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Chapter 4 Save or (Over-)Spend? How Shopping 
Pattern Choice Affects Consumer Grocery 
Spending 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 The diversity of today‟s grocery retailing environment allows consumers to engage in 
a multitude of different shopping strategies or patterns. Rather than repeatedly visiting a 
single (most preferred) store to buy their groceries, consumers can decide to patronize 
multiple stores, on separate or chained (combined) store trips, and can choose between several 
differently positioned store formats. Previous studies indicate that shopping patterns involving 
a single store have become the exception rather than the rule (Fox and Hoch 2005; 
Gijsbrechts et al. 2008; Stassen et al. 1999). Among US shoppers, Fox (2005) observes that 
only 15% are “store/format loyal”, i.e. allocate more than 70% of their grocery trips to their 
favorite supermarket store, the remaining households (85%) spreading their purchases across 
multiple chains and formats. Similarly, following a recent survey, 87% of Dutch shoppers buy 
their groceries at more than one supermarket banner (on separate or combined trips), the 
average number of chains visited by a household being equal to 2.8 (EFMI and CBL 2010). 
 While such more “involved” shopping patterns can also result from situational factors 
(i.e. idiosyncratic shopping locations or needs, Krider and Weinberg 2000; Fox 2005), they 
mainly stem from consumers shopping “strategically” (Fox 2005). By organizing their 
grocery shopping in a certain way, consumers hope to systematically reap higher shopping 
utility, and be able to buy their products at the best possible value (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). 
Savings play an important part in this matter. Indeed, several marketing scholars identify 
“shopping cost minimization” as the major reason for consumers to engage in multiple-store 
shopping, to prefer combined over separate shopping trips and/or to select a specific 
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(combination) of store format(s) (e.g. Fox and Hoch 2005; Galata, Bucklin and Hanssens 
1999; Mägi and Julander 2005). Consumers may, for example, visit an additional store to 
benefit from an increased number of price promotions (Fox and Hoch 2005), or shop at a 
“hard-discounter” to save money in categories where brand equity is less important to them 
(Costa et al. 2006). Especially in times of low consumer confidence, such practices gain 
importance: a 2010 EFMI and CBL survey indicating that in order to cut their grocery 
spending, 40% of shoppers increased the number of chains that they visit, and 12% switched 
to another store (format) (EFMI and CBL 2010). 
However, even though alternative shopping patterns may give access to lower prices 
and provide a means to economize on grocery expenditures, it is not obvious that such savings 
will actually be realized by consumers. To realize intended outcomes, consumers need more 
than just having access to the right opportunities – they also require the ability to take 
advantage of these opportunities, as well as the motivation to undertake the necessary actions 
(e.g. Batra and Ray 1986; MacInnis and Jaworsky 1989). Choice of a shopping pattern 
impacts on all three components. It not only affects the potential (opportunity) for savings, but 
also consumers‟ ability to spot these savings, and their motivation to behave consistently with 
the savings goal. For example, visiting more than one store implies that consumers will be 
confronted with a variety of different assortments and prices. This may severely complicate 
the price comparison process (and thus decrease the consumer‟s ability to spot attractive 
prices), and lead to increased exposure to in-store incentives (which stimulate unplanned 
purchases, and thus make consumers less motivated to stick to their savings objective). Also, 
depending on whether consumers opt for “traditional” (Hi-Lo) or (hard-)discounter (EDLP) 
stores, and whether they visit different stores on separate or combined trips, they may 
encounter fewer opportunities to take advantage of attractive price deals, be less able to 
accurately track their expenditures, and/or lose their motivation to save as a result of in-store 
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stimuli (e.g. Gauri, Sudhir and Talukdar 2008; Heilman, Nakamoto and Rao 2002; Van 
Ittersum, Pennings and Wansink 2010). It follows that while some shopping patterns allow 
consumers to save money, consumers may not capitalize on this opportunity because they are 
unable to correctly perceive it or because they become distracted from the savings goal. 
The question thus remains whether, and to what extent, shifts in shopping patterns 
actually increase or decrease consumers‟ overall expenditures. More specifically, we zoom in 
on three issues of interest. First, does the patronage of multiple stores lead consumers to 
spend less on groceries? Second, does this depend on the shopping organization, i.e. whether 
consumers visit these stores on separate or combined trips? Third, what is the role of store 
format choice? More specifically: how does the level of expenditures change when consumers 
patronize a hard-discounter store (like, for instance, Aldi or Lidl) instead of a traditional 
supermarket? To the best of our knowledge, though previous papers do provide valuable 
insights into the drivers of store choice, shopping pattern selection and spending, these 
questions have not been directly addressed. This is somewhat surprising, given that several 
scholars already suggested that some shopping pattern configurations may actually result in 
additional grocery spending – rather than a mere re-allocation of planned expenditures (Kahn 
and Schmittlein 1989). Our paper intends to further address this premise. 
We start by outlining why and how alternative shopping patterns may affect consumer 
grocery spending, thereby building on the Motivation-Opportunity-Ability (MOA) framework 
(Batra and Ray 1986; MacInnis and Jaworsky 1989). Though our objective is not to separate 
out these processes and drivers empirically, they help to understand why certain outcomes 
occur. Next, we empirically document the relationship between shopping pattern dimensions 
(i.e. single versus multiple stores, separate versus combined trips, traditional supermarket 
versus hard-discounter) and monthly grocery spending. In so doing, we make sure to account 
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for the spurious link caused by their common underlying drivers (i.e. characteristics affecting 
both shopping pattern choice and spending). 
Our findings expand the current marketing literature in several ways. Previous 
research has uncovered a considerable number of factors that drive consumers‟ choice of 
shopping pattern (e.g. Cude and Morganosky 2001; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008; Krider and 
Weinberg 2000). Moreover, a few studies link shopping pattern characteristics to specific 
aspects of subsequent in-store purchase behavior, such as price and promotion sensitivity 
(Bell, Bucklin and Sismeiro 2000) and unplanned purchases (Bell, Corsten and Knox 2011; 
Inman, Winer and Ferraro 2009). Our results complement these insights, by documenting how 
shopping pattern choice affects consumers‟ overall (monthly) grocery spending. Our findings 
also add to the literature on consumer shopping behavior. By laying out the processes that 
influence spending under different shopping regimes, we add to previous research on the 
impact of household and environmental factors influencing consumer spending and their 
adherence to budget constraints (e.g. Van Ittersum et al. 2010).     
The discussion is organized as follows. We first present the conceptual framework, in 
which we theorize on how consumers‟ shopping patterns may influence their grocery 
spending. Next, we present the methodology used to assess this relationship empirically, 
followed by a description of the data. We then discuss the estimation results and their 
implications. In the last section, we outline the limitations and issues for future research.   
 
4.2   Theoretical Background 
Households nowadays have access to an increasing number of grocery outlets and 
store formats, which – together with other evolutions such as increased mobility and 
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information access – open up multiple ways to do their grocery shopping.
27
 Faced with these 
options, households may engage in strategic behavior (Fox 2005), and develop systematic 
shopping patterns that allow them to meet their shopping objectives over a longer planning 
period (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Such shopping patterns can be characterized along three 
broad dimensions. First, consumers can buy the vast majority of their grocery purchases at a 
single store, or, conversely, allocate these purchases across multiple stores (Bell et al. 2000; 
Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). Second, when visiting multiple stores, consumers have different 
options to organize their trips to these stores: they can visit them either at separate points in 
time, or on chained (combined) shopping trips (e.g. Popkowski Leszczyc and Timmermans 
2001). Third, consumers have to make a selection of which store format(s) to visit. From a 
spending point of view, the store format classification based on pricing strategy is particularly 
relevant (Bell and Lattin 1998). As such, and given the recent evolutions in the retailing 
landscape, we distinguish between traditional supermarkets, characterized by a HiLo strategy 
(high regular prices and frequent price promotions), and hard-discounters, which strongly 
focus on consistently low (EDLP) price levels (Cleeren et al. 2010). 
The “traditional”, most straightforward shopping pattern is for consumers to purchase 
the larger part of their groceries at a single traditional supermarket – their “preferred store” 
(Hoyer and MacInnis 2010). However, more often than not, consumers are found to deviate 
from this pattern – a major reason being to economize on grocery spending (and as such pay 
less for the same shopping basket, or be able to buy more with the same budget) (Fox and 
                                                 
 
27 Another interesting development in this regard is that consumers also have the option to buy their groceries 
online. Online shopping environments offer consumers greater control over when and how long they shop, and 
in general allow for easier price comparisons and quicker store navigation. As is argued in the remainder of the 
theoretical section, these factors may strongly shape consumers‟ spending decisions. In this paper, however, we 
choose to focus on „offline‟ shopping patterns only, given that the penetration of online grocery shopping is 
currently still very low: for example, only 2% of consumers in the Netherlands buys groceries online at a regular 
basis (i.e. at least once per month) (EFMI 2010). 
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Hoch 2005; Gauri et al. 2008). In the remainder of this section, we discuss how different 
shopping pattern dimensions may shape consumers‟ expenditures. 
Our conceptualization, summarized in Figure 4.1, is rooted in the motivation-
opportunity-ability framework proposed by Batra and Ray (1986). Alternative shopping 
patterns differ in the opportunities they offer to reduce grocery spending. However, they may 
also affect the consumers‟ ability to realize these savings and their motivation to stick to this 
objective. Below, we indicate how each of the different pattern dimensions (choice of single 
versus multiple stores, choice of shopping trip organization and choice of store format) can 
affect consumers‟ opportunity, ability and motivation to control spending – and what causes 
these effects. 
Multiple-store (versus single-store) shopping 
 Consumers who systematically visit multiple stores have greater opportunities to buy 
their shopping basket at a lower cost. Provided that price differences exist between stores, 
they can take advantage of such differences by cross-shopping – buying each product in the 
store that sells it for the most attractive price. In addition, multiple-store shoppers will 
typically have access to a larger number of price promotions (than single-store shoppers), 
increasing the likelihood that they can buy a considerable amount of items on their shopping 
list at a reduced price. Hence, spreading grocery purchases over more than one store can lead 
to important savings (Gauri et al. 2008). 
 At the same time, however, patronizing multiple stores renders the process of price 
comparison and evaluation much more complex (Alba et al. 1994). Not only do consumers 
have to evaluate a larger set of product prices, price comparisons can also be complicated by 
(i) the separation of available price information in time and space, (ii) a larger (promotional) 
variation in prices, and (iii) lack of overlap in the stores‟ assortments. In such a case, given 
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best available prices. In contrast to single-store shoppers, who can focus on within-store price 
comparisons for a smaller set of category items, multiple-store shoppers may thus be less able 
to spot and take advantage of interesting prices. This can make their savings over single-store 
shoppers less pronounced. 
 In addition, somewhat paradoxically, visiting multiple stores may dampen consumers‟ 
motivation to save, for two reasons. First, given that multiple-store shoppers already expect to 
save money by allocating their purchases across stores, they may feel less need to engage in 
further (in-store) price search for each item on their shopping list (Bell et al. 2000). This 
makes it less likely that these consumers respond to attractive price deals for the items they 
plan to buy. Second, as each store environment comes with its own purchase triggers (e.g. 
atmospheric stimuli, displays and/or in-store coupons), multiple-store shoppers may become 
more distracted from their savings goal. Confronted with a larger number of different 
“temptations”, these consumers may engage in more unplanned purchases (Donovan et al. 
1994; Heilman et al. 2002; Inman et al. 2009) – which reduces their savings over single-store 
shoppers. 
In sum, while multiple-store shopping does give consumers access to better prices, the 
increased complexity of price comparisons and higher exposure to in-store marketing can 
negatively affect their ability and motivation to seize this saving opportunity. As such, 
consumers will not necessarily spend less money when they shop at multiple stores; on the 
contrary, they may spend even more. 
Combined-trip (versus separate-trip) shopping 
 The way consumers organize shopping trips to different stores affects their 
opportunities for savings. On the one hand, combined shopping trips allow consumers to 
purchase each product at the preferred store for that product (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). This is 
much more difficult in the case of separate store visits, however. Some categories are 
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purchased on such a frequent basis (e.g. perishable products; Krider and Weinberg 2000) that 
consumers will need to buy them at virtually every store visit, regardless of whether the store 
is actually preferred for these categories. Hence, combined-trip patterns better reap the 
savings opportunities from cross-store price differences. On the other hand, however, being 
more spread in time, separate visits leave more room for capitalizing on temporary deals at 
each of the different stores (Gauri et al. 2008). Depending on whether cross-store or cross-
time differences dominate, the opportunity to save will thus be higher for combined- or for 
separate-trip patterns. 
Shopping organization may also influence consumers‟ ability to spot savings 
opportunities. Given that combined trips involve several store visits, they can be more 
cognitively demanding. Given the multitude of purchase decisions that have to be made on a 
typical grocery shopping trip, and the higher time pressure when visits to two different stores 
have to be combined, this may leave combined-trip shoppers less apt to compare prices and 
monitor spending than their separate-trip counterparts. 
In a similar vein, consumers‟ motivation to focus on savings and stick to a strict 
shopping list may be affected. Three factors are at play here. First, combined trips entail more 
travel time (as consumers have to travel from store to store), a longer total checkout time, and 
a larger number of categories to be bought. This longer shopping trip duration can lead 
consumers to deplete their resources for self-control (Stilley, Inman and Wakefield 2010), 
which increases the likelihood that the consumer indulges in impulse purchases – and thereby 
spends more (Thomas and Garland 1993). Second, whereas separate-trip shoppers have more 
flexibility in aligning the timing of their trips with their moments of consumption, combined-
trip shoppers have to plan further ahead. Following Ülkümen, Thomas and Morwitz (2008), 
this makes them feel less confident in setting a trip budget – which results in an upward 
adjustment of the budget. This additional “budget slack” (Stilley et al. 2010) may then be 
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used to justify more unplanned or expensive purchases. Third, the outlay on combined 
patterns is less separated in time. Building on Thaler‟s (1985) mental accounting theory, this 
may make spendings on combined-trips more acceptable to consumers: single (integrated) 
losses being preferred over several smaller (segregated) losses that add up to the same amount 
(e.g. Heath, Chatterjee and France 1995; Mazumdar and Jun 1993). As a result, consumers 
may be less motivated to keep their losses in check (i.e. to save) on combined trips – again 
making it easier to justify additional or more expensive purchases. 
In sum, while combined-trip patterns do not by definition provide more or less savings 
opportunities than separate-trip patterns, they do make it more difficult for consumers to spot 
such opportunities. Moreover, they are more likely to trigger additional (or more expensive) 
purchases – not only because consumers are more tempted, but also because they can better 
justify such purchases to themselves. It follows that consumers can be expected to spend more 
on combined-trip patterns than on separate-trip patterns. 
Shopping patterns with (versus without) a hard-discounter 
Hard-discounters differ from traditional supermarkets in their price and promotion 
strategy, as well as assortment and store management practices. To offer high quality products 
at bottom prices, hard-discounters cut costs by streamlining their operations, by stocking a 
limited assortment that mainly consists of private label products, and by maintaining a strictly 
functional, no-frills store organization (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009). Sales promotions or 
other in-store incentives are seldom used. Instead, hard-discounters‟ regular prices lie (on 
average) more than 60% (40%) below the regular (promotional) prices of national brands sold 
at traditional supermarkets (Nauwelaers et al. 2012; Nielsen 2007). Clearly, this allows 
consumers to cut down the overall cost of their shopping basket, and presents them with 
ample opportunity to realize savings. At the same time, the hard-discounter strategy may also 
influence their in-store spending in other ways. 
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For one, the hard-discounter‟s lean assortment and consistently low prices lead to high 
price transparency and facilitate in-store price comparisons. This is in contrast with traditional 
(Hi-Lo) supermarkets, where the larger price variability complicates price search and 
evaluation (Vanhuele and Drèze 2002). Hard-discounter shoppers may therefore be better able 
to save money without too much effort, compared to traditional supermarket shoppers. In 
addition, due to the lack of in-store stimuli, shopping at a hard-discounter may be less 
cognitively taxing to a consumer. This may enable consumers to keep better track of their in-
store expenditures (Van Ittersum et al. 2010), and help them stick to their budgets. 
In addition, consumers shopping at hard-discounters may remain more motivated to 
behave consistently with their savings goal. First, since hard-discounters offer virtually no 
price deals (Nielsen 2007) or other in-store marketing incentives (such as in-store displays), 
they tend to stimulate less unplanned buying. In contrast, traditional supermarkets frequently 
offer temporary price promotions in multiple categories. This not only drives up purchases in 
the promoted category, but is also shown to elicit additional purchases in other categories 
(Drèze, Nisol and Vilcassim 2002; Walters 1991). Price promotions may provoke a consumer 
to spend more on non-promoted items because they enhance his shopping mood (Heilman et 
al. 2002; Milkman and Beshears 2009), or because the promotional savings are seen as 
“unexpected income”, which is readily spent on other purchases (Hodge and Mason 1995). 
Hence, the higher exposure to promotional incentives in traditional supermarkets may entice 
consumers to deviate from their savings goal, and spend more than they would in a 
“promotion-barren” hard-discounter store. Second, while traditional supermarkets‟ use of 
atmospheric elements and in-store marketing may evoke a hedonic shopping orientation, the 
hard-discounter‟s functional, no-frills store environment and back-to-basics assortment 
strategy (Cleeren et al. 2010) instead stimulates a utilitarian, goal-oriented shopping attitude 
(Arnold and Reynolds 2009; Babin and Darden 1995). This further reduces the consumers‟ 
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receptivity to in-store incentives and makes them more motivated to hold on to their purchase 
plans (Babin and Darden 1995). 
All in all, consumers who include a hard-discounter in their shopping pattern have 
considerable opportunities to save money through the hard-discounter‟s overall low price 
level. In addition, they will be better able to spot these opportunities and keep track of their 
spending. Moreover, hard-discounter shoppers are less exposed (as well as less receptive) to 
in-store marketing incentives aimed to stimulate unplanned purchases. Not surprisingly, this 
leads one to expect that consumers‟ grocery spending will be lower when a hard-discounter is 
incorporated into their shopping pattern. 
Interaction effects 
Apart from the main effects discussed above, some interesting interactions can emerge 
between the shopping pattern dimensions. While hard-discounters are seldom selected as the 
sole (or even primary) store, they are quite predominant in multiple-store patterns 
(Gijsbrechts et al. 2008), and more easily give rise to a combined-trip organization (see also 
chapter 2 of this dissertation). An interesting question is then: for shopping patterns involving 
a traditional store and a hard-discounter, does a combined-trip pattern also entail higher 
spending than a separate-trip pattern? Different, opposing, forces may be at work here. 
On the one hand, for patterns including a traditional and a hard-discounter store, 
savings opportunities stem not so much from over-time variation in price promotions (since 
hard-discounters generally hold their prices stable over time), but more from cross-format 
price differences. This substantially reduces – or even removes – the savings opportunities 
that are offered by separate-trip patterns over combined-trip patterns (due to being more 
spread in time). Conversely, the advantage of combined-trips over separate-trips in terms of 
saving opportunities – households being able to buy every product category in the store with 
the best offer – still applies. Moreover, as hard-discounters tend to be small and often located 
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near complementary traditional supermarkets (as is discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation), 
the shopping time for chained visits can be substantially lower, and closer to that of separate 
visits. This, together with the fact that a hard-discounter‟s lean store environment is less 
cognitively taxing, is likely to bring combined-trip shoppers closer to separate-trip shoppers 
in terms of their motivation and ability to save. Taken together, this implies that combined-
trip shoppers may actually spend less than separate-trip shoppers when a hard-discounter is 
incorporated into their shopping patterns –.having sufficient motivation and ability to take 
advantage of the larger saving opportunities in these patterns. 
On the other hand, however, much like (promotional) savings on planned items may 
induce spending on unplanned items (Hodge and Mason 1995), visiting a hard-discounter 
may provide consumers with a “license” to spend more at the traditional store. This will 
particularly hold for combined visits, in which the savings perception of hard-discounter 
shopping and the opportunity to indulge at the traditional supermarket, co-occur on the same 
trip. Under this premise, combined-trip shoppers may fail to capitalize on the savings 
opportunities that are available within their specific shopping pattern – and still spend more in 
the end than separate-trip shoppers. 
In conclusion, whether a consumer spends more in combined- than in separate-trip 
patterns possibly depends on whether a hard-discounter is incorporated into these patterns. To 
shed more light on this issue, we will present a methodology below that allows us to assess 
the actual nature of this interaction – as well as of the other effects discussed in this section. 
 
4.3   Methodology 
 As outlined above, rather than focusing on trip-to-trip behavior, we are interested in 
consumers‟ stable (strategic) shopping patterns and, in particular, how these relate to their 
total grocery spending. Consistent with this focus, we take the household-month as our unit of 
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analysis, and track consumers‟ shopping patterns and grocery spending levels on a monthly 
basis. In line with our conceptualization, we distinguish between shopping patterns that (i) do 
or do not involve a hard-discounter, and (ii) do or do not include multiple stores. Moreover, 
within the multiple-store patterns, we (iii) distinguish between separate- and combined-trip 
organizations. This leads to a total of six shopping patterns (for details on the 
operationalization: see the next section and Table 4.1). 
A straightforward procedure would be to simply test for differences in average 
spending across these shopping pattern alternatives. Such an approach, however, would 
ignore two important issues. First, it is clear that spending levels are not dictated by shopping 
patterns alone, but may also strongly differ across households (e.g. Bawa and Ghosh 1999). 
Hence, to capture the “true” effect of shopping patterns on consumer spending, we need to 
control for heterogeneity in spending across consumers, along with other possible confounds 
like seasonality. Second, the observed shopping patterns may be endogenous – shopping 
patterns themselves possibly depending on the households‟ characteristics and associated 
grocery budgets (Bell and Lattin 1998; Fox and Hoch 2005). To accommodate this 
endogeneity, we incorporate an additional model layer (estimated simultaneously) in which 
consumers‟ choice of shopping pattern is explained by a number of variables – including 
observed household features. In addition, we allow the error terms of the main spending 
equation and the pattern choice equation to be correlated. This enables us to capture effects of 
unobserved variables that simultaneously affect pattern choice and spending. Our spending 
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We elaborate on the variables included in these two equations below.  
Spending equation 
 The dependent variable thN_Spending ,  
reflects the total amount of money that was 
spent on groceries by household h in month t, divided by the household‟s average monthly 
spending. We use this “normalized” dependent variable because it allows us to control for 
heterogeneity in grocery spending across households. As such, the dependent variable should 
be interpreted as the household‟s “relative” spending (i.e. the ratio of actual to average 
monthly spending) – indicating whether the consumer spent more, less, or the same as the 
average amount. The lagged spending variable ( 1, thN_Spending ) is constructed in the same 
fashion, and is included to accommodate for possible dynamic effects. To control for 
seasonality in consumer spending (e.g. during holiday periods, or due to weather effects 
(Block and Morwitz 1999; Murray et al. 2010)), we include two dummies: tSummer  
and 
tWinter . Moreover, tMonth  captures any exogenous trends in consumer spending that may 
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have occurred over time. The shopping pattern effects that are key to our study (savings 
opportunity, ability and motivation) are captured through the variables h,tSSS_HD , 
h,tHDMSS_SEP_NO , h,tMSS_SEP_HD , h,tHDMSS_CMB_NO  and h,tMSS_CMB_HD , which 
indicate the shopping pattern that is chosen by household h in month t. These five dummies 
correspond to the six different shopping patterns as mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
with the single-store, no hard-discounter pattern as the reference condition.  
Shopping pattern choice equation 
 The shopping pattern choice equation [4.2] is specified as a multinomial logit model, 
with a separate set of parameters for each shopping pattern.
28
 The dependent variable, )(, sP th , 
is the probability that in month t, household h  selects shopping pattern s from a set of P 
possible shopping patterns (where P includes the same six patterns that were mentioned in the 
previous paragraph). )(, sU th  
and )(, sth  are the systematic and (Gumbel-distributed) random 
components of utility, respectively. 
We again use previous household (choice) behavior ( )(1, sPattern th  ) as an explanatory 
variable in the model, to accommodate for the fact that households often make choices based 
on past decisions. In addition, we include household demographics ( hlD , ) and seasonal 
dummies ( tSummer  and tWinter ), as both of these sets of variables may affect the time 
available for grocery shopping – which in turn influences shopping pattern choice (e.g. Fox 
and Hoch 2005; Popkowski Leszczyc and Timmermans 1997). The remaining variables 
pertain to the composition of a household‟s local store environment. First, consumers‟ 
inclusion of store formats in their shopping pattern will naturally depend on the availability of 
these formats. We therefore include the variables thUpscale , , thValue ,  and thHD , , reflecting 
                                                 
 
28 We keep all parameters fixed to zero for the single-store, no hard-discounter shopping pattern to ensure 
identification. 
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the number of “upscale” traditional, value-oriented traditional, and hard-discounter chains 
present in the households‟ local environment. We also add interactions between these 
variables, as these may drive the prevalence of multiple-store patterns involving combinations 
of these formats.
29
 The variable thMinDist ,  
is the smallest travel distance between any two 
stores in household h‟s local store environment in t. It reflects the extent to which stores in the 
vicinity of the household are “clustered”, which strongly determines the attractiveness of 
combined-trip shopping patterns (e.g. Fox and Hoch 2005; Popkowski Leszczyc et al. 2004). 
Though these variables are unlikely to determine the household‟s level of grocery spending 
directly, they can drive the availability and attractiveness of different shopping patterns, and 
therefore enter equation [4.2]. 
As mentioned before, we estimate the spending and shopping pattern choice equations 
simultaneously, and allow their error terms ( th,  and )(, sth ) to be correlated. To achieve this, 
we follow an approach proposed by Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004), and assume that the 
error of the spending equation, and the transformed error of the pattern choice equation, 
follow a bivariate logistic distribution (see Zhang and Krishnamurthi 2004 for more details). 
This results in the following joint probability that household h adopts shopping pattern s, and 
spends 




















































































                                                 
 
29 An important driver of multiple-store shopping is complementarity between available stores (Gijsbrechts et al. 
2008). Such complementarities are substantial for hard-discounters and upscale traditional supermarkets, while 
hard-discounters and value-oriented traditional chains are less complementary (see chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
The interactions between the store chain variables
 
allow us to capture these differential complementarities 
between the store formats accessible to the household. 
Chapter 4   Save or (Over-)Spend?  
110 
where χ captures the interdependence between the spending and pattern choice equations‟ 












where )(, sy th  is an indicator variable that reflects household h‟s actual choice of shopping 
pattern in month t. We estimate the parameters using simulated maximum likelihood. 
 
4.4   Data and Operationalizations 
Data sources 
 Our main data source consists of household scanner panel data for the Dutch market, 
as provided by GfK for the period January 2002 – August 2006. From this data set, we can 
derive both households‟ choice of shopping patterns and their monthly grocery expenditures. 
It also contains information on various household characteristics, including their socio-
demographic attributes and geographical location. To characterize households‟ local store 
environment (such as the stores that are available and the distances between them) we use 
data from Reed Business that tracks, every three to four months, the geographical location of 
all Dutch grocery outlets. 
 We focus on household purchases made in the top 9 grocery chains in the Netherlands, 
thereby covering 78% of sales. Our sample includes all households that participated in the 
panel throughout the entire period between January 2002 and August 2006, and bought more 
than 80% of their groceries in the nine chains under study.  To ensure that the expenditures of 
these households are comparable across different shopping patterns, we only consider 
purchases made in categories that are available across all nine chains (319 categories, which 
account for 84% of grocery spending). Our final sample thus covers 1325 households, 
observed over 56 months. 
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Operationalizations 
 Table 4.1 describes how we operationalize the dependent and independent variables of 
our model. We will now further discuss some of the key variables below. 
TABLE 4.1 
Variable Operationalizations 
Notation Variable name Operationalization 
Dependent variable 
















thSpending ,  
Household grocery 
spending 
Total amount of money spent on groceries by household h in 
month t (in hundreds of euros). 
Shopping patterns 
h,tSSS_HD  Single-store shopping with 
hard-discounter 
Step dummy, 1 when household h‟s shopping pattern in month t 
is single-store and includes a hard-discounter, 0 otherwise. 
h,tHDMSS_SEP_NO  Separate-trip            
multiple-store shopping 
without hard-discounter 
Step dummy, 1 when household h‟s shopping pattern in month t 
is multiple-store, involves separate trips and does not include a 
hard-discounter, 0 otherwise. 
h,tMSS_SEP_HD  Separate-trip           
multiple-store shopping  
with hard-discounter 
Step dummy, 1 when household h‟s shopping pattern in month t 
is multiple-store, involves separate trips and includes a hard-
discounter, 0 otherwise. 
h,tHDMSS_CMB_NO  Combined-trip          
multiple-store shopping 
without hard-discounter 
Step dummy, 1 when household h‟s shopping pattern in month t 
is multiple-store, involves combined trips and does not include 
a hard-discounter, 0 otherwise. 
h,tMSS_CMB_HD  Combined-trip          
multiple-store shopping  
with hard-discounter 
Step dummy, 1 when household h‟s shopping pattern in month t 
is multiple-store, involves combined trips and includes a hard-
discounter, 0 otherwise. 
)(, sPattern th  
Household pattern choice Dummy indicator, equals 1 if household h engaged in shopping 
pattern s in month t, 0 otherwise. 
Controls: Household demographics 
hHHsize  Household size Number of household members of household h 
hChildren  Number of children Number of child members (age<18) of household h 
hIncome  Household income Net monthly income (in hundreds of euros) of household h 
hDualInc  Dual-income household Dummy indicator, equals 1 if household h is a dual-income 
household, 0 otherwise 
hAge  Age of household head Age (in years) of the head of household h 
Controls: Seasonality  
tSummer  Summer indicator Step dummy, 1 when month t is in June, July or August, 0 
otherwise. 
tWinter  Winter indicator Step dummy, 1 when month t is in December or January, 0 
otherwise. 
Controls: Store environment 
thUpscale ,  
thValue ,  
thHD ,  
Number of upscale, value-
oriented and hard-
discounter stores 
Number of “upscale” (Albert Heijn, C1000, Super de Boer), 
“value-oriented” (Dirk, Edah, Jumbo, Plus)
a
 and “hard-
discounter” (Aldi, Lidl) chains that have an outlet located less 
than 5 km away from household h in month t. 
thMinDist ,  
Minimum inter-store 
distance 
Smallest observed distance between any two chains that are 
located less than 5 km away from household h in month t. 
a
 Our distinction between upscale and value-oriented (traditional) chains is based on the pattern of inter-store 
complementarities in chapter 2 of this dissertation, where the three chains classified as upscale were found to be 
much more complementary to hard-discounters than the four chains classified as value-oriented. 
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We measure a household‟s grocery expenditure in a given month as the total amount 
spent in that month within the 9 chains and 319 categories under study. If more than 80% of 
this amount was spent in a single chain, the household‟s shopping pattern for that month is 
classified as “single-store”; in all other instances, it is defined as “multiple-store”. In the latter 
case, the shopping pattern is “combined-trip” when more than half of the household‟s 
expenditures were made on multi-store trips, and “separate-trip” otherwise.
30
 Finally, we 
categorize a pattern as “with hard-discounter” if a hard-discounter chain (in our data: Aldi or 
Lidl) is either the household‟s primary or secondary store for that month (in terms of 
spending), and as “without hard-discounter” otherwise. These operationalizations are similar 
to previous studies (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). 
Data descriptives 
Table 4.2 displays, for each shopping pattern, the frequency with which it occurs, as 
well as the average amount of money spent by households within the pattern. Several 
interesting observations can be made. First, consumers commonly visit multiple stores – about 
56% of shopping patterns are classified as such – and do so primarily by making separate trips 
to each store. While hard-discounters are often incorporated within multiple-store patterns, 
they are rarely visited in isolation. Combined-shopping patterns are much less prevalent than 
separate-trip patterns, but relatively more prominent if the pattern involves a hard-discounter 
store. 
Second, from the raw data in Table 4.2, it seems that compared to single-store 
shopping at a traditional supermarket, multiple-store shopping does not seem to yield 
substantial savings: average expenses only being lower for separate-trip patterns that include a 
hard-discounter. To the contrary: when only traditional supermarkets are visited, multiple-
                                                 
 
30 Similar to chapter 2, multi-store trips are operationalized as trips where more than one chain was visited on the 
same part of the day (morning, afternoon or evening). 
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store shopping appears to be associated with higher spending – especially when the stores are 
visited on combined trips. This spending increase, however, cannot simply be attributed to the 
shopping pattern as such. Rather, it may reflect that households with different spending 
propensities also shop in a different way. We will therefore present the estimation results of 
our model in the next section, as it allows us to disentangle these effects.  
TABLE 4.2 







without hard-discounter 41.2% 176.74 
Single-store,  
with hard-discounter 2.4% 101.46 
Separate-trip multiple-store,  
without hard-discounter 22.2% 184.80 
Separate-trip multiple-store,  
with hard-discounter 22.4% 170.37 
Combined-trip multiple-store,  
without hard-discounter 4.2% 193.95 
Combined-trip multiple-store,  
with hard-discounter 7.6% 180.35 
 
4.5   Results 
 Our model comprises two (simultaneously estimated) equations: a shopping-pattern 
choice and a spending equation. Because the shopping-pattern choice equation is mainly 
included to avoid endogeneity bias, we only briefly comment on its parameter estimates. The 
main part of this section is devoted to the results for the spending equation – along with their 
implications for consumer expenditures across different shopping patterns.  
Shopping pattern choice equation 
 Table 4.3 displays the estimates for the shopping-pattern choice equation. The 
parameters make intuitive sense. The coefficient for lagged pattern choice is positive and 
highly significant – confirming previous literature that there is inertia in households‟ shopping 
patterns over time (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). For the remaining variables (whose values are not 
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TABLE 4.3 
















































































































































































































Estimates significant at the 5% (10%) level (two-sided) are portrayed in bold (italics). Values in brackets 
represent t-values for the coefficients. 
 
shopping pattern-specific) the single-store, no hard-discounter pattern constitutes the 
reference alternative, such that the parameter estimates reflect differential effects relative to 
this alternative. Larger households and/or households with older (e.g. retired) members are 
more prone to incorporate a hard-discounter into their shopping pattern – probably because 
they are on a tighter budget. Similarly, low-income households have far stronger propensities 
to (also) shop at a hard-discounter format. Presence of more children especially decreases the 
likelihood of combined-trip patterns, which may reflect that it is more difficult for households 
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with (young) children to leave the house for longer periods of time. Dual-earner households 
strongly prefer to visit a single (well-stocked) traditional supermarket for all of their grocery 
needs, which fits with their lower time availability for grocery shopping. While shopping 
pattern preferences thus greatly vary between households, we find them to remain relatively 
stable throughout the year – as none of the seasonality dummies is significant. Stronger 
presence of traditional (especially value-) supermarkets leads to more single-store and/or 
traditional-format shopping or, in the presence of many hard-discounter stores, to more 
multiple-store shopping involving both the traditional and hard-discounter format. Finally, as 
expected, lower inter-store distance makes households more likely to engage in combined-trip 
patterns.  
Spending equation 
 Before turning to our prime parameters of interest (i.e. the shopping pattern 
parameters), we briefly review the effects for the control variables. Table 4.4 summarizes our 
results. Again, we find a significant positive effect of the lagged dependent variable, which 
may indicate that households‟ previous expenditures help them set their budgets for future 
periods. In addition, our results show that households spend significantly more during the 
summer and (especially) the winter holiday periods. Finally, we also find a downward trend in 
household spending over time, which corresponds to the notion that households increasingly 
seek good value-for-money (e.g. Nielsen 2008). 
 The shopping pattern parameters can be interpreted as average deviations between 
consumers‟ monthly spending in the reference shopping pattern (single-store shopping 
without hard-discounters) on one hand, and the five alternative patterns on the other. We now 
interpret these parameters, and discuss their implications. 
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TABLE 4.4 





 Shopping patterns 
 Single-store,           
without hard-discounter 
 (reference) 






(-30.513) Seasonality and trends     
Summer (φ1) .012 
(6.030) 




Winter (φ2) .034 
(10.985) 




Monthly trend (φ3) -.001 
(-28.358) 




Error interdependence with pattern choice   Combined-trip multiple-store,           
with hard-discounter 
(β5) .048 
(14.034) Error interdependence (τ
b
) -.457 
(-25.562)     
Scaling parameter (ς) 6.826 
(729.331) 
  
     
a 
Estimates significant at the 5% (10%) level (two-sided) are portrayed in bold (italics). Values in brackets 
represent t-values for the coefficients. 
b 
To ensure that the estimate of the error interdependence parameter (χ) falls between -1 and 1, we used 
χ=2/exp(τ+1)-1 in our estimation procedure, and thus report the parameter estimate and t-value of τ here. 
 
Zooming in first on the shopping patterns that do not incorporate a hard-discounter, 
we find that the parameters β2 (multiple-store, separate-trips) and β4 (multiple-store, 
combined-trips) are both positive and significant. This indicates that consumers shopping at 
traditional supermarkets, spend more in multiple-store patterns than they do in single-store 
patterns. Turning back to our theoretical framework, it thus seems that while consumers have 
the opportunity to save money when shopping at multiple-stores, they do not seem to realize 
this savings potential – on the contrary, they turn out to spend even more. In addition, 
parameter β4 is larger in size than β2, and a statistical test reveals that this parameter 
difference (β4 – β2) is indeed significant (p-value <.01). This implies that, as expected, 
multiple-store shoppers (at traditional supermarkets) spend more in combined-trip patterns 
than in separate-trip patterns. 
Turning to the shopping patterns that include a hard-discounter; β1 (single-store), β3 
(multiple-store, separate trips) and β5 (multiple-store, combined-trips), we find further support 
for the above conclusions. The parameter differences (β3 – β1) and (β5 – β1) are significant (p-
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values <.01), and again indicate that more is spent on multiple-store than on single-store 
patterns. Moreover, we again find that expenditures are higher under combined-trip patterns 
than under separate-trip patterns (with the parameter difference (β5 – β3) being significant at 
p-value <.01). While we proposed that if the shopping pattern includes a hard-discounter, the 
inverse could hold as well, evidence for this claim thus remains lacking. 
 Based on our theoretical framework, we also expected that when consumers 
incorporate a hard-discounter into their shopping pattern, they will spend less on their 
groceries. While the estimated spending differences β1, (β3 – β2) and (β5 – β4) are all in the 
right direction, we (somewhat surprisingly) find that they are only significant for single-store 
and separate-trip patterns (p-values <.01), but not for combined-trip patterns (p-value .45). 
Even though we theorized that when consumers incorporate a hard-discounter into their 
shopping pattern, their opportunity, ability and motivation to save money increases, the above 
result suggests that when the hard-discounter is visited on the same trips as other stores, total 
grocery spending does not go down. Our theoretical framework provided a possible 
explanation: when consumers know that money will be saved during their shopping trip 
because of a visit to the hard-discounter, they may perceive this as a “license to indulge” on 
that same shopping trip. They may, for instance, allow themselves to buy more expensive 
items at the traditional supermarket – which cancels out their savings. 
To summarize, our findings indicate that, as expected, consumers spend more in 
multiple-store shopping patterns than in single-store patterns, and that this difference becomes 
especially pronounced when the stores are visited together on combined trips. While in the 
majority of cases, expenditures become lower again when consumers replace a traditional 
supermarket with a hard-discounter – we find, somewhat surprisingly, that this does not hold 
true when the consumers use combined trips to visit their stores-of-choice. Taken together, 
this leads to some interesting insights. First, even though consumers often decide to visit an 
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additional supermarket (next to their main, traditional store) out of a desire to save on grocery 
expenses, we find that they actually spend more – even when the additional supermarket is a 
hard-discounter (see Table 4.4). Hence, despite the savings opportunities it creates, multiple-
store shopping does not lead consumers to save on their actual grocery expenses. Second, we 
find that especially combined-trip patterns seem ill-suited to keep expenses in check. In these 
patterns, consumers‟ grocery outlay turns out to be the highest, and not even the incorporation 
of a hard-discounter helps to reduce spending.  
 
4.6   Discussion 
 Today‟s consumers can do their grocery shopping in a variety of ways. Not only can 
they choose to visit formats other than the “traditional” supermarket (such as the hard-
discounter);  they can also decide to shop in more than one store – either by visiting them on 
separate occasions or on combined, multi-store trips. Engaging in such alternative shopping 
patterns provides consumers with an opportunity to save money. Hard-discounters, for 
example, offer quality products at much lower prices than traditional supermarkets, while the 
patronage of multiple stores allows consumers to exploit cross-store price differences. As 
indicated by Gauri et al. 2008 and Fox and Hoch 2005, judicious shopping-pattern choice thus 
holds the promise of sizeable cuts on grocery spending. 
However, these same shopping patterns also strongly affect the consumers‟ shopping 
process and experience, e.g. with respect to the number of in-store stimuli that are 
encountered, the variety of different products that is available, and the length and frequency 
of shopping trips. These differences will, in turn, influence the extent to which consumers are 
able and/or motivated to capitalize on the saving opportunities associated with their shopping 
pattern. Following up on this premise, we proposed a framework on how different 
“dimensions” of shopping patterns may affect consumers‟ opportunity, ability and/or 
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motivation to save on groceries and, in turn, their actual spending. In addition, we empirically 
document these effects by studying differences in consumers‟ monthly grocery spending 
across different shopping patterns, after accommodating for household differences and 
common unobservable drivers. 
Interestingly, we find that, compared to a “standard” scenario where a consumer 
primarily shops at one traditional supermarket, consumers only end up spending less when 
they visit a single hard-discounter instead. Multiple-store shopping patterns, in contrast, drive 
up consumer expenses. Hence, this casts doubt on whether shopping around, in the end, leads 
consumers to cut down on their monthly grocery budgets – an objective that is commonly 
pursued (Nielsen 2011). 
Furthermore, additional spending in multiple-store patterns becomes especially 
pronounced when the stores are jointly visited on combined trips. This type of shopping 
pattern thus seems particularly unsuitable for consumers who seek to capitalize on any 
savings opportunities that may exist across stores. Not even the inclusion of a hard-discounter 
helps to reduce expenses in these combined-trip patterns, suggesting that consumers use the 
savings at this format to justify more expensive purchases elsewhere. 
Implications for consumer welfare and retail management 
 Our study generates valuable insights on the impact of shopping patterns on consumer 
welfare and retail performance. From a consumer perspective we find that, compared to a 
“standard” shopping pattern involving a single traditional store, the selection of an alternative 
shopping pattern seldom results in savings on grocery expenses. In fact, solely visiting a hard-
discounter appears to be the only effective approach to achieve spending cuts. However, this 
is also the least chosen option by consumers – as hard-discounters carry only the most 
essential items in each category, and few national brands. 
Chapter 4   Save or (Over-)Spend?  
120 
Though spreading purchases across multiple traditional stores also offers the potential 
to lower expenditures, we find that consumers, instead, end up spending more – possibly 
because the cross-store price differences are too small to compensate for consumers‟ reduced 
ability and motivation to save. Our findings further indicate that the risk of increased (rather 
than reduced) spending is especially high when consumers visit multiple stores on chained 
trips. Because these trips are more cognitively demanding and often made under time 
pressure, consumers can find it harder, and may be less motivated, to compare prices. At the 
same time, the increased exposure to in-store incentives may reduce the consumers‟ resistance 
to make unplanned purchases, resulting in higher expenditures on combined shopping trips – 
regardless of whether a cheaper hard-discounter is involved. Of course, to assess whether 
consumers would be better off avoiding these combined shopping trips, their advantages – 
such as reduced travel costs compared to separate trips – also have to be taken into account.  
  Even though consumers spend more in multiple-store patterns than in single-store 
patterns, retail managers naturally prefer consumers to visit their store in isolation, to procure 
their entire basket. However, we show that if a consumer visits the store together with other 
stores – the dominant pattern nowadays – more is spent if these stores are jointly visited on 
the same trip. This can be valuable information for retailers deciding on where to locate a new 
outlet. To illustrate, when entering a local market where multiple-store shopping prevails, 
retailers may be better off when their new outlet is located in the near vicinity of incumbent 
stores. Such a “twin-location” will strongly encourage multiple-store shoppers to visit the 
outlet on combined trips – thereby increasing the amount of money spent at the outlet. The 
finding that stores may benefit from a location close to their competitors is not new. However, 
our study puts it into a different perspective – co-location enticing shared customers to spend 
more. For traditional grocery stores, the results further suggest that investing in a pleasant 
store atmosphere and using in-store incentives to stimulate unplanned buying can prove 
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particularly valuable in times of hard-discounter competition and declining store loyalty. Not 
only does it increase their share of household expenditures, it also enhances the overall 
spending by consumers (in their store). 
4.7   Limitations and Future Research 
 Clearly, though our analysis leads to novel insights, it is also subject to limitations, 
and paves the way for future research. First, though savings are a key motive for consumers to 
patronize multiple stores (EFMI and CBL 2010), other motivations for multiple-store 
shopping may exist, and at least partly explain why no or little money is saved in the end. A 
consumer may, for example, choose to save money in some categories, but only because it 
allows him to spend more in others (Costa et al. 2006). Alternatively, a consumer may shop at 
multiple stores to ensure that he can buy his favorite item in every category (Cude and 
Morganosky 2001): a strategy that does not necessarily lead to lower spendings either. Future 
studies may therefore consider a more detailed distinction between the various shopping 
motivations (e.g. through qualitative surveys and/or a latent class approach) – and study how 
these motivations affect what consumers spend across different shopping patterns. 
 Second, while we uncovered interesting differences in consumer spending across 
shopping patterns, and theorized on factors that may drive these differences (e.g. difficulty of 
price comparisons, unplanned purchases and inaccuracies in tracking of expenditures), our 
current analysis did not allow us to assess the relative impact of each of these factors. Such 
information, however, might guide store managers on how to effectively stimulate consumer 
spending across different shopping patterns. We leave it as an issue for future study.  
 Third, our current model takes a fairly “static” view on how shopping patterns may 
drive consumer spending. That is, we only focus on how households‟ expenditures are 
affected by their current shopping pattern. However, it is also plausible that spending 
decisions may (partially) result from past pattern choices as well. For example, after making a 
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lot of extra purchases in a (combined) multiple-store pattern (e.g. because of impulse buying 
and/or stockpiling behavior), a household may choose to deplete this additional inventory first 
– and as such restrict its spending in subsequent periods. To uncover whether such longer-
term effects indeed exist, future studies can adopt a more “dynamic” perspective on the 
relationship between shopping patterns and spending. 
Fourth, our conceptualization of shopping patterns implied some assumptions. For 
example, we theorized that combined trips, in comparison to separate trips, generally take 
longer to complete, but occur less frequently. While this is the rule rather than the exception, 
it need not always be true: especially when stores are located close to one-another, small “fill-
in” combined trips may become feasible as well. Future work in this area would therefore 
benefit from a distinction between trip composition on one hand, and trip length and 
frequency on the other – along with their effects on monthly consumer spending.  
Fifth, in our classification of shopping patterns, we adopted a discrete approach, e.g. 
consumers who visited multiple stores in a given month, were classified as either separate-trip 
shoppers, or combined-trip shoppers (in that month). In reality, consumers may fall 
somewhere between both ends of the scale. For example: they may alternate between 
separate- and combined-trips (possibly depending on their time available), and while some 
multiple-store shoppers may divide their purchases more or less equally across the stores they 
visit, others may more strongly distinguish between their primary and secondary store(s). 
Future studies could therefore benefit from a more continuous view on the dimensions of 
shopping patterns, as it allows for a richer perspective on how these dimensions shape 
consumer spending. 
Finally, though our data allowed us to distinguish combined-trip from separate-trip 
shopping patterns, we could not assess the order in which the stores were visited on combined 
trips. Extant studies, however, suggest that this order may affect consumer spending, and how 
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it is allocated across stores. Fox and Semple (2002), for example, state that consumers‟ 
purchasing behavior at a retailer becomes different when the retailer is not the first to be 
visited. Khan and Dhar (2006) find that “smart” purchases are more likely to drive subsequent 
“indulgent” purchases, which can amplify the “licensing” effects that may exist between a 
traditional store and a hard-discounter (in case the latter is visited first). It would, therefore, be 
interesting to study the spending implications of this shopping-pattern dimension as well.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion  
 
 Today‟s grocery shopper is faced with the consequences of one of the most severe 
economic downturns in decades. Many consumers find themselves on a tighter budget than 
before, and are hard-pressed to better justify their purchases and/or cut back on their 
expenses. As a result, they increasingly behave as “smart shoppers”, not being averse to 
expend additional effort in getting the most value for their money (Nielsen 2011). 
 Many current trends in grocery retailing can be traced back to this increased 
importance of smart shopping. One of them concerns the rise of the “hard-discounter” format. 
These basic, no-frills stores offer a limited assortment of very low-priced, high-quality private 
label products, providing consumers with an excellent opportunity to “trade down” and save 
money on their basket of groceries. Hard-discounters have become very popular over the 
years – in some cases accounting for up to 40% of grocery sales. Still, while many consumers 
shop at this format (up to 80% in some countries), most of them keep frequenting other stores 
as well (EFMI and CBL 2010). 
 Such “multiple-store” patronage, in itself, can actually be seen as another phenomenon 
indicative of smart shopping. Due to increases in both consumer mobility and the availability 
of different grocery stores (EFMI and CBL 2010), it has become easier for consumers to 
systematically visit more than one store. This, in turn, allows them to buy each product on 
their shopping list in the store that offers the best value – and thereby pick the best out of 
multiple “worlds”. Multiple-store shopping behavior has become quite a common sight, with 
several academic and business sources reporting that the majority (60 to 80%) of consumers 
systematically allocate their purchases across more than one store (e.g. EFMI and CBL 2010; 
Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). 
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Despite the important role that hard-discounters and multiple-store shopping thus play 
in today‟s grocery business, both have received limited attention in the marketing literature 
(Cleeren et al. 2010; Gijsbrechts et al. 2008). This dissertation has therefore aimed to study 
both of these phenomena (and their interrelationship) in more depth – along with their 
implications for retailers and consumers alike. Our main findings are summarized in the next 
paragraph (§5.1), while the (managerial) recommendations and implications that emerge from 
these findings are presented in §5.2. Finally, §5.3 covers the main limitations of this 
dissertation, along with an overview of possible directions for future research. 
 
5.1   Summary of Findings 
 The previous three research-based chapters all offered different perspectives on hard-
discounters and/or multiple-store shopping. The second chapter focused on the implications of 
local hard-discounter entry for consumers‟ (multiple-store) shopping behavior and, as a result; 
the market performance of incumbent chains. The third chapter assessed whether economy 
private labels can help traditional retailers defend against the “hard-discounter threat”. 
Finally, the fourth chapter examined to what extent new shopping opportunities, such as hard-
discounter patronage and multiple-store shopping, actually help “smart shoppers” to reduce 
their grocery expenditures. For each of these three chapters, the main findings will be 
discussed below. 
Chapter 2 – Close Encounter with the Hard-Discounter: A Multiple-Store Shopping 
Perspective on the Impact of Local Hard-Discounter Entry 
While hard-discounters have become a force to reckon with in European grocery 
retailing and rapidly set foot in overseas markets as well, the format has not received much 
attention in the current marketing literature (which instead focused on an entirely different 
type of price fighter: the “large-discounter”). We address this gap by investigating how local 
Chapter 5   Conclusion  
127 
hard-discounter entry affects the market performance of incumbent chains – as well as the 
underlying role that is played by inter-store complementarities, and the multiple-store 
shopping behavior they may give rise to. 
 We find that while incumbents suffer sizeable losses from local hard-discounter entry, 
they rarely see their best (single-store-loyal) customers switching away. Instead, stores 
primarily lose multiple-store-shopping customers, who already purchased only a fraction of 
their grocery purchases at the store prior to the hard-discounter‟s entry. This explains why 
losses to hard-discounters are generally more pronounced in terms of customer count than 
share-of-wallet. In addition, our findings suggest that losses to hard-discounters are less 
severe for incumbents that carry a complementary offer, and/or are conveniently located vis-
à-vis the hard-discounter. Based on this notion, we tested the viability of a “cooperative” 
response strategy in which an incumbent enhances its complementarity with the hard-
discounter, and find that it not only helps the incumbent to recover lost customers and 
spending – but also keeps the risk of a counter-attack by the hard-discounter low. 
Chapter 3 – Battling for the Household’s Category Buck: Can Economy Private Labels 
Help Defend Against the Hard-Discounter Threat? 
 “Traditional” retailers often employ a price-based strategy to defend against hard-
discounters. One increasingly used approach is the introduction of an “economy private label” 
– a response that fits with the growing interest for “multi-tiered” private label programs. 
However, the current marketing literature does not give a clear indication on whether these 
economy private labels are actually successful in shielding against the hard-discounter threat. 
We therefore conduct a “difference-in-difference” analysis across 48 product categories, in 
which we compare retailers‟ losses to hard-discounters in the absence versus presence of an 
economy private label. 
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 We find that both retailers‟ vulnerability to hard-discounters, as well as the 
effectiveness of economy private labels in reducing this vulnerability, varies widely across 
categories. In some categories, like coffee and vegetables, traditional retailers do not suffer 
much from hard-discounter entry. In other categories, however, sales losses are quite 
substantial; this particularly holds for categories that are (i) infrequently bought, (ii) relatively 
undifferentiated, and (iii) highly consistent in terms of product quality. We find that for this 
very same group of categories, economy private labels can be effectively used to reduce the 
losses from hard-discounter entry. Our results also suggest that as an economy private label 
becomes available in a larger number of categories, its performance as a defense mechanism 
vis-à-vis hard-discounters improves. Still, some categories remain in which traditional 
retailers are susceptible to hard-discounters, but where economy private labels do not help 
improve their situation – highlighting the need for an alternative defense mechanism. 
Chapter 4 – Save or (Over-)Spend? How Shopping Pattern Choice Affects Consumer 
Grocery Spending 
 Consumers can nowadays engage in a variety of different shopping patterns. An often-
cited reason to opt for a “non-standard” pattern, e.g. one that involves multiple (grocery) 
stores and/or the patronage of a hard-discounter, is the desire to save money. However, 
insights from the current (consumer behavior) literature suggest that different shopping 
patterns also affect consumers‟ ability and motivation to reap these savings – which raises the 
question whether, in the end, consumers actually spend less under these patterns. We shed 
more light on this issue by comparing consumers‟ expenditures across six different shopping 
patterns (defined along three dimensions), while controlling for household-specific and 
situational factors. 
 Our results show that, compared to a scenario in which a consumer buys all of his 
groceries at a single, “traditional” supermarket, consumers only spend less when this store 
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would be fully replaced with a hard-discounter. Conversely, and inconsistent with the savings 
perspective, we find that all multiple-store shopping patterns lead to higher – rather than 
lower – expenditures. This suggests that multiple-store shoppers are not fully able and/or 
motivated to capitalize on the savings opportunities available to them – e.g. because of a 
larger number of prices and/or in-store stimuli to process. Expenditures turn out to be 
especially high when consumers embark on longer, “multi-store” trips (instead of visiting the 
stores on separate occasions). In these cases, spending is not even reduced when part of the 
household‟s groceries is bought at a (low-priced) hard-discounter. 
 
5.2   Implications and Recommendations 
 The findings of this dissertation lead to several practical insights and 
recommendations, for both retailers and consumers. These will be covered in this section. 
The traditional retailer’s perspective 
Impact of hard-discounters. For many traditional retailers, the rise of the hard-
discounter format has become one of their greatest “sources of concern” (Cleeren et al. 2010) 
– leaving them desperately seeking for an appropriate response strategy that will keep these 
hard-discounters at bay (Nielsen 2007). However, our findings in chapter 2 and 3 put this 
issue into a new perspective. While traditional retailers should – naturally – expect to lose 
sales as a result of hard-discounter entry, chapter 2 first of all suggests that these losses are 
(on average) less severe than those reported for large-discounters like Wal-Mart (Ailawadi et 
al. 2010; Singh et al. 2006). In addition, after hard-discounter entry, traditional retailers still 
get to keep many of their loyal customers; that is, customers who buy (almost) their entire 
shopping basket at the store. Such customers are extremely valuable to retailers, as they 
account for a large part of their sales, and retaining them is easier than winning over new 
customers (Rosenberg and Czepiel 1984). Conversely, for customers who already frequented 
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some of the retailer‟s competitors in a multiple-store shopping pattern, there is a higher risk 
that the retailer will be replaced by the new hard-discounter. Though chapter 4 shows that 
these multiple-store shoppers generally spend more money on groceries, only part was spent 
at the retailer in the first place – decreasing the importance of such losses in clientele. 
Moreover, traditional retailers tend to feel the impact of hard-discounters only in part 
of their assortment. Chapter 2 shows that for numerous categories, consumers still prefer a 
traditional retailer to hard-discounters. As a result, as discussed in chapter 3, traditional 
retailers‟ sales losses to hard-discounters vary considerably across categories – even 
remaining completely absent in some of them. 
Importance of location. As shown in chapter 2, the degree to which traditional retailers 
are susceptible to hard-discounters is influenced by their geographical location in a non-
straightforward way. Not surprisingly, losses in patronage and share-of-wallet are lower when 
a hard-discounter entrant locates at a considerable distance, in which case it does not compete 
for the same consumers. More interesting, however, is the finding that hard-discounters 
entering in close proximity are also less harmful – the largest losses being recorded for 
instances where the hard-discounter opens shop at a moderate distance. For one, being located 
nearby the entrant increases the traditional retailer‟s chance of still being visited after the 
hard-discounter‟s entry. Given that (new) hard-discounter customers will rarely visit this 
format in isolation, a location close to the hard-discounter makes them more prone to keep the 
traditional retailer in their shopping pattern as well. In addition, being part of an attractive 
“one-stop shopping location” – in which consumers can easily combine visits to both the 
traditional and hard-discounter store – may actually bring in new traffic as well. While 
traditional retailers generally do not have a say in where their competitors locate 
(Foodmagazine 2009), hard-discounters often choose – on their own accord – to open up 
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nearby. Thus, our results suggest that traditional retailers, in the face of such entry, should not 
take an overly defensive stance. 
  Importance of chain positioning. Chapter 2 shows that regardless of their location, 
some retailers are better able to keep their losses to hard-discounters in check than others. An 
important driver in this regard is the degree to which a traditional retailer complements the 
hard-discounter‟s offering. Because hard-discounters are usually visited alongside other 
stores, traditional retailers are more likely to be selected when they supplement the hard-
discounter‟s offering with unique strengths of their own. Since hard-discounters‟ value-for-
money proposition is hard to beat, those strengths will primarily lie in offering a wide range 
of products – particularly in categories where consumers‟ needs relate more to assortment 
than price. Hence, “upscale” supermarkets, with a clear focus on assortment selection rather 
than low prices, are more complementary to hard-discounters than supermarkets that seek a 
compromise between the two. Chapter 2 shows that the latter group – being “squeezed in the 
middle” (Foodmagazine 2009) – suffers more severe sales losses, and should thus be warier 
of hard-discounters.  
Response strategies. This dissertation also provides insights into possible strategies 
that retailers may employ to (further) reduce their losses to hard-discounters. An important 
conclusion is that, rather than opting for an “across-the-board” strategy, traditional retailers 
should adjust their response on a category-by-category basis – as will be discussed below. 
First of all, while chapters 2 and 3 show that traditional retailers have little to fear 
from hard-discounters in some categories (such as cereals and meat), these categories should 
definitely not be overlooked in formulating a response strategy – but can rather form a good 
starting point. Retailers are recommended to extend their current advantage over hard-
discounters in these categories, by building on their unique strengths (e.g. through the 
expansion of their assortment, or the improvement of its composition). This makes them more 
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complementary to the hard-discounter and, as discussed above, increases the likelihood that 
they will still be visited after the latter‟s entry. 
Traditional retailers are considerably more vulnerable to hard-discounters in other 
categories, however. Chapter 3 reveals that this especially concerns categories that are (i) 
infrequently bought, (ii) relatively undifferentiated, and (iii) consistent in terms of product 
quality. Conveniently, these are the same categories in which traditional retailers can 
successfully prevent sales losses by carrying an economy private label. This corroborates the 
findings in chapter 2, which indicate that a price-based response is particularly effective in 
categories where traditional retailers are “weak”. Traditional retailers are therefore 
recommended to employ an economy private label in such categories – and as such 
supplement the aforementioned “complementarity-enhancing” strategy (which focuses on 
“strong” categories instead). Additionally, while chapter 3 emphasizes that economy private 
labels will not work for every single category in which retailers are susceptible to hard-
discounters, retailers should still introduce these products on a sufficiently broad scale – as we 
find that their effectiveness increases with the number of categories in which they are present. 
Finally, chapter 4 points to a response strategy that not necessarily applies to a specific 
group of categories, but does tie in with the importance of multiple-store shopping in a hard-
discounter context. We show that consumers who combine visits to a hard-discounter and a 
traditional retailer on the same shopping trip, may use their savings at the former as a “license 
to indulge” – and therefore spend more at the latter. We therefore suggest that traditional 
retailers (especially those who operate in close proximity of a hard-discounter, and thus attract 
many “combined-trip shoppers”) strongly encourage such additional spending, e.g. by 
employing more in-store stimuli. This helps them to secure a larger part of the consumer‟s 
wallet – and thus compensate for the sales lost to the hard-discounter. 
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The hard-discounter’s perspective 
 While none of the three core chapters of this dissertation have been written from the 
perspective of hard-discounters, our results do give rise to some implications and 
recommendations for this store format as well. Chapter 3 shows that hard-discounters 
primarily experience difficulty in securing a large share-of-sales among categories that are 
frequently purchased, strongly differentiated and/or where product quality is highly variable. 
Given these characteristics, if hard-discounters want to effectively compete with traditional 
retailers in this group of categories as well, they are advised to put more effort into reducing 
consumers‟ purchase risk (e.g. through quality assurance) – as well as to make their 
assortment more reflective of differences in consumer needs. 
 Even though hard-discounters perform much better sales-wise in categories with lower 
purchase frequency, product differentiation and/or quality variability, our findings also 
suggest that for these same categories, hard-discounters will experience fierce competition 
from the economy private labels that are deployed by their (traditional-format) competitors. 
This thus puts considerable pressure on hard-discounters‟ sales for these categories as well. 
Given that economy private labels are basic in nature and only of an “acceptable” quality, 
hard-discounters are again suggested to place more emphasis on the quality and/or 
sophistication of their products, in order to increase the added value of their assortment vis-à-
vis economy private labels. 
 Chapter 2 provides several interesting insights as well. We find that hard-discounters 
are seldom visited in isolation, indicating that in order for a hard-discounter to be visited, it 
generally needs to be accompanied by other stores. This suggests that hard-discounters 
perform best when they make it convenient for consumers to visit them along their current 
store-of-choice, i.e. by locating in close proximity of (multiple) incumbents. Also, these 
incumbents should be as complementary to the hard-discounter as possible, as this increases 
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the likelihood of (joint) patronage as well. This poses an interesting conflict: while hard-
discounters generally are most complementary to “upscale” supermarkets, the latter – given 
their sophisticated private label programs – are also the most likely to carry an economy 
private label. While the current dissertation cannot provide a definitive recommendation on 
this matter, it may form an interesting venue for further research. 
The consumer’s perspective 
 This dissertation also offers some interesting insights for grocery shoppers themselves. 
Chapter 2 signifies that, given consumers‟ needs and preferences across different categories, 
no single store is likely to be the most satisfactory option for every category. Instead, 
consumers can better meet their needs by visiting more than one store, purchasing each 
category in the store whose offer best reflects their preferences. These advantages, or 
“complementarities”, are especially large when the stores strongly differ in focus and/or 
positioning – as is the case between (upscale) traditional supermarkets and hard-discounters. 
While the patronage of multiple stores also requires more effort, e.g. in terms of travel and/or 
shopping time, increases in consumer mobility and store clustering have made these 
additional “shopping costs” less severe – and thus less likely to weigh up against the benefits. 
 While multiple-store shopping thus allows consumers to simultaneously pursue 
different shopping objectives (that may vary by category), chapter 4 suggests that consumers 
who only (or predominantly) visit multiple stores out of a desire to save will generally be less 
successful. Our findings indicate that multiple-store shopping (which involves a much larger 
number of prices and in-store stimuli to process) actually leads shoppers to spend more than 
on single-store patterns – even when a hard-discounter is among the stores visited. These 
expenditures are particularly high when the consumer embarks on “combined trips”, i.e. visits 
multiple store destinations per shopping occasion. 
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 In all, when consumers' main shopping goal is to cut back on their total grocery 
spending, they are advised not to engage in multiple-store shopping (and especially not in the 
form of combined-trips). However, when consumers, instead, seek to save money (“trade 
down”) in some categories, so as to benefit from higher variety and/or quality (“trade up”) in 
others, multiple-store shopping can be an effective way to reach these objectives – especially 
when both a traditional supermarket and a hard-discounter are visited.  
 
5.3   Limitations and Future Research 
 Naturally, the research in this dissertation is subject to a number of limitations. While 
some were already mentioned in each of the three core chapters, others do not pertain to a 
single chapter. These limitations will be covered below, along with a discussion of the 
ensuing directions for future research in the area of hard-discounters and/or multiple-store 
shopping. 
 Response to hard-discounters. This dissertation puts a large focus on the evaluation of 
possible defense strategies for traditional retailers, in response to hard-discounters. The 
strategies covered largely pertain to adjustments in the retailer‟s (category) marketing mix, 
such as price cuts, assortment extensions, or the proliferation of (different types of) private 
labels. However, we did not yet explore the viability and/or effectiveness of strategies that are 
more communication-oriented. For example, should traditional supermarkets advertise 
themselves as “having everything hard-discounters have and more” – that is, offering both 
low prices and high-profile products (such as Albert Heijn did in 2010, with a campaign that 
emphasized its three price tiers)? Or should retailers rather differentiate themselves, and only 
advertise their unique selling points vis-à-vis hard-discounters (i.e. an extensive selection of 
national brands, or an excellent level of consumer service)?  
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 On a related note, our finding that more complementary retailers are better able to 
withstand the hard-discounter threat begs the question on whether retailers should 
communicate these complementarities to consumers. While an explicit “association” with the 
hard-discounter may strongly stimulate store traffic (Foodmagazine 2009), it may 
simultaneously make the retailer‟s current customers more aware of (and interested in) its 
competitor. Future research should therefore take up this issue. 
 Moreover, it remains unclear how in-store marketing can be used by traditional 
retailers in their battle with hard-discounters. Given that consumers systematically visit both 
formats, should traditional retailers primarily use their in-store incentives to prevent 
consumers from buying “weak” categories at the hard-discounter? Or should they, instead, 
concentrate their efforts on more hedonic (higher-margin) categories, which consumers could 
then justify buying through their (projected) savings at the hard-discounter? This is another 
interesting topic for future studies to address. 
 Finally, future work in this area could investigate the (potential) role of word-of-
mouth and/or social media. While recent marketing studies already corroborate the 
significance of these non-traditional forms of marketing communication (Stephen and Galak 
2012; Villanueva, Yoo and Hanssens 2008), little is known on their effectiveness within the 
grocery retailing business. Marketing scholars could therefore investigate whether word-of-
mouth and social media can help retailers in improving their position vis-à-vis hard-
discounters – and if so, how they should be implemented. 
Category differences. The findings of our dissertation point to considerable differences 
in how consumers behave across product categories. In chapter 2, we show that the 
importance that consumers attach to price and assortment varies over categories, and that this 
can lead to different store (format) preferences for different categories. However, our results 
did not document to what extent consumers actually act upon these preferences. In other 
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words, it remains unclear: (i) how (multiple-store) shoppers allocate their purchases across 
different stores, (ii) whether this allocation is consistent with their needs across different 
categories, and (iii) which factors determine this degree of consistency. These questions form 
interesting starting points for future research. In addition, while chapter 2 provided examples 
of both categories in which consumers are primarily price-sensitive, and of categories in 
which they attach more value to assortment instead, less is known on what drives consumers 
to “trade up” or “trade down” in a category. Intrinsic category characteristics may play an 
important role here, which should be explored by future studies as well. 
 Chapter 3 further supports that consumers‟ store preferences vary between categories 
– as we find traditional retailers‟ losses to hard-discounters to be highly category-specific. 
Indeed, several industry sources confirm that hard-discounters‟ share-of-trade “is very 
different by category” (Nielsen 2007). In a similar vein, we find that the defensive ability of 
economy private labels vis-à-vis hard-discounters greatly differs across categories. While we 
conducted an exploratory analysis to determine in what types of categories economy private 
labels do and do not work, we were only able to make these inferences on a limited number of 
categories. As retailers come to carry economy private labels in many of their categories 
(Albert Heijn, for instance, nowadays offers more than 400 products under its “Euroshopper” 
label), marketing scholars can replicate and extend our analysis on a larger sample of 
categories. 
While chapter 4 highlighted how much consumers spend on their entire grocery 
basket, across different shopping patterns, it did not drill down to the category level. This, 
also, is a fruitful venue for future research. Given our finding that multiple-store shoppers 
spend more on their groceries – despite the opportunities for savings that these patterns 
provide – it would be interesting to study in which categories consumers “overspend” (and, 
conversely, in which ones they actually do save money). Such knowledge would be of great 
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value to retailers, for example in selecting in which categories to concentrate their (in-store) 
marketing efforts. 
Data sources. Our primary source of data for the three core chapters comprises 
purchase data of GfK‟s Dutch consumer panel, which consists of about 6000 households in 
total. This had several implications for our analyses, delineated below. 
 First, chapters 2 and 3 investigate how traditional chains‟ customer count, share-of-
wallet and (volume) sales are affected by the advent of the hard-discounter format, and how 
they should best respond. Naturally, we do so by analyzing the purchase behavior of 
individual households. However, these panel members can be quite sparsely located across 
some of the markets in which the retailers operate. To add further confidence to our findings, 
it may therefore be beneficial to augment our current analyses with actual (outlet) sales data – 
if available. 
 Second, while the panel purchase data allow us to track in detail how households 
respond to different marketing stimuli, they do not provide insights into the underlying 
motivations for such behavior – forcing us to make assumptions on these matters. For 
example, an important question is: why do consumers, in some instances, prefer hard-
discounter products over those offered at traditional retailers (particularly when some of 
these, e.g. economy private labels, are low-priced as well)? Furthermore: what is (are) 
consumers‟ main shopping goal(s) behind different shopping patterns, and how do those goals 
shape their purchase and/or spending behavior within the patterns? These are interesting 
questions for future research to address – for example by making use of survey data. 
 Third, even though our data allowed us to characterize consumers‟ shopping trips 
based on the number of stores visited (which was used in both chapters 2 and 4), other 
classifications were much less evident – or even impossible – to make. For example, we did 
not make a formal distinction between “major” and “fill-in” shopping trips (e.g. Kahn and 
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Schmittlein 1989), nor could we account for whether a shopping list was used to guide the 
trip. Since chapter 4 showed that the way in which consumers shop can have a strong effect 
on their subsequent decisions, future studies should investigate how these trip characteristics 
may shape consumer behavior, e.g. the amount spent or the (types of) products purchased. 
 Market setting. Another limitation is that our data pertain only to the Netherlands. 
First, the Dutch grocery market is characterized by a high “outlet density” (EFMI and CBL 
2010), which allows consumers to engage in multiple-store shopping – and to switch between 
stores on a category-by-category basis – with relative ease. As shown in this dissertation, such 
behavior strongly shapes retailers‟ sales. While the same phenomena are likely to apply to 
other markets as well (e.g. in the US, while stores are less clustered, consumers are more 
mobile), a replication in other countries would shed further light on the generalizability of our 
results.  
 Furthermore, even though the Dutch market is highly competitive, and relatively 
sophisticated in nature, it lacks the presence of two retailing formats that are important 
elsewhere: the “large-discounter” (e.g. Wal-Mart) and the “hypermarket” (e.g. Carrefour). In 
addition, the online grocery channel is still in its infancy – only market leader Albert Heijn 
has a large-scale online division, and the share of Dutch consumers who shop online for 
groceries on a structural basis (i.c. each month) amounts to less than 2% (EFMI and CBL 
2010). This is in stark contrast with the UK, for example, where the three top retailers all 
operate a full-fledged online channel next to their “brick-and-mortar” stores (Twinkle 
Magazine 2012). All of these formats and/or channels likely compete with hard-discounters in 
different ways, and give rise to a greater range of shopping patterns consumers can engage in. 
Again, this encourages researchers to incorporate other countries in their studies as well, in 
order to gain a broader insight into the possible implications of hard-discounters and 
(multiple-store) shopping patterns.  
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Current and future developments. It should be emphasized that this dissertation, and 
the data that were used for its development, provide a “snapshot” of the current state of 
grocery retailing. However, the “wheel of retailing” is constantly in motion, with retailers 
continuously making adjustments to their positioning, communication strategies and/or 
marketing mix. For instance, while hard-discounters initially entered the market as “no-
nonsense” price-fighters, they nowadays also target more affluent (and quality-conscious) 
consumers, for example by stocking national brands and/or adding specialized sections (e.g. 
for fresh produce or bakery) to their stores (Foodmagazine 2012; Ter Braak 2012). This 
makes them increasingly similar in positioning to the traditional retailers with which they 
compete. To illustrate, some business executives even already classify Lidl as a “service 
supermarket” (Foodmagazine 2012). 
Another example lies in the private label programs that are employed by retailers. 
While chapter 3 shows that economy private labels do not help traditional retailers defend 
against hard-discounters in every category, it also indicates that they tend to become more 
effective as their rollout proceeds. Given that many retailers nowadays have introduced their 
economy private label in the main majority of categories, it may be interesting to re-evaluate 
the defensive ability of these products. In addition, retailers have added new types of private 
labels to their assortments as well. Traditional retailers, like the UK-based Tesco, have started 
to sell “discount brands” – private labels that match hard-discounter products in terms of both 
price and quality. Meanwhile, the hard-discounters themselves have introduced “premium” 
private labels into their assortment, such as Aldi with its “Prestige” brand (FoodPersonality 
2012). Again, this development increases the similarities between both formats even further. 
Not only the retailers themselves are changing, though – their customers evolve as 
well. For example, not only has the number of consumers that are receptive of hard-
discounters grown (Steenkamp and Kumar 2009), these same consumers – gaining trust in the 
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hard-discounter‟s offer over the years – may also have become more willing to assign a 
greater role to hard-discounters in their shopping patterns (buying an increasingly large part 
of their basket at the format). This would explain why hard-discounters‟ initially grow at a 
slow pace, but then gain considerable momentum over the years (Silverstein and Roche 
2006). Future studies may further investigate this topic, and thereby gain more insight into 
what categories consumers use to “sample” the hard-discounter, and whether consumers‟ 
quality impressions can “spill over” to other categories as well. 
Finally, the market environment in which retailers and their customers meet is also 
unlikely to remain in its present-day state. Several business resources report that the current 
economic downturn – and its detrimental effect on consumers and businesses alike – is slowly 
fading away (Distrifood 2012; EFMI and CBL 2010). This raises the question of whether the 
trends of hard-discounter patronage and multiple-store shopping will continue to hold in the 
near future. On one hand, consumers may again become more lenient in setting their grocery 
budgets – reducing the need for “smart shopping”. On the other hand, as Lamey et al. (2007) 
show in the context of private labels, consumers may also choose to persist in such price-
conscious behavior – even when the “bad economic times are long over”. These are 
interesting issues for future research to address.  
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Appendix 1   Shopping Pattern Choice and Spending Share Model 
In each month, households' shopping decisions involve four interrelated choices, 
which we model in a nested fashion.  
Single- versus multiple-store shopping 
Each month, households are assumed to make a decision on whether to purchase their 
groceries exclusively within a single chain, or to visit multiple chains. Assuming that 
















































)(MSSPht  is the probability that household h visits multiple stores in month t. 
h
tW  represents 
systematic utility, while h
Mt and 
h
St  are Gumbel-distributed errors. tMonth  is a trend variable 
controlling for evolutions in multiple-store shopping behavior independent of local market 
characteristics. )(MSSIV ht  and )(SSSIV
h
t  are inclusive values (to be specified below), 
reflecting the expected maximum utility from the multiple- and single-store shopping 
patterns, respectively, in which household h can engage in month t.  
Shopping Organization: Separate-trip versus combined-trip shopping 
Households that patronize multiple stores must decide whether to organize their trips 





















































)|( MSSCMBPht  is the conditional probability that household h, given that it visits multiple 
stores, visits them on combined trips; htV  is a systematic utility component and 
h
Ct  and 
h
St  
are Gumbel-distributed errors. tMonth , again, controls for any exogenous trends in combined-
trip shopping behavior, and )(CMBIV ht  and )(SEPIV
h
t  are inclusive values (to be further 
specified), reflecting the expected maximum utility from combined- and separate-trip 
patterns, respectively. The denominator of [A.2] is used to specify the inclusive value of MSS 
in [A.1]: )ln()ln()(












Store (set) Choice 
A household‟s decision on which store or set of stores to select is captured by a 
multinomial logit model. For each individual store, the probability that this store is selected 


































t    
)|( SSSrPht  is the conditional probability that household h patronizes store r in month t, given 
that it visits only one store that month, while )(rU
h
t  and )(r
h
t  are again the systematic and 
(Gumbel-distributed) random utility components. Store selection is a function of three types 
of utility: (i) in-store utility ( )(rinstU h ): benefits obtained from the physical environment or 
customer service in the store, (ii) basket utility ( )(rbsktU
h
t ): benefits and costs of purchasing 
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one's basket (shopping list) of groceries at the store, and (iii) travel (dis)utility ( )(rtrvlU h ): 
transportation costs involved in visiting the store (for the drivers of these utility components: 
see Tables 2.1 and 2.3 in the main text). The number of stores included in the denominator of 
[A.3a], h
tK , reflects a household‟s consideration set. The log of the denominator of [A.3a] 















Store set selection. Households can also choose to visit a set of stores. Consistent with 
Gijsbrechts et al. (2008), we restrict the maximum number of stores within a set to two. As 
such, a household‟s choice between all available store sets (given that the household engages 
































)|,( CMBsrPht  is the conditional probability that household h, in month t, engages in a 
shopping pattern that comprises stores r and s, visited on combined trips. The total utility of 




t  , where 
)|,( CMBsrU ht  is the systematic part of utility (composed of the in-store, basket and travel 
utilities associated with combined trips to stores r and s), and )|,( CMBsr
h
t  is a Gumbel-
distributed error component, with location parameter zero and scale parameter 1/ξ. We further 





















t CMBlkU   (Ben-Akiva and 





t   , both of which are Gumbel-distributed, 
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then follows a logistic distribution, with corresponding cumulative density function (Zhang 



























For the choice of a set of stores, visited on separate trips, the same expressions apply (except 
that CMB is now replaced by SEP in the above equations).  
Spending share 
The derivations for the spending share model, and its correlation with the store-set 
choice component, closely follow those developed by Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004). 
Given that household h, in month t, engages in a combined-trip pattern involving stores r and 


























































and where )),,(|( CMBsrrht  follows a logistic distribution with location parameter zero and 














Similar to Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004), we now introduce the correlation between the 



























where χ is a parameter between -1 and 1. Then, as shown by Zhang and Krishnamurthi 
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(2004), the probability that store set (r,s) is selected and that a portion )),,(|( CMBsrrmht  of 








































































































































Similar derivations lead to an equivalent expression (but with SEP replacing CMB, and 
parameters 1, 2 and 3 replacing 1, 2 and 3) for the simultaneous probability of choosing 
set (r,s) and spending a share )),,(|( SEPsrrmht  at store r, given a separate-trip pattern. 
Estimation 
To estimate the model, using a latent class approach to capture random household 
heterogeneity, we maximize the following log-likelihood function: 







































































































 is the size of household-segment g, and the y‟s are indicator variables reflecting the 
household‟s actual choice. Like Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004), we set the scale parameter 
  equal to 1 for stability. 
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Appendix 2   Estimation of Category-Specific Price and Assortment Sensitivities 
Both our shopping list attraction and inter-store complementarity measures are based 
on the stores‟ category-by-category attractiveness ( ),( rcAttrt ). These attractions are, in turn, 
specified as a function of the stores‟ category price, assortment size and PL share in the 
category. Estimating the effects of these variables simultaneously with the shopping pattern 
choice parameters would make the model exceedingly complex. Hence, to obtain the 
parameters associated with these variables, we adopt a two-step approach similar to Bell and 
Lattin (1998). First, we use category-, chain- and household-specific data to obtain an overall 
indication of price, assortment and private label responsiveness by product category, across 
households and chains. Based on these category-specific parameters, we then calculate the list 
attractions and complementarities for each store (pair). Though we use the same sample to 
estimate the category responsiveness parameters on the one hand, and the parameters of the 
shopping pattern choice- and spending model on the other, there is no concern about 
endogeneity. The reason is that (i) the parameters cA, , cP ,  and cPL ,  capture category 
responsiveness to assortment size, price and private label presence in general – such that 
household, chain and shopping pattern effects are averaged out, and (ii) these parameters 
serve to calculate basket attractions and store complementarities across all categories, which 
are inputs to a model with (chain- and) consumer-specific parameters (see Bell and Lattin 
1998; Campo, Gijsbrechts and Nisol 2003 and Fox et al. 2004 for similar arguments).  
The model used to assess the category-responsiveness parameters of interest, cA, , cP ,  and 





















































We operationalize ),( rcVolShareht  as the share of household h‟s total purchase volume in 
category c within month t, that is bought in store r. htZ  and 
h
t  are the systematic and random 
components of utility, respectively. To make the effects of assortment size, price and PL share 
comparable within categories, we standardize ),( rcAssort t , ),( rcPricet  and ),( rcPLsharet
across chains and time. Finally, we include stores‟ selling surface and distance from the 
household as control variables. 
The estimation results are summarized in Table A.1. The majority of the estimated 
coefficients is significant and has the expected sign. Using these estimates, we compute 
predicted differences in category attractiveness between HDs and traditional stores. The 
average differences are reported in Table A.2. The results are in line with expectations on the 
type of categories where HDs are typically strong (i.e. provide an important value advantage) 
or weak (quality advantage of traditional stores). 
TABLE A.1 




Price level  
coefficient (P,c) 
% Store brands 
coefficient (PL,c)  
Number of positive  
(significant positive) effects 42 (37)  6 (5)  11 (10)  
Number of negative 
(significant negative) effects 10 (8)  46 (41)  41 (39)  
Mean coefficient across categories .161 -.263 -.610 






















[TC – HD] Sign test 
Strong in traditional chains Weak in traditional chains 
Baking products
 
.959 14 Chocolate products
 
-.485 14 
Sauces .822 14 Cheese -.478 12 





 .666 14 Eggs
 
-.410 14 
Diet products .615 14 Sugar -.397 14 
Perfumes .575 14 Fish -.352 12 
Vinegars
 
.550 14 Paper towels -.282 13 
Ketchups & mayonaise .549 14 Sandwich fillings -.266 10 
All-purpose cleaners .531 14 Cosmetics: skin -.261 14 
Hot drinks .474 12 Dishwashing products -.250 11 
Air fresheners
 
.423 8 Pickles -.211 10 
Pet food .402 14 Milk substitutes -.189 9 
Potatoes .379 14 Soft drinks -.183 14 
Cosmetics: hair .370 11 Milk & yoghurt drinks -.178 14 
Spices .360 12 Salads -.162 13 
Rice & pasta .356 14 Salty snacks
 
-.134 10 





.286 9 Laundry detergents -.123 8 
Meals .275 12 Cold cuts -.105 10 
Beers .199 14 Biscuits -.082 10 
Soup .193 14 Dairy products -.039 7 
Bread
 
.188 14 Alcoholic drinks (non-beer) -.037 6 
Vegetables .140 14 Sweets -.025 8 
Fruit .115 13 Bakery products -.012 4 
Butter .071 6 Pastry -.007 9 
Ice cream .006 4    
Bread substitutes .002 5    
a 
Attraction differences are computed as the category‟s mean attraction across traditional chains and time, minus 
the category‟s mean attraction across hard-discounters and time. 
b 
Number of hard-discounter/traditional supermarket-pairs (out of 14) for which a sign test supports the 
hypothesized direction of the difference in the chains‟ attractions (=.05). For example, for hot drinks, a sign test 
supports that the traditional supermarket has higher attraction in the category (than the hard-discounter) for 12 







Appendix 3   Marginal Effects and Elasticities 
Notation 
The parameters are the same as in the main text:  is the inclusive value parameter at 
model layer A (single- versus multiple-store shopping),  is the inclusive value parameter at 
model layer B (separate versus combined shopping), 3 and 4 are the list-attraction and 
distance parameter, respectively, and  and  are the complementarity parameters for separate 
and combined trips. Moreover, a “|” in the probability points to conditionality, and a “,” to 
simultaneity. For instance, ),,,( MSSCMBsrPht  would be the probability that store set r and s 











t  . 
Or, as another example, )|( CMBrPht  is the probability that the consumer visits store r (that 
is, selects a store set involving r), given that he engages in combined shopping. This would be 
the sum of probabilities )|,( CMBlrP
h
t  across all stores l other than r.  
Impact of marginal utility changes 
As a starting point, we derive expressions for the change in patronage probability of a 
store r, resulting from a marginal change in the systematic utility components, that is: (i) the 
utility of store r in a SSS pattern ( )(rU
h
t ), (ii) the utility of store r in a combined-trip MSS 
pattern together with store s ( )|,( CMBsrU ht ), and (iii) the utility of store r in a separate-trip 
MSS pattern together with store s ( )|,( SEPsrU
h
t ). After some tedious derivations (details 
can be obtained from the authors), the following expressions for the marginal effects are 
obtained. 











































The first term on the right hand side gives the patronage change in single-store shopping, 
where the expression in squared brackets would typically be positive. The second term gives 
the change in patronage of r in multiple-store shopping patterns, this effect is clearly negative. 
The total impact on the patronage probability of store r can be simply re-written as: 



































Impact of marginal increase in )|,( CMBsrU ht  on )(rP
h
t : 
This effect comprises four components. The first component is the change (=increase) in the 
choice probability of r in a combined pattern together with s: 
[A.10a]  




































The second component is the change in single-store patronage for r: 























The fourth component is the change in patronage in combined-store shopping for r in a set 





























While the first component is expected to be positive, the other components are typically 































































Impact of marginal increase in )|,( SEPsrU ht  on )(rP
h
t : 
This effect, again, comprises four components, similar to the ones above. The change in 
single-store patronage for r is now given by: 






t   




























































Expressions [A.9b], [A.10e] and [A.11b] show that the impact of a utility change depends on 
(i) the probability of patronage of store r, conditional on a specific organization of the MSS 
shopping pattern ( )|( SEPrPht  and )|( CMBrP
h
t ); (ii) the probability of patronage of store r, 
conditional only on whether the consumer selects a single- or a multiple-store shopping 
pattern ( )|( SSSrP
h
t  and )|( MSSrP
h
t ); and (iii) the unconditional patronage probability of 
store r ( )(rPht ). In Table 2.7 of the main text, elasticities are calculated for the average level 
of these probabilities for the considered incumbent, across the entire data set.   
Marginal Effect of Specific Explanatory Variables 
For illustrative purposes, we derive the marginal effects for three variables: the 
distance between two stores r and s, the complementarity of stores r and s, and the list 
attraction of store r. Below, we derive the ceteris-paribus impact of a marginal change in 
these variables, on the patronage probability of store r. We then comment on how changes in 
specific marketing-mix instruments within a category, can be calculated through. 
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Impact of a change in distance between stores r and s on patronage of r (ceteris paribus). The 
distance between stores r and s only intervenes in the utility of the store set (r,s) in a 
combined pattern. Hence, the distance impact on the total patronage probability for store r can 











































































Using expression [A.10a] above, we further observe that the probability of a combined 
shopping pattern involving store r and s will change by: 
































































– a change that is clearly negative for negative values of the distance parameter. 
These expressions reveal that for a given household, any decrease in the distance between 
stores r and s (that will not affect the distance between the consumer‟s home and each of the 
stores, ceteris paribus) will (i) enhance the probability of combined shopping for that store 
pair but, at the same time, reduce store r‟s single-store shopping propensity (and its 
propensity to be chosen on separate trips, or combined trips along with other stores).  
Impact of a change in complementarity between stores r and s (ceteris paribus). This 
complementarity intervenes both in the separate and combined utility components of store set 

















































































































































































































The probability that store r and s will be the consumer‟s chosen set, in either a separate or 
combined pattern, changes by: 
   
 
 

































































































































































The expression shows that this change is always positive. 
Taken together, we find that ceteris paribus, an increase in store complementarity between 
store r and s will enhance the MSS patronage of r (and, especially, its propensity to be chosen 
along with store s, in either a separate or combined pattern), but will reduce the probability 
that it is selected as a single store. 
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Impact of a change in store r’s list attraction. The shopping list attraction intervenes in the 
single-store shopping utility, as well as in all MSS utilities involving store r. Hence, its total 





















































































































, and the other components can be obtained from 
[A.9b], [A.10e] and [A.11b] above, after replacing s by l. Note that the impact of a change in 
list attraction, even ceteris paribus (that is, even if that change in list attraction does not, in 
itself, affect complementarity), will depend on the store r‟s complementarity with other 
stores. Moreover, increasing the store‟s list attraction may enhance or reduce SSS at the store, 
depending on the net effect of the different components in the expression. 

















– an expression that does not contain any complementarity component.  
Impact of a change in store r’s marketing mix within a product category. Based on the above, 
it is easy to see that a change in a marketing instrument ),( rcX t  of store r within a specific 
category (e.g. a change in list price, assortment size or private label share), on the store‟s visit 


























































The expressions above refer to marginal effects. Elasticity expressions are easily 
obtained by multiplying these marginal effects by the variable that is changed (i.e. inter-store 
distance, complementarity or list attraction), and dividing it by the probability of interest.  
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Appendix 4   Survey Items for the Measurement of Category Factors 
 To obtain the category factors “hedonic (versus functional) product”, “visibility of 
consumption” and “quality variability”, three experts rated each of the 48 categories in our 
dataset on each of these three characteristics. For this purpose, the following survey items 
were used: 
Hedonic (versus functional) product. “How would you rate the nature of this product 
category? (1: definitely functional; 5: definitely hedonic)” (Leclerc, Schmitt and Dubé 1994) 
Visibility of consumption. “The possession and usage of this product category is visible to 
people other than my immediate family or housemates. (1: strongly disagree; 5: strongly 
agree)” (DelVecchio 2001) 
Quality variability. “In this product category, there are big differences in quality between the 
various brands. (1: strongly disagree; 5: strongly agree)” (Steenkamp et al. 2004) 
